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ABSTRACT
One of the biggest issues facing the Church at the beginning of the twenty-first
century is its encounter with Islam. This thesis will argue that the theology of Karl
Barth can be used as a resource for Christian inter-religious encounter in a European
context with the other Abrahamic faiths, in particular Islam. An analysis of his work
suggests that it defies the stereotypical typology of exclusivism, inclusivism and
pluralism.
This thesis will demonstrate that Barth's theology of Israel is central to his
understanding of Islam. While there is residual anti-semitism and negative
stereotyping of both Judaism and Islam in the Barthian corpus there are also
resources available here to compensate for this. One resource can be found in
Barth's discussion in §69.2 entitled "The Light of Life". Here Barth's work offers
the potential for allowing for the possibility of discerning God's presence in the other
Abrahamic faiths. It thus provides the potential of acknowledging what those
religions can teach Christians about Christianity.
This thesis will also examine the section at the end of §69.2, commonly
termed "Creation and its lights", revealing that the argument within which it is set
parallels that which is associated with Barth's application of the just state as a
parable (analogy) of the Kingdom of God. The just state is a state which strives for
the common good for both Christians and non-Christians.
One place where inter-religious encounter can come to concrete expression is
within the public arena. This thesis will argue that a case can be made on the basis of
Barth's theology for promoting a democratic society which respects freedom and
difference - this is argued on Christian grounds. This argument can be extended to
accommodate religious pluralism. Other faith groups can contribute to a just society
and interact in ways which are theologically fruitful for the Church's own life. The
final chapter of this thesis will illustrate this point by investigating what an encounter
between the Church, as Barth conceives it, and the Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan
might look like. Ramadan's work illustrates that there is also a basis in Islam for
vi
open, pluralistic societies dedicated to democratic ideals. The Church can make
common cause with Ramadan on the topical subjects of gender equality, socio¬
economic policies and the war against terrorism. But the Church can also learn about
its own faith from this encounter. Ramadan's work comes to the Church as a
"secular" parable of God's kingdom, calling the Church to renewed humility,
repentance and revision of doctrine.
vii
INTRODUCTION
Daniel Migliore, in his Gunning Lecture of March 6th 2007 at the University of
Edinburgh, rightly argues that the new encounter between Christianity and Islam is
"the greatest religious issue of the twenty-first century".1 While these two world
faiths have co-existed in tension for almost 1400 years, there is added urgency today
to their encounter with one another. It is an encounter that is taking place worldwide.
It is no longer the case that Christians and Muslims live in separate countries
thousands of miles apart:
Today the Muslim world population is estimated to have reached
almost one billion, one-fifth of humanity. Islam occupies the centre
of the world. It stretches like a broad belt across the globe from the
Atlantic to the Pacific, encircling both the 'haves' of the consumer
North and the 'have-nots' of the disadvantaged South. It sits at the
crossroads of America, Western Europe and Russia on one side and
black Africa, India and East Asia on the other. Historically, Islam is
also at the crossroads, destined to play a world role in politics and
to become the most prominent world religion in the next century.2
Migliore correctly highlights in his Gunning lecture that, even beyond
demographics, current events have catapulted Christianity and Islam into a new,
complex, and highly-charged encounter. The terrorist attacks on the New York
Trade Center and the Pentagon on "9/11", the subsequent wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the suicide bombings in London on "7/7", Madrid, and other cities, the
continuing Palestinian-Israeli conflict: these and other events virtually guarantee that
Christian-Muslim relationships will be burdened and stretched by unrelieved
suspicion and most likely deep hostility for many years to come.3
' See Daniel Migliore, "The Different Power ofGod: the Witness ofChristianity and Islam", Gunning
Lecture delivered in Martin Hall, New College, University of Edinburgh, 6th March 2007.
2 Gerhard Bowering, "Christianity - Challenged by Islam", in Islam: a challengefor Christianity, ed.
Hans Kiing and Jiirgen Moltmann (London: SCM and Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1994), 114.
Specifically, Peter Mandaville contends that Islam has, over the past two decades, become
exceedingly prevalent in Europe. Estimates of Muslims living in Europe range generally "between 9
and 15 million" thus constituting the largest religious minority group on the continent. See Peter
Mandaville, "Towards a critical Islam: European Muslims and the changing boundaries of
transnational religious discourse", in Muslim Networks and Transnational Communities in and across
Europe, ed. S. Allievi & J. Nielsen (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 127, 129.
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Migliore, "The Different Power of God: the Witness of Christianity and Islam".
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Adding to the problem, Migliore contends, is the lack of preparation that the
Christian Church and Christian theology bring to this new and complex engagement
with Islam.4 The Church lacks even a working consensus about what the goals of the
Christian community and Christian theology should be in this encounter, let alone
what are the best means to achieve these goals.5
This thesis will argue that in this context the theology of Karl Barth has
something to contribute to the encounter with Islam. Barth's theology has often been
overlooked with respect to inter-religious encounter. Barth himself never really
deals with the issue. This is perhaps partly why he has also been blamed for the
virtual moratorium on inter-faith encounter between the publication of Hendrich
Kraemer's The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World (1938)6 and the
beginning of Vatican II in 1962. In tandem with this perception of Barth, pluralist
theologians, such as John Hick and Paul Knitter, argue that fruitful inter-faith
encounter necessitates a revision of traditional Christology, and in particular a
departure from Christian claims that salvation comes through Christ alone.7
4
Migliore, "The Different Power ofGod: the Witness of Christianity and Islam".
5 Ibid. From a Eurocentric position Hinrich Stoevesandt gives a possible reason for this situation: He
contends that traditionally the Church in the West has viewed any encounter with non-Christian
religions as an exotic exercise on the edge of academic credibility. However, the situation in Europe
in which the Church finds itself today is one akin to the situation of the early Church during the
Roman Empire: the only other time in its history that the Church has had to exist as a minority in close
proximity to other religions in Europe. Stoevesandt highlights the fact that all religions were tolerated
in the pantheon of the Roman Empire: all these religions were diverse but had a commonality in being
coerced to give allegiance to the "official emperor cult of the state". The only two religions which
found this type of pluralism incompatible with their belief systems were Christianity and Judaism.
See Hinrich Stoevesandt, "Wehrlose Wahrheit: Die Christus bekennende Kirche inmitten der Vielfalt
der Religionen", Zeitschriftfur Theologie unci Kirche, 102 Jahrgang, Heft 2 (Juni 2005), 206. In
many respects one can draw an analogy from the early Church experience to the religious pluralism of
contemporary Europe, a pluralism existing within the secularism of the modern European state - an
anology that Stoevesandt's argument seems to suggest. But this thesis will attempt to argue that the
Church's existence and cooperation with other religions in this context is not founded on necessarily
idolising secularism. Rather it should be founded, as Eberhard Jiingel believes, on understanding
secularism as a 'child' ofChristianity with pluralism being a necessary outworking of this
relationship, where Christianity acts as a 'pointer' to secular society of the future they share in
common (See Eberhard Jiingel, "The Gospel and the Protestant Churches of Europe: Christian
Responsibility for Europe from a Protestant Perspective", Religion, State and Society, 21.2 (1993),
142).
6 Hendrich Kraemer, The Christian Message in a non-Christian World (London: Edinburgh House
Press, 1938).
7 See for instance John Hick and Paul Knitter, eds., The Myth ofChristian Uniqueness: Toward a
Pluralistic Theology ofReligions (Maryknoll: Orbis Books and London: SCM, 1987).
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Indeed, pluralist theologians claim distinct advantages for their approaches to
the reality of religious pluralism. They claim that they allow for the reception of new
truth from outside the walls of any given religious community, while also claiming to
provide conceptual frameworks across confessional boundaries, i.e., for public
theologies. They normatively contend that there is more than one true religion,
where each religion shares a common core, or end. S. Mark Heim identifies this end
as salvation: "a single process that takes place within all major religious traditions,
though not normatively understood or described in any of them". He is correct to
point out that "the largely undefended assumption that there can be only one
religious end is a crucial constitutive element of 'pluralistic' theologies".9 However,
as Geoff Thompson argues, contra the pluralist position, there is in fact a
"heterogeneity of the goals of the world's religions" and any extension of the
Christian doctrine of salvation to other religions is therefore problematic.10 This is
because, J. A. DiNoia argues, different religious communities may proclaim
deliverance or escape from the present human condition, but "they differ profoundly
in their descriptions of the nature of that condition, the higher state of being to be
sought, and of the appropriate means to achieve it".11
Hence, this thesis asks a question normally answered by "pluralist
theologians" and does so with reference to an unexpected source: How can one turn
to Karl Barth as a resource for constructing a theology which affirms truth outside
the Church and which thus lays the groundwork for making common cause with
Muslims?
To many, this might appear to be counter-intuitive, and a highly problematic
question. For example, Attaullah Siddiqui writes:
The Church Dogmatics of Karl Barth (1886-1968) do not provide any
opportunity for a fair hearing for the Prophet of Islam. The Prophet's
message and monotheism, Barth believes, is "no different than
8 S. Mark Heim, "Salvations: A More Pluralistic Hypothesis", Modern Theology, 10 (October 1994),
341.
9 Ibid.
10 Geoff Thompson, "Religious Diversity, Christian Doctrine and Karl Barth", International Journal
ofSystematic Theology, 8.1 (January 2006), 3-4.
1' J.A. DiNoia, The Diversity ofReligions: A Christian Perspective (Washington: Catholic University
of America Press, 1992), 40-1.
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'paganism,' " a paganism all the more dangerous because Islam was
able to instill in its followers the "esoteric essence" which Barth
equates with monotheism. In relation to Islam, Barth was a theologian
preoccupied with history, locked in the past, resisting the future.12
Certainly, Barth would have to reject most "pluralist theologies" because, "by
definition, they posit other sources and norms of revelation outside or alongside
1 ^
Jesus Christ". Barth explicitly states that "[a]s there can be no other sons of God,
so there can be no other lords nor witnesses to the truth apart from or side by side
with Jesus Christ".14 This Christocentric exclusivism leads to the often-heard
complaints against Barth's view of other religions: that his is an extreme version of
the claim that there is no salvation outwith the Church.15 These complaints are based
on a misreading of Barth. That Barth leans towards some form of universalism is no
secret: a large segment of evangelical Christianity has long opposed Barth's
Christology not only for its refusal to make a distinction between the ontic realization
of reconciliation and its noetic appropriation16 but also because it appears to lead him
down the road to universalism.17 Just how Barth's work might be argued to be
universalist or otherwise is not the focus of this thesis. What is at issue here is
whether or not, as "an exclusivist in terms of his assessment of revelation", Barth can
offer an account of truth outside the Church and thus positive theological grounds for
i o
making common cause with Muslims.
12 Ataullah Siddiqui, "Islam and Christian Theology", in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to
Christian Theology since 1918, third edn., ed. David Ford with Rachel Muers (Oxford: Blackwell,
2005), 666. This opinion might reflect the general lack of interest in this area. However some do
attempt to suggest that Barth might be a resource for an encounter with Islam: see for example
Michael Bource, "Een uitlating van Barth over de islam", In de waagschaal, 30 (2001), 495-6, At
Polhuis, "De overhead als weldaad", In de waagschaal, 34 (2005), 176-8 and Werner Schatz, "Karl
Barth und der Islam", Reformierte Presse, 35 (2005), 8-9.
13
George Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape ofHis Theology (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1991), 246.
14 CD IV/3.1, 93.
15 Paul O. Ingram, "The Christain Encounter with Non-Christian Religious Ways: A New Possibility",
in Tradition as Openness to the Future, ed. Fred O. Francis and Raymond Paul Wallace (Lanham,
MD: University Press of America, 1984), 107.
16 J. Leland Mebust, "Barth on Mission", Dialog, 20 (Winter 1981), 19.
17 Donald W. Dayton, "Karl Barth and the Wider Ecumenism", in Christianity and the Wider
Ecumenism, ed. Peter C. Phan (New York: Paragon House, 1990), 182.
18 Tim Bradshaw, "Grace and Mercy: Protestant Approaches to Religious Pluralism", in One God,
One Lord in a World ofReligious Pluralism, ed. Andrew Clarke and Bruce W. Winter (Cambridge:
Tyndale House, 1991), 174.
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This thesis argues that Karl Barth can offer resources for such an account.
Chapter 1 demonstrates that the charge that Barth's position, with regard to non-
Christian religions, falls simply at the exclusivist end of a spectrum which classifies
positions within the specialty of theology ofreligions cannot be sustained. There is a
radical inclusivity to Barth's christological and revelational exclusivity which
indicates solidarity and concern for the other, the stranger. This insight provides a
basis on which to build a constructive proposal for an encounter with religious others
- in particular Muslims.
It is a well known fact, however, that Barth's theology does not give
particular attention to the religions of the world. When he does speak of them, he
usually does so in the context of his examination of the understanding of "religion"
as he perceives it from within Christianity. With this in mind, Chapter 2 investigates
Barth's understanding of Islam historically, politically and theologically. Central to
his understanding of Islam is his theology of Israel. While Barth recognises the
interdependency of Church and Synagogue, he associates rabbinic Judaism too
closely with biblical Judaism thus eclipsing the distinctiveness of rabbinical Judaism.
Rabbinic Judaism needs to be addressed on its own terms. By the same token, Islam
should also be addressed on its own terms and not as any kind of derivation of
rabbinic Judaism. The mutual dependency argued for between Church and
Synagogue should also be extended to include Mosque.
While there is negative stereotyping of both Judaism and Islam in the
Barthian corpus there are resources available within the same corpus to overcome
this difficulty and to recognise the aforementioned dependency. One such resource
is provided by Barth's account of extra-ecclesial truth in his Doctrine of
Reconciliation, in particular his discussion in §69.2 entitled "The Light of Life."
Chapter 3 will investigate Barth's concept of "secular words" of the Kingdom,
arguing that here Barth provides the Church with criteria in order to receive words
from other religions by evaluating them and by determining what use the Church is
to make of them. This provides scope for Christian preconceptions concerning the
content of scripture to be challenged, whilst also allowing for the possibility of
discerning God's presence in the other Abrahamic faiths. It also provides an equally
strong commitment to acknowledging the genuine diversity of those religions whilst
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also acknowledging what those religions (in particular Islam) can teach Christians
about Christianity.
While Chapter 4 recognises that Barth never gave clear examples of parables
of the Kingdom, an examination of the few pages at the end of §69.2, commonly
termed "Creation and its lights", reveals that the argument in which they are set
parallels that which is associated with Barth's application of the just state as a
parable (analogy) of the Kingdom. The just state is a state which strives for the
common good of all. The service of the Church to the state is directed towards this.
In striving for the common good Christians can make common cause with non-
Christians because of their mutual dependency upon God. This mutual dependency
parallels the mutual dependency argued for in Chapter 2 between Christians, Jews
and Muslims. In this understanding, there is no reason to suggest that Barth's term
"non-Christians" should not be interpreted to include Jews and Muslims. Within
Barth's paradigm then, Christians, Jews and Muslims should be able to co-operate
with each other and make common cause for the betterment of society.
Near the end of Barth's life he mentioned the desire to devote himself to the
history of world religions. Integral to this plan was the relation between Judaism and
Islam. Chapter 5 argues that the foundation of Barth's inter-religious plan would
have been found within his understanding of God's covenant with Israel and its
fulfilment in Jesus Christ. This chapter will argue that the ontological unity of
Christianity and Israel should be interpreted to include Islam; any inter-religious
enterprise should be fundamentally ethical in nature: incorporating a responsibility
for members of the Abrahamic faiths to struggle for justice, both individually and
corporately, before God. But the Europe of today is inherently more secular and
pluralist that the one of Barth's time. Nevertheless, in tandem with Jeffrey Stout,
Barth's understanding of the just state can be extended to accommodate religious
pluralism. Barth's work implicitly provides an understanding of truth claims which
provides unexpected potential for inter-religious encounter and cooperation. This
potential can be explicated through Geoff Thompson's interpretation of John Cobb's
understanding of pluralism. Thompson's interpretation provides a framework for
using Barth's work for such encounter and co-operation. Barth's theology can
therefore be brought productively into conversation with Islam. The Church can use
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aspects of Barth's theology on an ad hoc basis in seeking to promote common cause
with Muslims on issues of social justice and political action by identifying elements
common to both religious traditions. But this encounter also has the potential to
testify to divine grace in ways that can contribute constructively to the theological
and ethical self-understanding of the Church when aspects of Islam emerge as
secular words of the Kingdom.
Chapter 6 investigates what an encounter between the Church, as conceived
by Barth, and the Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan might look like. Ramadan's work
illustrates that there is a basis in Islam for open, pluralistic societies dedicated to
democratic ideals. The Church can make common cause with Ramadan on the
topical subjects of gender equality, socio-economic policies and the war against
terrorism. But Ramadan's work also comes to the Church as a "secular" parable of
God's kingdom, calling the Church to renewed humility, repentance and revision of
doctrine.
Barth's theology can help Christians relate to Muslims by showing that God's
grace is at work in places it is not expected - beyond the boundaries of the Church.
The Church can be addressed through the presence and voice of the other and the
stranger. In today's context this includes address through the presence and voice of
Islam. This understanding can contribute in some small part to the renewed
encounter of these world faiths at the beginning of the twenty-first century.
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CHAPTER 1
The concept of religion in Barth's early work and a refutation of the charge
that he is solely an exclusivist
Introduction
Karl Barth's view of religion is perhaps the most unpopular aspect of his theology
for Christian theologians engaging in any aspect of inter-religious encounter.
According to D. T. Niles, when he asked Barth how he knew that Hinduism was
unbelief without ever having met a Hindu, Barth's reply was "a priori"} Anecdotes
such as this one as well as Barth's formula "revelation of God as the abolition of
religion" have led many scholars to regard Barth's theology as expressing a dogmatic
and negative attitude toward non-Christian religions. This has helped to stereotype
Barth as the most illustrative representative of an exclusivist attitude towards other
religions.
Alan Race, in Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian
Theology of Religions, develops a tripartite typology in terms of "exclusivism",
"inclusivism" and "pluralism".2 In elaborating this typology Race takes Barth's
thought to represent "[t]he most extreme form of the exclusive theory".3 Similarly
Roman Catholic Paul Knitter, in No Other Name?: A Critical Survey of Christain
Attitudes Toward the World Religions, has taken Barth as his primary example of the
"[c]onservative [ejvangelical" position which emphasizes the "centrality and
uniqueness of Jesus Christ".4 Knitter seeks to overcome this position by his own
proposal of a "[tjheocentric Christology" which he believes is more amenable to
dialogue with other religions.5 Knitter offers a more extended analysis of Barth in
his earlier (1972) doctoral dissertation at Marburg published as Toward A Protestant
Theology ofReligions, a study of the work of the German Protestant theologian Paul
Althaus on this question.6 In this volume Knitter follows Althaus in using Barth and
1 D.T. Niles, "Karl Barth - A Personal Memory", The South East Asia Journal of Theology, 11
(1969), 10-11.
2 Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patters in Christian Theology ofReligions
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1982), 10-105.
3 Ibid., 11.
4 Paul Knitter, No Other Name?: A Critical Survey ofChristain Attitudes Toward the World Religions
(Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985), 80.
5 Ibid., 171.
6 Paul Knitter, Towards a Protestant Theology ofReligions (Marburg: N. G Elwert, 1974).
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Troeltsch to mark out the "Scylla and Charybdis for any Christian theology of
religions".7 Knitter accepts the label of Althaus to describe Bath's position as
"Christomonist" a "narrow, restrictive, exclusive understanding of the reality of
Christ, which bans all extra-Christian reality into the realm of meaninglessness and
o
godlessness".
While the exclusivistic tendencies that follow from Barth's "Christocentrism"
in both the method and content of his theology should not be minimized, the
aforementioned interpretations of Barth are remarkably unsympathetic to his
fundamental intention and fail to grasp some of the countervailing themes in Barth's
work that do provide some basis for greater engagement with non-Christian
religions.
While Barth has some important things to say about other religions and their
adherents, Barth does not undertake to provide a full-blown theology of religions. In
fact, Barth has relatively little to say about particular religions, but a great deal to say
about religion. In his mature theology of religion and the religions in the Church
Dogmatics, Barth is rather less concerned with what Christians should think about
non-Christians than he is with how modern concepts of religion, religious experience
and religious consciousness have influenced what Christians think about being
Christian.
This chapter intends to demonstrate that the charge that Barth's position, with
regard to non-Christian religions, falls simply at the exclusivist end of a spectrum
which classifies positions within the specialty of theology of religions cannot be
sustained. To be sure, Barth's analysis of modern concepts of religion and religious
experience could be deployed in an effective theological critique of pluralist
positions. But, "while Barth is clearly no pluralist, his theology of religion and the




way".9 As Gavin D'Costa states: "Barth . . . overturns these categories by being both
exclusivist, inclusivist, and universalist!"10
Ernst Troeltsch and the school of history of religions
Liberal Protestant theology developed in Germany in the nineteenth century under
the influence of Friedrich Schleiermacher, Albrecht Ritschl, Wilhelm Herrmann and
Adolf von Harnack, to mention only the more prominent among its representatives.
Under this movement could also be classed a certain relativistic conception of
Christianity among religions that was proposed by followers of the school of history
of religions. Perhaps the most important philosopher of this school was Ernst
Troeltsch (1865-1923).
In 1908 Troeltsch, who was then professor of systematic theology at
Heidelberg, wrote an assessment of the theological scene in his native Germany
during the previous half century.11 He found that the "chief characteristic" of that
period was, in his opinion, the "decline of the church's voice in the whole of public
life, above all in the interests and intellectual horizons of educated Germany and
across the whole spectrum of academic work".12 What the Churches were teaching
was no longer a matter of public debate: "Ordinary academic and literary activity
passes them by, and gets on with its own problems and tasks quite independently."13
Church teaching had become mainly personal, subjective and confessional and
attempts were made simply to make these conform with traditional statements of
doctrine.
At the same time, Troeltsch noted, academic theology "has become far more
indifferent to the problems of the church".14 Indeed "the educated and liberal world
perceives with naive astonishment" that the Churches, which it has largely
disregarded, still exercise "some quite considerable political influence", and of a
9 J. A. Di Noia, "Religion and the Religions", in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 245.
10 G. D'Costa, 'Theology of Religions', in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian
Theology since 1918, third edn., ed. David Ford with Rachel Muers (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 630.
11 Ernst Troeltsch, "Half a Century of Theology: A Review", in Ernst Troeltsch: Writings on Theology






strongly conservative character.15 What is disastrous for a culture, Troeltsch argued,
is when it attempts to separate what he called "religious faith" from "scientific
work".16 No, "the different sources of knowledge must somehow coincide and
17 1 &
harmonize". Here "scholars and professors" must lead the way. Such a harmony
becomes possible when it is commonly recognized that the claims of faith have their
meaning and truth not in some supernatural revelation apart from history, but in
relation to the one historical world of which all knowledge is part. Theology is
dependent "upon the general feeling of historical reliability produced by the
impression of scientific research".19
Troeltsch's position involves two basic premises which he contended are
20 fessential to the credibility of any theological work in the modern world. The first is
that what the Church has traditionally called "revelation", and assumed to be
supernatural, is really the natural power immanent in religion. The second premise is
that "human religion exists only in manifold specific religious cults", which are
21relative to the surrounding culture and never unchanging or absolute. Thus the
subject matter of modern dogmatics (contemporary theology) cannot be "simply the
Bible or an ecclestical confession".22 Instead, the whole relativistic cultural
configuration of the Christian religion as it developed in the history of the world
provides the data for theology.
For Troeltsch, if these two premises are accepted - that revelation occurs only
in religion and that religion occurs only in historically relative forms - then theology
faces an acute problem with the traditional claim of the Church that Jesus Christ is
the one and only Lord and Saviour, not only for Christianity, but for the whole
world. Troeltsch's answer to this problem is to say that "with every advance in




IS Ernst Troeltsch, "The Significance of the Historical Existence of Jesus of Faith", in Ernst Troeltsch:
Writings on Theology and Religion, ed. Robert Morgan and Michael Pye (London: Duckworth, 1977),
199.
19 Ibid.
20 See Ernst Troeltsch, "The Dogmatics of the 'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule' ", The American




yet originally independent religious and ethical forces flowing together, that it is
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quite impossible to treat Christian faith as something absolutely separate". Once
one begins to research the syncretistic origins of Christianity in history one is forced
to acknowledge both that "Christianity is by no means the product of Jesus alone"
and that it is impossible to call "the Christian community the eternal absolute centre
of salvation for the whole span of humanity".24 For Christianity to try to remain
christocentric in a world of many "other centricisms" that increasingly intermingle
would be similar to cosmology in the twentieth century trying to remain geocentric.25
The constant in Christianity, Troeltsch concludes, is not Jesus Christ, for
though these words designate the major symbol of the Christian religion, that symbol
is interpreted variously in different times and places. It is by no means certain that
the Christian community and cult will "remain bound to the historical personality of
Jesus".27 The constant in Christianity, and what is essential for it and thus for
theology, is that "the historical Christian religion" contains within itself a
"productive power ... to create new interpretations and new adaptations - a power
which lies deeper than any historical formulation which it may have produced".28
"Thus", Troeltsch writes, "we are thrust back again to history itself and to the
necessity of constructing from this history a religious world of ideas which shall be
9Q
normative for us". The credibility of theology is to be determined by the cultural
synthesis which it constructs to meet the religious needs of the time.
Barth on Religion
Karl Barth was a young Swiss pastor, fresh from training in the best liberal theology
of his day at the universities of Berlin, Tubingen and Marburg when he heard
Troeltsch lecture in 1910. He later wrote that after listening to Troeltsch he had "the
dark foreboding that it had become impossible to advance any farther in the dead-end
30
street where (theologians) were strolling in relative comfort".
23 Troeltsch, "The Significance of the Historical Existence of Jesus for Faith", 189.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Troeltsch, "The Dogmatics of the 'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule' ", 12.
27 Troeltsch, "The Significance of the Historical Existence of Jesus for Faith", 205.
28 Troeltsch, "The Dogmatics of the 'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule' ", 12.
29 Ibid., 10.
30 Karl Barth, Theology and the Church (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 61.
12
"Is it possible", Barth asks "for an historian to do justice to Christianity?"31
Barth rejected, as did Troeltsch, the attempt to separate academic theology from the
life of the Church. But for Barth this rejection first emerges from the context of the
Church, from his efforts as pastor not as professor. And what makes the separation
intolerable for Barth is not that Church teaching fails to understand the historically
relative character of its symbols and constructs. Rather it is that theology at the
universities fails to understand that no human method, historical-critical or
otherwise, no matter how scientific, can uncover or construct God.
This point is illustrated in an essay Barth wrote during the last days he spent
in Marburg as editor of Die Christliche Welt?2 The essay is entitled "Modern
Theology and Work for the Kingdom of God". It was occasioned by a recent
discussion amongst students as to why so few graduates of the more "modern"
theological faculties were applying for foreign missions. Barth's thesis was that
students from the more modern faculties of Marburg and Heidelberg found it
"incomparably more difficult" to make the transition into pastoral activity than it was
-5-5
for students from more conservative places like Halle and Greifswald. The reason
for this was that conservative students, when called upon to testify to their faith, had
at their disposal a whole host of authoritative doctrines which they could with good
conscience set forth as normative statements of faith. The "modern" theological
student had no such normative statements - the reason for this lay in the very nature
of the modern understanding of religious life.
For Barth then, the problem of humanity's relationship to God and the role
religion plays in this became ultimately a struggle for hope. "[W]e are Christians!
Our nation is a Christian nation!" he wrote in 1916; "A wonderful illusion . . . , a
self-deception! We should above all be honest and ask ourselves far more frankly
what we really gain from religion. . . . Are we hoping that something may
happen?"34 Unlike Troeltsch, the young Barth drew closer to the Reformers and to
31 Ibid.
32 Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and
Development, 1909-1936 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 68.
33 Ibid., 69.
•'4 Karl Barth, The Word ofGod and the Word ofMan, trans. Douglas Horton (London: Hodder and
Stoughton Limited, 1928), 20.
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the theology of the crucified Christ.
Barth's theological approach to the topic of religion at this point in his career
is demonstrated in "Modern Theology and Work for the Kingdom of God" where he
addresses, in the characteristic modalities of liberal Protestantism, the "History of
Religions" approach to biblical interpretation.15 However, DiNoia posits that Barth
could hardly be described as having a theory of religion before 1922, since the topic,
'Xft
strictly speaking, was not of his own choosing. During this early period, Barth
speaks to the important role religion plays in the thought of his theological
opponents. It is in the course of arguing against opponents such as Troeltsch that
Barth finds himself drawn into the modern discussion of religion.
The Romans Commentaries
While the 1919 and 1922 editions of Barth's commentary on the Epistle to Romans
mark a decisive shift away from liberal Protestantism, they nonetheless continue to
reflect Barth's concern with what he will eventually call in his mature treatment of
37these issues "The Problem ofReligion in Theology".
In the first edition of Barth's Romerbrief, references to religion "appear
frequently in the text, typically in parallel with morality {Religion und Moral is a
38
constantly recurring phrase), and nearly always in negative contrast to the gospel".
The incapacity of human morality and religiosity to attain salvation echoes Barth's
interest in Ludwig Feuerbach, whom he saw as a support in his assault on nineteenth
century theology.39
35 See McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 68-70.
36 Di Noia, "Religion and the Religions", 245.
37 CD 1/2, 280-97.
38 Garrett Green, "Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl Barth's Theology of Religion", 77te
Journal ofReligion, 75 (October 1995), 475. See also Garrett Green, Karl Barth on Religion: The
Revelation ofGod as the Sublimation ofReligion (London: T & T Clark, 2007), 7. See also Karl
Barth, Der Rdmerbrief (Bern: Bei G. A. Baschlen, 1919; unveranderter Nachdruck der ersten Auflage
von 1919, Zurich: EVZ, 1963).
39 Barth maintained that Feuerbach, since he denied the word "God" and its cognates could be
predicated of anything except man, believed he was following through to their logical conclusion the
philosophical and theological syntheses of Hegel and Schleiermacher respectively. Barth writes: "We
saw that its [theology's] whole problem had become how to make religion, revelation and the
relationship with God something which could also be understood as a necessary predicate ofman . . ..
To Feuerbach at all events the meaning of the question is whether the theologian, when he thus
formulates the problem, is not after all affirming the thing in which the assent of humanity seems to
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According to Garrett Green religion is a favourite but non-technical term in
the first edition of Barth's Romans commentary. In the second edition of 1922 it
becomes a structural element, associated from time to time with the concept of
"law".40 By doing this, Barth affirms that religion, comparable to the law, remains
good, just and holy, though religion can bring forth awareness of sin but not
justification.41
The revised edition of the Romerbriefadditionally bears the marks of Barth's
exposure to existentialist ideas, especially through his reading of Soren
Kierkegaard.42 Here Barth conceives of religion as the limit or frontier of human
existence, where humanity meets "an inexorable and predetermined 'either-or.' "43 It
is not simply that religion exposes the limited quality of human existence; rather,
religion is that limit, it is "the last human possibility".44
Grace however, is not another possibility. Grace is the impossibility
which is possible only in God, and which is unencumbered and
untouched by the final possibility, the ambiguity of religion: The
wages ofsin is death, but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus
Christ our Lord.45
In a similar way to theologians of the nineteenth century, "Barth identifies the
essentially human with the essentially religious. But unlike those theologians, he
characterizes it in dialectical, even contradictory, terms."46 Religion, Barth writes,
culminate . . ., namely man's apotheosis." See Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth
Century: Its Background and History (Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1973), 537.
40
Green, "Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl Barth's Theology ofReligion", 475. (See
also Green, Karl Barth on Religion: The Revelation ofGod as the Sublimation ofReligion, 8).
41 Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans, from the sixth edition by Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London:
Oxford University Press, 1968), 242, 254-5.
42 For Kierkegaard the infinite qualitative difference between God and humanity is due to sin. Barth's
reassertion of this difference puts a halt to any talk of God which proceeds from humanity upwards to
God and hence this difference is a major presupposition of Barth's critique of nineteenth century
theology. While Barth's position is a reformulation of Kierkegaard's, it is also a return to the
Reformation teaching on humanity. See Philip Almond, "Karl Barth and Anthropocentric Theology",
Scottish Journal ofTheology, 31.5 (1978), 439.
43
Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 229.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 231.
46 Green, "Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl Barth's Theology of Religion", 476. (See
also Green, Karl Barth on Religion: The Revelation ofGod as the Sublimation ofReligion, 8-9).
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echoing Marx, is like a skillfully administered drug, and the "well-balanced, mature
man" - the man of law and religion- is essentially godless man: "With acute analysis
Feuerbach has penetrated the truth when he points out that sinful passions are clearly
seen, awakened and set in motion, with the intrusion of the possibility of religion,
and because of it".47 This is a crucial statement of Barth's indebtedness to
Feuerbach's critique of religion, meeting what Barth saw to be the great pretence of
nineteenth century theology.
However, religion is recapitulated in the law. Religious persons, seeing that
the law is not sin but spiritual, realize that it is themselves who are in bondage and
that no form of religion can deliver them from this spiritual condition. The conflict
of Paul's famous "Ego" (Romans 7:14-15) is a confrontation of Friedrich
48Schleiermacher's "apprehension of the absolute - feeling and taste for eternity". /
come to know that "sin dwelleth in me", and that the oneness of God's holiness and
mercy is the problem of my existence. Religious experience bears witness to the fact
that sin is all: "A man at one with himself is a man still unacquainted with the great
problem of his union with God."49
Nowhere however, is the existentialism of the early Barth more evident than
in the close association of religion with death:
Religion, though it come disguised as the most intimate friend ofmen,
be they Greeks or barbarians, is nevertheless the adversary. Religion
is the KRISIS of culture and of barbarism. Apart from God, it is the
most dangerous enemy a man has on this side of the grave. For
religion is the human possibility of remembering that we must die: it
47




Ibid., 266. Barth contends that while Schleiermacher had attempted to give religion a place of its
own separate from ethics and metaphysics, nevertheless what Schleiermacher said of God had its
foundation in the facts of the pious Christian self-consciousness. For Schleiermacher, God was
revealed through humanity's immediate sensuous experience of the aesthetic unity of nature. Barth
does admit that Schleiermacher had tried to give the objective and the historical its due, and in
particular the fact of Jesus Christ. Barth states: "There can be no doubt about the personal sincerity
of this assertion. But it is just this which is in question - whether this assertion can be considered as
objectively valid, whether the strength of this assertion can be some other strength beside that of the
asserting believer himself. . . Schleiermacher does not seem to be able to say that there is an external
significance of Christ, an absoluteness of Christianity." For Barth, there is no ultimate opposition in
the writings of Schleiermacher between God and humanity; no essential distinction between Christ
and the Christian. See Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 471.
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is the place where ... the intolerable question is clearly formulated -
Who then art thou?50
Although Barth will later reject the kind of existential anthropology presented
here so dramatically, nothing he says here about religion is incompatible with his
later views.51
The First Dogmatic Effort52
In the first of a projected series entitled Prolegomena to Christian Dogmatics, begun
in 1927 and later abandoned for a new approach, Barth devotes a section to "Grace
C *3
and Religion" {Die Gnade und die Religion). Against J. G. Fichte's philosophy of
"the experiencing self', Barth "hurled the scandal of Christian preaching, which he
called the 'hazard' of human effort, and an act wholly dependent upon grace.
Likewise, against the school of Schleiermacher, Barth stressed proclamation rather
than 'religious feeling' as the object of theology"54 The core of this dogmatic effort
remains substantially unchanged throughout the later Church Dogmatics:
The basic reality of a possibility of the human soul for religion
consists in the purest sense in the awe before the wholly other, to
whose superiority and help, on the basis of a powerful experience over
against himself, and all that he otherwise knows, man entrusts himself.
This actually as such is not the subjective possibility of revelation, but
the powerful expression of the opposition of man against God with
himself. If there is to be a common interest (Gemeinschaft), with
50 Ibid., 268.
51 Hans Urs von Balthasar maintains that there were two critical turning points in Barth's life: "The
first was the turning from liberalism to Christian radicalism, which occurred during the First World
War and received its expression in The Epistle to the Romans. The second was his final emancipation
from the shackles of philosophy, enabling him finally to arrive at a genuine, self-authenticating
theology." See Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology ofKarl Barth: exposition and response, trans.
Edward T. Oakes S. J. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 93. For a critical response to this work
see McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology.
1 rely here upon Cark F. Starkloff s translation of Barth's Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes:
Prologemena zur christlichen Dogmatik (1927), in his article "Karl Barth on Religion: A Study for
Christians in Mission", Missiology, 6.4 (October 1978), 449-450. Almond contends that Barth's
second turning point occurs in the Prolegomena to Christian Dogmatics, as it is here that he
endeavours to eliminate all the hidden roots of philosophy from theology. See Almond, "Karl Barth
and Anthropocentric Theology", 441.
53 Karl Barth, Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes: Prolegomena zur christlichen Dogmatik (Miinchen: Chr.
Kaiser Verlag, 1927), 310.
54 Starkloff, "Karl Barth on Religion: A Study for Christians in Mission", 449.
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God, then it is not so in itself but through the grace of God, which
grasps it as faith and obedience.55
Barth recognizes Rudolf Otto's study of religion as an a priori of the human
consciousness, and as a human phenomenon he places it alongside politics, science
and art. He turns this phenomenon of awe before the Holy into an assault on liberal
Protestantism - "that 'shameful confession' with its propensity to substitute words
like 'religion' and 'piety' for faith and obedience".56 Barth's progress towards a
definition of religion finally arrives at the words of Goethe: "In our breast there
surges forth a pure aspiration freely and gratefully to devote ourselves to a higher,
purer, unknown, explaining itself by the eternally nameless. This is what we call
piety (Frommsein).'"51 Such a striving is indeed within humanity's capabilities;
humanity can be holy and can have religion. What humanity cannot have in all of
this is a correlative to the Word of God - a claim made for religious experience by
liberal Protestantism. Whereas liberals hold religious experience to be the subjective
possibility of receiving the Word of God, Barth places the possibility solely and
entirely in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit.
Carl Starkloff contends that Barth's warfare in the Prolegomena is against the
effort to tame God, to make God an object among other objects:
The God of Schleiermacher is a product of human religion; He does
not stand personally over against humanity. Religion is thus a
personal power (Eigenmacht) before God, and not the admission of
weakness (Ohnmacht) of Christian faith. God becomes a predicate of
human life and activity. However, Barth adds, religion may be
transformed by the power of grace, and become acceptable as faith
and obedience, where presumed reverence before the Almighty
becomes actual reverence. Religion lived out in obedience can be, not
the service of idols (Gotzendienst) but service of God (Gottesdienst).
In faith, the dialectic becomes analogy (which in turn becomes
dialectic); religious experience under obedience can correspond to the
outpouring of the Holy Spirit.58
55
Barth, Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes: Prolegomena zur christlichen Dogmatik, 301-2 as translated by
Starkloff, "Barth on Religion: A Study for Christians in Mission", 450.
56 Starkloff, "Barth on Religion: A Study for Christians in Mission", 450.
57
Barth, Die Lehre vom Worte Gottes: Prologomena zur christlichen Dogmatik, 305 as translated by
Starkloff, "Barth on Religion: A Study for Christians in Mission", 450.
58 Starkloff, "Barth on Religion: A Study for Christians in Mission", 450.
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§17 of The Church Dogmatics
Volume one of the Church Dogmatics is entitled The Doctrine of the Word of God.
This theological introduction to the Word of God is the context for Barth's most
developed treatment of religion, comprising the entirety of §17.59 The thesis
statement contains Barth's formal theological definition of religion:
The revelation of God in the outpouring of the Holy Spirit is the
judging but also reconciling presence of God in the world of human
religion, that is, in the realm of man's attempts to justify and to
sanctify himself before a capricious and arbitrary picture of God. The
Church is the locus of true religion, so far as through grace it lives
60
grace.
This theological interpretation of religion takes place under the heading
Gottes Offenbarung als Aufhebung der Religion, which the translators of the Church
Dogmatics have rendered "The Revelation of God as the Abolition of Religion". 61
His theory of religion is structured in three "dialectical 'moments' ":62
1. The Problem ofReligion in Theology
2. Religion as Unbelief
3. True Religion.
The Problem ofReligion in Theology
Barth begins his treatment of religion by telling the "sad story"6' of the gradual
emergence of religion as an independently known quantity alongside revelation to
the point where "religion has not to be understood in the light of revelation, but
revelation in the light of religion".64 This modern Christian heresy, which he dubs
59 CD 1/2, 280-361.
60 Ibid, 280.
61 Green argues that "the mistranslation of the crucial term Aufhebung as 'Abolition' has played a
major role in encouraging the caricatures of Barth's theology that have for so long distorted its
reception in the Anglo-Saxon world". He contends that "Barth has borrowed a favourite term of
Hegel's and put it to his own use. He shares with Hegel the conviction that the truth can only be told
by saying both no and yes; and he finds in the unique ambiguity of the verb aufheben a way of
articulating their dialectical interrelationship." Hence Green employs the etymologically equivalent
terms "sublate" and "sublation" for "abolition". See Green, 'Challenging the Religious Studies
Canon: Karl Barth's Theory of Religion', 477.
62 Ibid., 477. See also Green, Religion: The Revelation ofGod as the Sublimation ofReligion, 12.
63 CD 1/2, 290.
64 Ibid., 291.
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"religionism", poses the problem to which the first subsection of § 17 is devoted.65
Revelation, the subject matter of theology, "has at least the aspect and
character of a human phenomenon. It is something which may be grasped
historically and psychologically."66 Because "[w]e can inquire into its nature and
structure and value as we can in the case of all others", this unavoidably leads to the
problem of human religion.67 Green contends that Barth is in agreement here with
the secular theorists of his day, "emphasizing that religion is to be studied
/:o
historically and comparatively". In fact, Barth permits the relativizing of
Christianity among the religions of the world on theological grounds. This is
because religions, for Barth, are "one specific area of human competence, experience
and activity . . . one of the worlds within the world of men".69 They are human
activities, human constructions. In this way so is Christianity:
... we would have to deny revelation as such ifwe tried to deny that
it is also Christianity, that it has this human aspect, that from this
standpoint it can be compared with other human things, that from this
standpoint it is singular but certainly not unique.70
Because revelation assumes the historical and social form of religion,
"theologians run the risk of misconstruing the relationship of revelation and religion,
a risk to which they have in fact succumbed by reversing the proper priority. . . .
The problem is not that modern theology has attributed a religious character to
revelation but rather that it has made religion into the criterion of revelation rather
than the other way around."71 The theological task at hand is therefore to establish
the priority of revelation over religion without denying the religious nature of
revelation. Barth's alternative to Neo-Protestant "religionism"72 is "to recount the
73




68 Green, "Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl Barth's Theology ofReligion", 479. (See
also Green, Karl Barth on Religion: The Revelation ofGod as the Sublimation ofReligion, 13).
69 CD 1/2, 281.
70 Ibid.
71
Green, "Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl Barth's Theology of Religion", 479. (See
also Green, Karl Barth on Religion: The Revelation ofGod as the Sublimation ofReligion, 14).
72 CD 1/2, 291.
73 Ibid., 296.
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Hence, the appropriate analogy for relating religion and revelation is the incarnation
of Christ: "It is because we remember and apply the Christological doctrine of the
assumptio carnis that we speak of revelation as the abolition of religion."74
Religion as Unbelief
Given that religion is an exclusively human effort to know God, Barth argues, it is
nc
"unbelief'. The fallenness of human religion is unbelief, consisting not primarily
in a simple ignorance of God's revelation, but in an active rejection of it through the
proud attempt to make oneself the subject in the divine-human relationship in place
of God:
If man tries to grasp at truth of himself, he tries to grasp at it a priori.
But in that case he does not do what he has to do when the truth comes
to him. He does not believe. If he did, he would listen; but in
religion, he talks. If he did, he would accept a gift; but in religion he
takes something for himself. If he did, he would let God Himself
intercede for God; but in religion he ventures to grasp at God.
Because it is grasping, religion is the contradiction of revelation, the
concentrated expression of human unbelief, i.e., an attitude and
activity which is directly opposed to faith.76
Religion is therefore anthropocentric by definition; whereas revelation is
theocentric. Religion is a human activity; whereas revelation is God's unconditioned
action towards humanity.
Barth's judgment against religion is not in any way an attempt to construe
Christianity as inherently superior to other religions. He refuses to establish a
hierarchy among religions qua human activities - as human, they are all inevitably
unbelief. Insofar as Christianity is a human activity, a human response to God's free





In CD 1/1 Barth asks: "Can this acknowledgment of God's Word be differentiated even from the
phenomenon of what are called 'other religions' with any clear distinctiveness of individuality? To
the degree that it has its reality in this human acknowledgment, does not Christianity undeniably




In Christianity, humans act, but in revelation, God acts. Barth laments that "all this
Christianity of ours, and the details of it, are not as such what they ought to be and
78
pretend to be, a work of faith, and therefore of obedience to the divine revelation".
Christianity, as a human activity, can claim no superiority vis-a-vis other religions on
the basis of any characteristics inherent in it: "... we can speak of 'true' religion
7Q
only in the sense in which we speak of a 'justified sinner' ". While "[n]o religion is
true" it can become true "according to that which it purports to be and for which it is
upheld. And it can become true only in the way in which man is justified, from
without . . . ."80 In a nutshell: "Like justified man, religion is a creature of grace."81
Green correctly believes that this is "the climax to Barth's entire argument of §17,
the linchpin of his theological theory of religion". Barth writes: "There is a true
religion: just as there are justified sinners. Ifwe abide strictly by that analogy ... we
83need have no hesitation in saying that the Christian religion is the true religion."
Unlike the History of Religions School, Barth is not proposing an apologetic
that portrays Christianity as the apex of religion, "the culmination of a historical or
evolutionary process".84 All such apologetics are undialectical because they fail to
apply divine judgment to Christianity. "The religion of revelation is indeed bound
up with the revelation of God", he writes, "but the revelation of God is not bound up
with the religion of revelation."85 Barth makes no claim for "the superiority of
Christianity on historical, philosophical, phenomenological, comparative - or any
other nontheological - grounds".86 The truth of Christian religion comes from the
free grace of God rather than from any qualities inherent in Christianity qua human
activity: "The Christian religion is the true one only as we listen to the divine





Green, "Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl Barth's Theology of Religion", 482. (See
also Green, Karl Barth on Religion: The Revelation ofGod as the Sublimation ofReligion, 20).
83 CD 1/2, 326.
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Green, "Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl Barth's Theology of Religion", 482. (See
also Green, Karl Barth on Religion: The Revelation ofGod as the Sublimation ofReligion, 20).
85 CD 1/2, 329.
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Green, "Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl Barth's Theology of Religion", 482. (See
also Green, Karl Barth on Religion: The Revelation ofGod as the Sublimation ofReligion, 21).
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revelation".87
Revelation is God's offering of free grace. But "grace" is not an abstract
category describing a particular class of events. Barth takes care to insist that "the
Christian-Protestant religion of grace is not the true religion because it is a religion of
grace". If that were the case, he asks, then "why should we not say it of a whole
range of other religions, for which grace in different names and contexts is not a
wholly foreign entity?"88 Barth offers Pure Land Buddhism (Jodo Shinshu) as an
example of another potential "religion of grace" which he calls the "most adequate
and comprehensive and illuminating heathen parallel to Christianity", and
specifically to "Reformed Christianity".89 He concludes that despite their remarkable
parallels to Reformation Christianity, the Yodo-Shin and Yodo-Shin-Shu movements
of twelfth- and thirteenth-century Japan do not qualify theologically as true religions.
Their very similarity to Protestant Christianity makes it all the more evident that
"[o]nly one thing is really decisive for the distinction of truth and error. ... That one
thing is the name of Jesus Christ."90 Jesus Christ is "the reality of the grace itself by
which one religion is adopted and distinguished as the true one before all others",
God's grace made concrete, visible, knowable.91
The name of Jesus Christ, according to Barth, "is the very essence and source
of all reality".92 This axiom applies to Christianity as a religion: one is justified in
speaking of Christianity as the one true religion only insofar as it has its source solely
in Jesus Christ. Christianity becomes the one true religion in "an act of divine
creation".93 Christianity is "taken up" into Jesus Christ. "The Christian religion",
Barth asserts, "is simply the earthly-historical life of the Church and the children of
God." As such it is only an "annexe to the human nature of Jesus Christ".94
Christianity does not occupy a position of superiority on its own merits but is
dependent solely on the free, electing grace of God in Jesus Christ. It is thus "the











sacramental area created by the Holy Spirit, in which the God whose Word became
flesh continues to speak through the sign ofHis revelation".95
An evaluation of the concept of religion in the early work of Barth
From a very early time Barth's theology was identified as a " 'corrective theology'
(Theologie des Korrektivs)".96 While Barth himselfwas disinclined to own this label
there is little doubt that he consciously strove to carry out a corrective role. He
endorsed, for example, the statement of one of Friedrich Schleiermacher's
commentators that Schleiermacher's "achievement as a whole is so great, that the
only threat to it would be a corresponding counter achievement, not a cavilling
Q7
criticism of detail". Barth's polemics against religion and, indeed, his whole
theological approach represent just such a counter achievement. Hence the criticisms
of religion which one encounters in his early writings must be viewed within their
historical context as attempts to counter the nineteenth-century emphasis on religion.
"Religion" in its classic treatment in paragraph 17 of Church Dogmatics is
merely a formal category. It serves as the backdrop against which a positive
understanding of revelation - Barth's primary concern - may be projected. Starkloff
views Barth's critique of religion as "polemic against, not so much the 'non-
Christian religions' as the various anthropocentrisms of writers like Fichte,
Schleiermacher, Hegel, Troeltsch, Ritschl, and finally Tillich, Bultmann and even
Barth's old friend Emil Brunner".98 Barth himself confirms this opinion when he
states in his discussion of religion that "the discussion cannot be understood as a
preliminary polemic against the non-Christian religions, with a view to the ultimate
assertion that the Christian religion is the true religion".99 Barth, unlike many of his
nineteenth-century predecessors, saw the problem of the relationship between
Christianity and the other religions as but one of a number of issues on the agenda of
the theologian with which he personally did not have time to deal. Consequently he
offered no specific theology of religions, developing instead a theology of religion.
This means that any perspective Barth might have on the religions has to be
95 Ibid., 359.
96 Karl Barth, The Word ofGod and The Word ofMan, 103.
97 Karl Barth, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 427, quoting H. Scholz, Christentum
und Wissenschaft in Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre (1911), 201.
98 Starkloff, "Karl Barth on Religion: A study for Christians in Mission", 444.
99 CD 1/2, 326.
24
extrapolated from his understanding of religion as a category as well as his treatment
of other topics. It is possible to assume therefore that the enormity and complexity
of this task accounts for the preponderance of inadequate assessments of Barth on
this matter and the ill-founded charge that Barth represents "the most extreme form
of the exclusivist theory".100
A refutation of the charge that Barth is solely an exclusivist
To be sure, the exclusivist tones of Barth's work cannot be ignored. But because
Christianity is a religion and therefore a human construction, it stands, like all other
religions, under the judgment of God's Word. Any truth present in Christian
proclamation is not due to any inherent qualities on the part of Christians, but solely
to God's free, electing grace in Jesus Christ. The ultimate distinction between
Christianity and the other religions lies emphatically "in the name of Jesus Christ in
whom the Christian religion is created, elected, justified, and sanctified".101 As Tom
Greggs comments:
The ultimate and unshakeable distinction between religions and the
"true religion" can be seen "only in Him, in the name of Jesus Christ,
i.e., in the revelation and reconciliation achieved in Jesus Christ.
Nowhere else, but genuinely so in Him." For Barth, this revelation
and reconciliation are inseparable: reconciliation is the content of
revelation, and revelation the only direct and overt means by which
reconciliation may be known (albeit there may be incognito forms).
Both revelation and reconciliation are identical with the person ("the
name") of Jesus Christ. They are, thus, an event (a history) before
they are a body of ideas. In this event, the Jesus Christ of history who
lived and died for us in the first century CE in Palestine is present and
effectual in the here and now.102
100 Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 11. In an interesting article entitled The Impossibility of
a Pluralist View ofReligions, Gavin D'Costa argues that the logical impossibility of a pluralist view
of religions means that Race's typology of exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism as three approaches
or paradigms regarding Christianity's view of other religions is untenable. He argues that pluralism is
in fact another form of exclusivism as, in its various forms, it holds to exclusivistic criteria. Hence,
the differentiation between the two does not really seem to be an objective distinction "except in so
much as it indicates that usually those called pluralists are exclusivists without knowing it, they are (as
later day inclusivists might say) anonymous exclusivists!" This thesis, in concert with D'Costa's view
of pluralism, accepts only the two paradigms of exclusivism and inclusivism as valid alternatives with
reference to this discussion of Barth's theology in relation to non-Christian religions. See Gavin
D'Costa, "The Impossibility of a Pluralist View ofReligions", Religious Studies, 32 (1996), 223-32.
101 Tom Greggs, "Bringing Barth's critique of religion to the inter-faith table", unpublished paper
(Forthcoming in the Journal ofReligion (January 2008)).
102 Ibid.
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Barth's Christological and revelational exclusivism is, then, in George
Hunsinger's words, "exclusivism without triumphalism".10' But this has to be held
in dialectical tension with Barth's recognition of the inclusive nature of the category
of "religion". The Christian religion is "a species within a genus in which there are
many other species".104 Like all the other species of religion, Christianity stands
under the critique of religion as Unglaube (faithlessness). But because it stands
under this judgment above all others, it cannot engage in heightening its position
through the judgment of revelation over and against them; instead, "it is our business
as Christians to apply this judgment first and most acutely to ourselves: and to others,
the non-Christians, only in so far as we recognise ourselves in them".105 There is the
clear assertion then that the understanding of Christianity as the "true religion" can
never be used "as preliminary polemic against the non-Christian".106 As Greggs
suggests:
Standing most sharply judged under this thesis, the Christian cannot
come to the inter-faith table with any sense of a privileged position,
nor even as an equal, but only as one who is the most guilty of idolatry
and self-righteousness even in the quest to purge herself of these
things. The Christian's solidarity with the other is never as primus
inter pares, but only as a member of the religion to whom God's "No"
is most sharply spoken in the search and quest for God. It is this
sharpest "No" spoken to the Christian Church with which Barth is
concerned - never an intolerant attitude towards other faiths, or an
unloving one towards members of those faiths.107
There is therefore an inherent recognition of the other in Barth's
understanding of religion. But Greggs is right to suggest that this does not
necessarily lead to naive pluralism. It implies rather that "the Christian religion
stands in solidarity with other religions".108 With solidarity "one must be truly
concerned with other religions" despite difference.109
1
Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 280.










Barth's belief that "humanity is cohumanity" lends support to Greggs'
claim.110 All human beings are the creation of God. Since the created world has "its
place, its existence, its structure, its endurance" from God's revelation in Christ,111
Robert Jenson contends that it follows that the human being "is being which
originates in the event of its rescue from perversion and its exaltation into fulfilment
in the existence of Jesus Christ".112 The human creature has his or her reality in
113
being the covenant-partner of God. William Werpehowski comments that what
Barth means by this is that creaturely freedom is freedom for the good of a history of
relationship with God. But this inherently means living with other humans in
fellowship: "[the] 'properly and essentially' human is never expressed in lonely
isolation, in which one would seek to find fulfilment in neutrality or hostility toward
one's fellows".114 By contrast, "the normatively human is rather a being-in-
encounter in which one's distinctive life is qualified by and fulfilled in connection
with the life of the other".115 Thus all activities are human insofar as they are
realized in relationship:
Thus the fact that I am born and die; that I eat and drink and sleep;
that I develop and maintain myself; that beyond this I assert myself in
face of others, and even physically propagate my species; that I enjoy
and work and play and fashion and possess; that I acquire and have
and exercise powers; that I take part in all the works of the race either
accomplished or in process of accomplishment; that in all this I satisfy
religious needs and can realize religious possibilities; and that in it all
I fulfil my aptitudes as an understanding and thinking, willing and
feeling being - all this as such is not my humanity. In it I can be
either human or inhuman. . . . There is no reason why in the
realization of my vital, natural and intellectual aptitudes and
potentialities, in my life-act as such, and my participation in
scholarship and art, politics and economics, civilization and culture, I
should not actualize and reveal that "I am as Thou art."116
Barth describes the constituents of this form of creaturely covenant as "free
communication": a "living relationship between one man and his neighbour,
110 CD III/2, 222-85.
111 CD IV/3, 386.
112 Robert Jenson, Alpha and Omega (New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1963), 98.
113 CD III/2, 203-324.
114 William Werpehowski, "Justification and Justice in the Theology of Karl Barth", Thomist, 50.4
(October, 1986), 633.
1,5 Ibid.
116 CD III/2, 249.
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117between 'I' and 'Thou', between man and woman". A "[hjuman being is being
with others".118 Humans are human because they live together, see and hear each
other, speak to each other, and assist one another freely.119 What this implies for
Werpehowski is mutual interdependence:
The mutuality of speech and hearing requires that each party try to
interpret him or herself to the other, in order for both to discover and
specify a relevant and presumed common sphere of life and interest.
The discovery of this intersubjective space is directed toward
assistance, in which each party helps and is helped by the other from
within the shared space. One acts not from one's isolated point of
view, nor from the associate's perspective, but from a third point of
view, a perspective from which one's own good and the other's good
are equally in play.120
Barth suggests that this relationship should be enacted with gladness.121 This
is because "[h]umanity lives and moves and has its being in this freedom to be
oneself with the other, and oneself to be with the other".122 For Barth, "individual"
and "community" are not separate and potentially antagonistic; to commend the one
includes commendation of the other. Since all act within the grace of creation, this
freedom is a possibility for Christians and non-Christians alike.
ft is this freedom that permits one to recognise one's own uniqueness as a
Christian while also recognising and respecting one's relationship to the non-
Christian, the religious other: a relationship founded on mutual interdependence.
Here lies potential for inter-religious encounter.
But the question arises: in what sense are Christians and non-Christians
different from each other? Barth contends that "a Christian, unlike others, knows
something",123 What a Christian knows is the truth of Jesus Christ: therefore "[i]t is
'17 Karl Barth, "The Christian Message and the New Humanism", in Against the Stream, ed. R. G.




Werpehowski, "Justification and Justice in the Theology of Karl Barth", 633-4.
121 CD III/2, 267. Cf. Helmut Gollwitzer, An Introduction to Protestant Theology, trans. David Cairns
(Philadelphia: Westminister Press, 1982), 98-101.
122 Ibid., 272.
123 Karl Barth, Karl Barth's Table Talk, ed. John D. Godsey (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1963), 88.
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from looking to Jesus Christ that Christians] . . . must derive any true knowledge of
what it means to be human".124 Barth writes:
The nature of the man Jesus alone is the key to the problem of human
nature. This man is man. As certainly as God's relation to sinful man
is properly and primarily His relation to this man alone, and a relation
to the rest of mankind only in Him and through Him, He alone is
primarily and properly man. 25
Humanity has genuine knowledge of human nature only through Jesus Christ;
this is because "the ontological determination of humanity is grounded in the fact
that one man among all others is the man Jesus".126 Because of this Barth is able to
say that "to be a man is to be with God", for "[m]an is with God because he is with
Jesus".127 This, in turn, means that: "Godlessness is not, therefore, a possibility, but
an ontological impossibility for man", and "sin itself is not a possibility, but an
128
ontological impossibility for man".
This theme is elucidated in Christ and Adamn9 The essence of this
exposition of Romans 5 is simply that "[o]ur relationship to Christ has an essential
priority and superiority over our relationship to Adam".130 With respect to election
Barth interprets Paul as having meant that "[t]he righteous decision of God has fallen
upon men not in Adam but in Christ".131 Of anthropology, in relation to the fall,
Barth states: "to find the true and essential nature of man we have to look not to
Adam the fallen man, but to Christ in whom what is fallen has been cancelled and
132what was original has been restored". A few pages before, he argues: "We have
really seen that on both sides [in both Jesus Christ and Adam] there is the formal
identity of the one human nature which is not annulled or transformed even by
124 William Stacy Johnson, The Mystery ofGod: Karl Barth and the Postmodern Foundations of
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sin".133 He concludes that "Jesus Christ is the secret truth about the essential nature
of man, and even sinful man is still essentially related to Him".134 In the closing
pages of this work Barth makes some claims which are directly related to the status
of non-Christians:
The context is widened from Church history to World history, from
Christ's relationship to Christians to His relationship to all men. . . .
What is said here [Romans 5:1-11] applies generally and universally,
not merely to one limited group of men. . . . The fact of Christ is
here presented as something that dominates and includes all men. The
nature of Christ objectively conditions human nature and the work of
Christ makes an objective difference to the life and destiny of all
Because of the universal and objective nature of Christ's work there is no
ontological difference between the Christian and the non-Christian, least of all a
difference which is in some way dependent on religion, for:
Much in true human nature is unrelated to 'religion', but nothing in
true human nature is unrelated to the Christian faith. That means that
we can understand true human nature only in the light of the Christian
gospel that we believe. For Christ stands above and is first, and Adam
stands below and is second. Man's nature in Adam is not, as is
usually assumed, his true and original nature; it is only truly human at
all in so far as it reflects and corresponds to essential human nature as
it is found in Christ.136
Barth sees the Christian as being different from the non-Christian more in
terms of the former's knowledge of the good news than of the latter's inclusion in
salvation. In The Humanity ofGod he describes those outside the Christian faith as
. . . really only "insiders" who have not yet understood and
apprehended themselves as such. On the other hand, even the most
persuaded Christian, in the final analysis, must and will recognise






particular language for insiders and outsiders. Both are contemporary
men-of-the world - all of us are.137
This point is reinforced in Table Talk:
The distinction is not between the redeemed and the non-redeemed,
but between those who realise it and those who do not. The emphasis
in much of today's preaching has to do with salvation in the future,
something the preacher can help give, instead of speaking of the
perfect salvation already accomplished. We only await its final
revelation. The emphasis should be on the deed of God that is done.
Cognitio means the gnosis of the pistis. Faith is a form of
knowledge.138
Barth understands the non-Christian to differ from the Christian only in being
unaware of the objective facts of salvation: non-Christians are "unwitting witnesses"
to the truth of the Gospel.139 This is because Christianity is "taken up" into Jesus
Christ as an "annexe" to his human nature.140 Christian proclamation of the Gospel
is true in part because the proclaimers are granted knowledge of that which they
proclaim, i.e., they are granted the knowledge of the name of Jesus Christ - "the very
essence and source of all reality".141
But this gift given to Christians cannot be wielded as a weapon against others
or clung to as a sign of one's superiority over non-Christians; rather, knowledge of
the name of Jesus Christ should impel Christians to be more self-critical of their
sinful attempts to control God's free revelation in Christ.
137 Karl Barth, The Humanity ofGod, trans John Newton Thomas and Thomas Weiser (London:
Collins, 1961), 58-9.
138 Barth, Table Talk, 87.
139
Hunsinger describes it in this manner: "The sovereign freedom of the Word is such that it can and
does declare itself through unwitting witnesses in the secular sphere . . . Insofar as the one Word of
God declares itself in this way, in the form of secular parables, it becomes clear that, despite all
ambiguity, the real contextual whole in which these words participate is only apparently secular; in
reality it is actually christocentric . . . [T]he sovereign freedom of the Word, with its ability to posit a
periphery whose scope extends beyond the sphere of the Bible and Church, effectively opens up the
possibility, nonetheless, of a progression from the Word to secular words". See Hunsinger, How to
Read Karl Barth, 265. Chapter 3 will argue that the "secular sphere" is also meant to include non-
Christian religions.
140 CD 1/2, 348.
141 Ibid.
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Moreover, Jesus Christ, who died for humanity in history, is present and
effectual here and now, even extra muros ecclesiae:
As the reconciliation of the world to God, the justification and
sanctification of man, is the reality, and indeed the living and present
reality in Jesus Christ the true Witness of its truth . . . not only intra
but extra muros ecclesiae there are also lights in the darkness, clarities
in confusion, constants in the oscillating dialectic of our existence,
orders in disorder, certainties in the great sea of doubt, genuine
speaking and hearing even in the labyrinth of human speech. They are
all very wonderful and unexpected and unforeseen.142
Conclusion
This chapter has shown that there seems to be a radical inclusivity to Barth's
Christological and revelational exclusivity which indicates recognition, solidarity and
concern for the religious other. This clearly allows for the possibility of Christian
co-existence with religious others in a pluralist context. In light of this, most
previous judgments about the implications of Barth's theology for inter-religious
encounter must be challenged. Barth recognises that the non-Christian (including the
religious other) differs from the Christian only in being unaware of the objective
facts of salvation. This difference is therefore a noetic rather than an ontic one.
However, as has been hinted in this chapter, even this difference in knowledge is a
relative one, for in Barth's discussion of "secular parables of the kingdom" in the
fourth volume of the Dogmatics, he indicates that there is much in the secular world
which is both true and edifying for the Church. More will be said of this later. In the
meantime, however, the findings of this chapter provide a basis on which to build a
constructive proposal for an encounter with religious others, in particular Muslims.
Chapter 2 will continue to investigate this by examining Barth's understanding of
Islam historically, politically and theologically, finally focusing on the central
importance of his theology of Israel in this respect.
142 CD IV/3, 476.
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CHAPTER 2
Barth's understanding of Islam historically, politically and theologically, and
the central importance of his theology of Israel
Introduction
This chapter will argue that Barth comments briefly, sporadically and polemically on
Islam as a false religion. He views it as a threat to Christendom, using it as a cipher
for National Socialism, as an example of absolute monotheism, and finally as a
"paganised" form of rabbinic Judaism. An examination and critique of Barth's
understanding of Judaism, which is central to his understanding of Islam, recognises
the interdependency of Church and Synagogue for Barth. As this chapter will
demonstrate, this mutual dependency should also be extended to include Islam.
The Religions
As has been argued in Chapter 1, Barth's theology does not give particular attention
to the religions of the world. There are only a few passages in his Church Dogmatics
and other writings where he is explicitly concerned with other religions. Most
impressive in this regard is his dialogue with Buddhism.1 Otherwise, however, the
religions only appear in a rather general way. When Barth does speak of them, he
usually does so in the context of his examination of the understanding of 'religion', a
term which really does not have the religions of the world primarily and concretely
in view. Indeed, § 17 reserves the term 'revelation' solely for revelation in Christ. It
denotes God's own self-disclosure as this is understood in Christian faith. In contrast
to this, religion, and along with it the religions, represent only human "reality and
possibility".2
' Cf. CD 1/2, 340-4. Responding to a letter by the philosopher-theologian Katsumi Takizawa in 1937,
when the text of CD 1/2 was almost ready for print, Barth mentions the Yodo-Shin school in Buddhism
and asks: "Why didn't you tell me anything about this before? The matter has interested me very
much. Unfortunately I have been able to study this subject only the way it was possible to me from a
distance, and it might well be, that my explanation on this point seem very amateurish in your eyes. ..
. I would like to known, for instance, in how far there is a connection between the Yodo-teaching and
the old Nestorian mission in China, from where it came to Japan. Or is any connection lacking? And
were, or eventually are you influenced yourself directly or indirectly by this remarkable form of
Buddhism?" (cited by Alle Hoekema, "Barth and Asia: 'No Boring theology' ", Exchange, 33.2
(2004), 109.
2 CD 1/2, 283.
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It is this fundamental distinction between revelation in Christ and religion
which determines most of what Barth has to say about the religions. They cannot
become the "true religion", whereas this may be claimed of Christianity, within
which human religious capacity is determined by God's revelation.3 Therefore the
other religions stand a priori under the verdict of being false. This view is
exemplified in 1959, where Barth explicitly takes up the question of the world's
religions:
The various religions are the various attempts of the world to make
something out of the presence and revelation of God which is known
to it but not recognized by it. In religion the world tries to
domesticate the God who is known and yet also unknown and strange,
to bring him into its own natural and intellectual sphere of vision and
power. In religion, then, the world unwittingly and unwillingly
confesses that God is known to it as well as unknown. Not
recognizing him, however, it fashions for itself, in the form of what
seems to be a suitable image, worship and service of God, surrogates
of his being and action, and of the human being and action demanded
by him, believing that it can satisfy him with these surrogates and at
the same time satisfy itself.4
Islam in Barth's early writings
In Barth's early writings he comments polemically and sporadically on Islam, clearly
understanding it as a false religion.5 An example of this is in a sermon on 1 John 1:5
which he delivered in May 1916 to his congregation in Safenwil:
Gott ist Licht und nichts Anderes! . . . Gott ist nicht Allah, der Gott
des falschen Propheten Mahommed, der wahllos geheimnisvoll Gutes
und Boses sendet. Gott ist nicht das Schicksal, das nicht weiB, was es
will. Gott ist Licht, und was er will, ist Liebe und Leben unter seinen
Geschopfen.6
3 Cf. Karl Barth's portrayal of Christian life as "true religion" in CD 1/2, 325-361.
4 Karl Barth, The Christian Life: Church Dogmatics IV/4, Lecture Fragments, trans. Geoffrey
Bromiley (Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1981), 130.
5 This is consistent with his later writings: see for example CD IV/2, 42 and CD IV/3.2, 875.
6 Karl Barth, Karl Barth Gesamtausgabe: Predigten 1916, ed. Hermann Schmidt (Zurich: TVZ,
1998), 187. Hermann Schmidt believes that Barth's early knowledge of Islam can be traced back to
the work of Conrad von Orelli's Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte: "Allwissenheit und Allmacht
Gottes werden haufig verkundigt. . .. Besonders aber wird seine Souveranitat, d. h. schlechthinnige
Unabhangigkeit betont. Seine Majestat lasst sich in keiner Weise zur Rechenschaft ziehen; man muss
sich unbedingt vor ihr beugen. Der Mensch kann vieles in Gottes Walten nicht begreifen . . . (See
C. von Orelli, Allgemeine Religionsgeschichte (Bonn: A. Marcus & E. Weber's Verlag, 1911), 380).
Schmidt also contends that Barth's spelling of the Prophet's name as "Mahommed" in this early
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Another example is from a letter to Eduard Thurneysen in 1921 where Barth
critically comments on a lecture given by Carl Stange about developments in the
history of religions school:
. . . er lieB sich iiber indische Religionsgeschichte, Islam, iiber die
Verhaltnisse im Innern Afrikas, alte und neue Missionsmethoden,
Marchenforschung, homerische Helden usf. mit einer Sachkunde
vernehmen, die mich mit offenem Munde verharren lieB; hatte ich
doch von den meisten dieser Dinge kaum dem Namen nach gehdrt,
und das ist noch nicht einmal das Spezialfach dieses
Schlangenmenschen. Ich deutete zum SchluB Beiden an, wie sehr sie
mir gleicherweise unsympathisch seien in ihrem Tun, was aber nur
Hirsch verstand und sofort aufschnellte: Ja, ja, er habe das schon in
meiner Predigt heute gemerkt, bei mir sei das geschichtliche
Christentum iiberhaupt nur eine VerheiBung!7
The first glimpse of Barth's understanding of Islam as a threat to
contemporary "Christendom" is in an article entitled "Questions to Christendom",
published in 1931. Here Barth says that Christendom is faced with "a whole series
o
of alien religions different from those of the past". These, he says, have an
sermon is influenced by Goethe's depiction of the Prophet in his play "Mahommet", a translation of
Voltaire's Enlightenment drama of the same name (See Barth, Karl Barth Gesamtausgabe: Predigten
1916, 187-8). In the confirmation classes of 1909-10 and 1915-16 in Safenwil, Barth teaches on
world religions. These classes are a mix of fact and opinion. For instance, the notes for the 1909-
1910 session include some general facts about Islam as understood at that time, as well as Barth's
opinions on different aspects of the religion: "Muhammed um 600 n. Chr. aus machtigem
Araberstamm, Hirt, dann Kameltreiber der Cadidja, die er spater heiratet u. dadurch reich wird. Lernt
auf Reisen Chrt [Christentum] (schlechte Vertreter, oberflachlich) u. Judentum kennen.
Verzuckungszustande, Cadidja sagt ihm, er sei z. Propheten Gottes berufen. (Flug nach Jerusalem,
durch 7 Himmel, zu Gott). Anhang u. Feinde (Lehre: nur ein Gott). 622 Flucht nach Medina
(Fledschra) wird Machthaber, Einnahme von Mekka (hi. Stadt) Nach seinem Tod groBe Fortschritte
(Spanien, bis Frankreich). - M[ohammed] war religios u. intelligent, aber verdunkelt durch Eigennutz,
Liige, Polygamic. Seine Rel[igion] nehen heidnischen sehr hoch (Erfolge bei Negern!) weil
monotheistisch, aber grausamer despotischer Gott (Allah ist groB u. M. ist sein Prophet) 5
Vorschriften; Beten, Almosengeben, Fasten im Ramadan, Waschungen, Wallfahrt nach Mekka.
Mechanische Religion, auBerliche Moral, Versprechungen auf ein sinnliches Jenseits. HI. Buch:
Koran (114 Suren)" (See Karl Barth, Karl Barth Gesamtausgabe: Konfirmandenunterricht 1909-
1921, ed. Jiirgen Fangmeier (Zurich: TVZ, 1987), 63-4). Jiirgen Fangmeier's footnotes to the 1915
lesson Die Religionen confirms Schmidt's thesis, citing similarities between Barth's statements about
different world religions and statements made by von Orelli on the same topics (See Barth, Karl Barth
Gesamtausgabe: Konfirmandenunterricht 1909-1921, 127-30).
7 Karl Barth, Karl Barth Gesamtausgabe: Karl Barth - Eduard Thurneysen Briejwechsel, Band 2,
1921-1930, ed. Eduard Thurneysen (Zurich: TVZ, 1974), 23. (In the quoted text usf. is an
abbreviation for und so fort.)
8 Karl Barth, Questions to Christendom (or Christendom's Present-Day Problems), trans. R. Birch
Hoyle (London: The Lutterworth Press, 193- (undated)), 3.
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irrational power over the individual. The "new religions" listed by Barth which are a
threat to Christendom are "Genuine Communism (Russian)", "International
Fascism", " 'Americanism' " and "New Islam".9 On the latter he writes:
. . . now it is surely no accident that even in this our time the
renowned historic religions of the East, the nearest to us and most
striking of which is Islam, seem to have acquired new vitality. As a
"religion" (in that power so distinctive of religion which unites all
men and is ultimately a riddle) Islam seeks to be accepted quite
differently and seriously. At various places Islam is crying to the
Christian missionary an almost irresistible Halt! In the wonderfully
complicated forms of "anthroposophy," i.e. "man's wisdom," and
Islam is sending its roots deep down into the soil of land where
Christendom had sway.10
Islam in Barth's writings of the Nazi Era
Of the new religions listed by Barth in 1931, the two most closely tied to each other
over the next decade would be International Fascism, in the particular form of
German National Socialism, and New Islam.
The political problem of Barth' day was the totalitarian threat of National
Socialism. As Bruce McCormack describes this period of Barth's theological
development at the University of Bonn, he indicates that, following the general
election in Germany of September 1930, Barth had a political awakening, and,
recognizing the very real threat presented by the National Socialists, joined the SPD
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) in May 1931.11 In a letter to Hans
Asmussen (dated January 14, 1932), he declares:
After moving to Germany, I imposed upon myself a political interlude
which lasted nearly ten years. But early last year, in view of the fact
that right-wing terror was gaining the upper hand, I thought it right to
make clear with whom I would like to be imprisoned and hanged.12
9 See ibid., 4-6.
10
Ibid., 6. In CD IV/1, 676, Barth blames Christian disunity in the mission fields of Asia as a
contributing factor to the advancement of Islam there.
11





Barth was to stay in Bonn from March 1930 until June 1935. The period of
1933-35 saw his involvement in the German Church Struggle. In March 1933 he
delivered a lecture on "The First Commandment as Theological Axiom". In this
lecture Barth warns against giving allegiance to false gods on the basis of natural
theology or natural orders of Volk or State.14 In many respects this lecture anticipates
the most important document produced by the Confessing Church under Barth's
influence - the Barmen Declaration of May 1934. The Declaration highlights the
false notion that there are:
other sources or figures of revelation besides Jesus Christ, that
demand unconditional loyality and obedience in certain areas of life
(Theses 1 and 2); that the message of the Church can legitimately be
turned to ideological purposes which require the appointment of
leaders with special power and authority in the Church for their
execution (Theses 3 and 4); that the State can become an all-
embracing system controlling every facet of life and replacing the
Church, and that the Church can subvert its message to the purposes
of the State, thereby becoming its extension (Theses 5 and 6). 5
On 26 November 1934 Barth was suspended from the exercise of his teaching
duties in Bonn for refusing to "give an unqualified oath of loyalty to Adolf Hitler."16
On 22 June 1935 he was formally dismissed by the Minister of Cultural Affairs in
Berlin.17 In a letter to the French Reformed theologian Pierre Maury in December
1938, Barth says that he could no longer avoid the correlation between the Kingdom
of God and any particular political ideology as he had done so up until now. The
implication of this was that the Confessing Church should now be defending
democracy more openly in the face of fascism than it had done.18 In the same month
Barth delivered the lecture "The Church and the Political Questions of our Day" - an
analysis of Hitler's attack on the Jewish people. Timothy Gorringe calls this his
"most outspoken account of the Church's political responsibility".19 In it Barth
writes: "Anti-Semitism is sin against the Holy Ghost. For anti-Semitism means
13 Ibid., 412.
14 Karl Barth, Theologische Fragen und Antworten (Zollikon: Evangelischer Verlag, 1957), 127-43.
15 Robert E. Willis, The Ethics ofKarl Barth (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971), 408.
16 McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology, 449.
17 Ibid.
18 Karl Barth, Pierre Maury, "Nous quipouvons encoreparle": Correspondence 1928-1956, ed.
Bernard Reymond (Lausanne: L'Age d'homme, 1985), 268-9.
19
Timothy J. Gorringe, Karl Barth: Against Hegemony (Oxford: OUP, 1999), 156.
37
rejection of the grace of God. But National Socialism lives, moves, and has its being
9f)
in anti-Semitism." Anyone who rejects and persecutes the Jews "rejects and
persecutes Him who died for the sins of the Jews - and then, and only thereby for our
sins as well".21 Gorringe paraphrases Barth:
The Church has to pray for [the suppression of anti-semitism] and [its]
elimination as in former days it prayed for the overcoming of Islam.
In face of it silence is impossible and only speaking out will do.22
In this lecture Barth clearly links National Socialism and Islam. He describes
National Socialism as a "proper Church". He speaks of a "new Islam, its myth as a
new Allah, and Hitler as this new Allah's prophet", against which decisive and final
23action must be taken.
What Barth means by calling National Socialism a "proper Church" is spelt
out clearly in a short reply he makes to a letter by Emil Brunner in 1948 on the
difference between National Socialism and Communism.24 The major threat in
National Socialism - which made it an unmitigated evil to be opposed at all cost -
lay in the fact that both in Germany and elsewhere, people "had succumbed to
Hitler's spell".25 It was the fact that the pseudo-religious ideology put forth by the
National Socialists had captured the imaginations and minds of the people, and
threatened to become the ruling loyalty of their lives, that overshadowed, finally,
even its obvious totalitarianism, its virulent anti-Semitism, and the militarism that
brought about its extension throughout Europe. Barth writes:
Whether the essence of National Socialism consisted in its
'totalitarianism' or ... in its 'nihilism', or again in its barbarism, or
anti-semitism . . . what made it interesting from the Christian point of
view was that it was a spell which notoriously revealed its power to
overwhelm our souls, to persuade us to believe in its lies and to join in
its evildoings. It could and would take us captive with "strong mail of
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23 Barth, The Church and the Political Problem ofour Day, 43.
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trans. E. M. Delacour and S. Godman, ed. R. G. Smith (London: SCM, 1949), 113-8.
25 Ibid., 114.
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craft and power". We were hypnotised by it as a rabbit by a giant
snake. We were in danger of bringing, first incense, and then the
complete sacrifice to it as a false god."6
The danger posed by National Socialism, then, was not simply "a matter of
declaiming some mischief, distant and easily seen through".27 It was a matter of life
and death, a historical crisis of the first order, and it called for resolute and
unyielding resistance:
For that very reason I spoke then and was not silent. For that very
reason I could not forgive the collaborators, least of all those among
them who were cultured, decent and well-meaning. In that way I
consider that I acted as befits a churchman.28
Barth's understanding of National Socialism as an all encompassing threat to
Europe in the 1930's and early 1940's (as a false religion) bears similarities to the
understanding of Islam "as a strong political force and . . . perpetual threat" in the
Europe of Martin Luther's time.29 Von J. Paul Rajashekar contends that from the
beginning of the First Crusade until the "zenith of the Ottoman imperialism" of the
16th century, "Muslims and Christians understood themselves to be two mutually
exclusive societies at war. A good measure of Christian perception of Islam was
TO
influenced by this factor."
Specifically, Barth understands Islam as a cipher to speak of National
Socialism. Like National Socialism, Islam's image of God is idolatrous31 and hence
false.32 The worship of God by the (Muslim) Turk of Luther's time was a form of
natural religion which parallels Barth's view of the pseudo-religion of National
"3-3




29 Von J. Paul Rajashekar "Luther and Islam: An Asian Perspective", Lutherjahrbuch, 57 (1990), 179.
30 Ibid., 180.
31 CD 1/2, 302.
32 CD IV/3, 875.
33 CD 1/2, 287. Barth uses the word Turk in the same sense as Luther. Rajashekar contends that this
was a common medieval expression that is synonymous with Islam or Muslims. See Rajashekar,
"Luther and Islam: An Asian Perspective", 177.
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a form of "righteousness by works" which "means the fall of Lucifer and despair".34
In contrast to this, God in his revelation - Jesus Christ - does not allow humanity to
come to terms with life, to justify and sanctify itself. Jesus Christ takes on the sin of
the world and wills that "all our care should be cast upon him, because he careth for
•3 c
us". Barth quotes Luther as saying:
... by this article our faith is sundered from all other faiths on earth.
For the Jews have it not, neither the Turks and Saracens, nor any
Papist or false Christian or any other unbeliever, but only proper
Christians (Luther, Heer-pred. wid. d. Turcken, 1529, W.A. 30
II 186, 15.)36
And again:
We cannot do any greater despite to our Lord God than by unbelief,
for by it we make God a devil. Again, we cannot do him any greater
honour than by faith, when we regard him as a Saviour. Therefore he
cannot abide a doubting heart, like the Turk [italics mine] who doubts,
... by good works we do not become a Christian but remain a
heathen {Pred. ub. Joh. 447~54, 1534, E.A. 5, 229 f.).37
io
Luther clearly sees the Turk as "an instrument of the devil" - Allah. By
comparison, Barth sees devotion to Adolf Hitler - the new Mohammed - as evil. He
endorses Luther's attitude to the Turkish War as providential.39 Islam was a tangible
threat to the Christian world in the Middle Ages.40 The Turks had to be repelled
then41 just as the Nazis have to be now. Illustrative of this last point of comparison is
Barth's powerful use of the imagery of the fusion of statecraft and religion in Islam
in his "Letter to Great Britain From Switzerland", to argue that Christians should
support the war against Hitler:
34CZ)I/1,169
35 CD 1/2, 309.
36 Ibid, 309-310. Barth is quoting here from advice Luther gives to Christians, anticipating that many
would be captured during Turkish raids into Germany: while in captivity in Turkey Christians should
practice private devotions as an effective means of sustaining an inward faith. (See Egil Grislis,
"Luther and the Turks: Part II", Muslim World, 64.4 (October 1974), 278.
37 CD IV/1, 415.
38
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39 CD III/3, 25.
40 CD IV/3, 20.
41 CD III/3, 100.
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We shall not regard this war, therefore, either as a crusade or as a war
of religion. We shall spare ourselves the peculiar passions and the
vain expectations and hopes which are wont to be bound up with such
an undertaking; we may safely leave all such things to the modem
Mohammed [italics mine] and his deceived hordes.42
Islam in Barth's Dogmatic Writings: Monotheism
The Gottingen Dogmatics
Islam is referred to in the Gottingen Dogmatics in a discussion on the uniqueness of
the "oneness" of God. Here Barth uses Islam as an example of the misunderstanding
that God's oneness is in fact monotheism and that Christianity has this attribute in
common with Islam:
If we think through the concept of unity to the end we can come
dangerously near to Islam's fanatical proclamation of the one God . . ..
It was not a good moment when the discovery was made that
Christianity and Islam at least have monotheism in common as
compared with other religions. If by the uniqueness of God what is
meant is so-called monotheism, the religiously clarified and
embellished idea of the "one," the cult of the number 1, then the
uniqueness of God is certainly not meant.43
There is no way to speak "generically" about God. All speech about the one
true, living, Triune God must be recognized as highly particular. One can only speak
correctly about God if one has been enabled to know God by means of God's self-
revelation. For Barth this means that one cannot correctly speak about God unless
one does justice to the triune nature of revelation. Only God can reveal God, and
that is precisely what God does reveal: Godself in a three-fold manner. God is
Triune. Hence to speak of God without holding on to this recognition is to be
speaking falsely of God.
This has to be held dialectically in tension with the recognition that at all
times one should have in mind the one God who was revealed to Abraham, Isaac,
42 Karl Barth, "A Letter to Great Britain from Switzerland", in A Letter to Great Britain from
Switzerland, trans. E. H. Gordon and G. Hill (London: The Sheldon Press and New York: Macmillan,
1941), 20-1.
43 Karl Barth, The Gottingen Dogmatics: Instruction in the Christian Religion, trans. Geoffrey W.
Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991), 430.
41
Jacob and Moses. There is but one God and this "oneness" must be recognized as
highly particular. The way in which Christians make use of the term "monotheism"
when speaking of God is therefore also highly particular, in case an idol is set up in
the name of protecting the universality of God. Monotheism, Barth insists, is not
protected by downplaying God's "threeness":
As though God did not reveal himself as he is, his essence, when he
reveals himself! as though for him manifestation and essence,
economic being and immanent being, were not one in revelation rather
than two! as though to all eternity and in the deepest depth of his deity
he were not this God, the one in three, because he is God: the object
that turns and becomes subject, wherever and however we may think
it, when we think of this object.44
The biblical witness for Barth is an affirmation of the absolute uniqueness
and particularity of the "oneness" of the Subject of revelation:
Revelation is not the peak of the particular on the mountain of the
usual and the universal. It is the heaven above all else that is
distinctive or general. When one ventures to say "God," then in all
else that we say there must resound in ours ears like the thunder on
Sinai: "I am the Lord thy God, thou shalt have none other gods but
me" [Ex. 19:16; 20:2-3], This is what Iesous Kyrios meant on the lips
of the first Christians.45
Faithfulness to the First Commandment demands faithfulness to the scandal
of particularity in which the one Triune God reveals Godself. "The content of
revelation is God", Barth reminds his hearers.46 "God cannot reveal anything more
certain, more specific, more living than himself. Any emptiness or abstraction that
we might first feel when hearing the term 'God' is on our side."47 One must allow
the one God of Israel who raised Jesus from the dead to tell humanity who God is







What Christians mean therefore by the oneness of God is not meant in any
way to be understood in continuity with Islamic monotheism:
The "if only I have Thee" with which we here call God unique is not
in any sense a general idea that we can form, but a command that
meets us: "You shall have no other gods but me [Exod. 20:3] - this is
the basis of the uniqueness - and: "You shall not make any image or
likeness" [Exod. 20:4] - this is the basis of the simplicity. The basis
of the divine unity lies in the Johannine I: "I am the way, the truth . .
.. I am the resurrection" [John 14:6; 11:25]. God tells us that he wills
to be known and worshiped as unique and simple, so that there is no
reason for us to become intoxicated with our monotheism .... In
God's Word in which he meets us as a He there is no basis for this
t>^>e of uniqueness or simplicity, the Mohammedan [italics mine] . .
Islam is a "lofty and refined" type of monotheism, an attempt to "bypass
God's Word".49 But there is no way of getting around God's Word, of bypassing
revelation, if one is to understand what is meant by God's three-in-oneness. God's
three-in-oneness is absolutely unique, without creaturely equivalence, simply due to
the fact that the triunity one is attempting to describe is God's, ofwhich there is only
one example.50
The starting point for deriving the doctrine of the Trinity therefore has a
specific origin: "the confession of revelation in Jesus, the confession Iesous
Kyrios".5i This confession is fundamentally at odds with Islam.52 The Christian
faith, in its evangelical form, has to be opposed to all other faiths, specifically Islam,
ST
as Christianity is "the confession of truth as opposed to that of error and untruth".
The Church Dogmatics
The oneness of God is again addressed in the Church Dogmatics. In CD 1/1 §9, The




50 Later in the Church Dogmatics, Barth states that the triunity of the Christian God means that God is
different from the God of Judaism and Islam. See CD III/3, 30. Islam is described as a "later
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"oneness". As in the Gottingen Dogmatics, Barth emphases here that there is no
excuse for speaking of the Christian faith in God as "a kind of monotheism", another
representation ofwhich is Islam.54
Monotheism is not some general category, but has a very specific content.
Reiterating the Gottingen Dogmatics, Barth believes that it is only in revelation that
the Church recognizes that it must speak of God as both one and three, and that the
"oneness" of God is only such that it includes the idea of the "threeness".55 It is not,
Barth declares, that the Church tries to hold on to the concept of God's unity in spite
of the doctrine of the Trinity. The doctrine of the Trinity is precisely how the Church
has felt itself compelled to describe the unity of God. The concept of God's
"oneness" and the concept of God's "threeness" must come from the same source or
else the Church becomes embroiled in a useless attempt to reconcile two unrelated
concepts. It is not that reason is able to discover and describe God's oneness and
revelation provides the impetus for speaking about God's threeness, so that the
threeness needs to fit into a prior understanding of oneness, Barth explains. Again
echoing the Gottingen Dogmatics, he contends that revelation must be allowed to
serve as the only source for describing the being of God.56 In God's revelation God
discloses Godself to be the God of unity in trinity in whom only the equality of
Father, Son and Spirit is compatible with true monotheism - not the monotheism of
abstraction (e.g. the monotheism of Islam), but the monotheism of the true God in
God's self-revelation.37
Many religions are explicitly or implicitly monotheistic, but at issue in the
unity of self-revelation is the unique revealed unity which must not be confused with
co
the singularity or isolation of numerical unity. The unity of God includes a










Barth believes that speaking of "modes of being" to describe the persons of
the Trinity does more to protect against charges of abstract monotheism than the
traditional theological concept "person". It does much to prevent the distinctions
from being dissolved into a single essentially undifferentiated concept of an Absolute
Personality or Spirit. Father, Son and Spirit are not encountered as three individual
centres of consciousness, three persons, which are then somehow to be reconciled
with the idea of God as one person. In revelation, God addresses the human being as
the one God here, here and here, again and again and again. The single subject is
repeated in three modes of being, distinguishable, yet inseparable:
What we have here are God's specific, different, and always very
distinctive modes of being. This means that God's modes of being are
not to be exchanged or confounded. In all three modes of being God
is the one God both in Himself and in relation to the world and man.
But this one God is God three times in different ways, so different that
it is only in this threefold difference that He is God, so different that
this difference, this being in these three modes of being, is absolutely
essential to Him, so different, then, that this difference is irremovable.
Nor can there be any possibility that one of the modes of being might
just as well be the other, e.g., that the Father might just as well be the
Son or the Son the Spirit, nor that two of them or all three of them
might coalesce and dissolve into one. In this case the modes of being
would not be essential to the divine being. Because the threeness is
grounded in the one essence of the revealed God; because in denying
the threeness in the unity of God we should be referring at once to
another God than the God revealed in Holy Scripture - for this very
reason this threeness must be regarded as irremovable and the
distinctiveness of the three modes of being must be regarded as
ineffaceable.60
Barth follows Tertullian, the Cappadocians, Augustine, Anselm, Aquinas,
Calvin and Luther in making the relationality of these three modes that which
constitutes the Trinity. Father, Son, and Spirit are "three distinctive modes of being
of the one God subsisting in their relationships one with another".61 Quoting Luther
he argues that this relationality guards against Islam:
. . . With this faith I here guard myself. . . against. . . Mahomet, and
all that are wiser than God Himself, and mix not the persons into one
person, but in true Christian faith retain three distinct persons in the
60 CD 1/1, 360-1.
61 Ibid., 366.
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one divine, eternal essence, all three of which, to us and creatures, are
one God, Creator and Worker of all things. (Von den letzten Worten
Davids, 1543, W.A., 54, 58, 4).62
Islamic monotheism is again mentioned in an exposition of the unity of God
as one of the perfections of the divine freedom in §31 of CD II/1: God is free both in
Godself, in an absolute sense, and in being free from external conditioning. Thus,
although God in God's freedom can relate and indeed does relate to the real world,
the world is rendered relative to God:
The relativity of the other is made necessary ... by God's
absoluteness. It is made irrevocably necessary. There cannot, then,
be any divinisation of the world .... 3
This is "a designation of His freedom, of His being as it is self-grounded and
therefore absolutely superior to every other being".64 God is absolute in both a
noetic and an ontic sense. God is not "one instance in a genus".65 God is absolutely
unique, "an instance outside every genus".66 Therefore one cannot ascribe the unity
that is a predicate of creaturely unities to God, otherwise unity and uniqueness would
be absolutised above God. The concept behind absolutising unity and uniqueness
above God is monotheism:
"Monotheism" is an idea which can be directly divined or logically
and mathematically constructed without God. It is the reflection of
the subjective sub-consciousness, the requirement of freedom and the
claim to mastery on the part of the human individual; or it is the
reflection of this as already reflected in the various cosmic forces of
nature or spirit, fate or reason, desire or duty; or more concretely it is
perhaps one of the various "incarnations" of these cosmic forces
which in his occasional doubts about the divinity of his own
individuality man absolutises in an attempt to reach out beyond









An example of the "absolutising" of "uniqueness" is "the noisy fanaticism of
Islam regarding the one God, alongside whom, it is humorous to observe, only the
zro
baroque figure of His prophet is entitled to a place of honour":
The artifice adopted by Islam consists in its developing to a supreme
degree what is at the heart of all paganism, revealing and setting at the
very centre its esoteric essence, i.e. so-called "monotheism". . . .
Monotheism . . . can be impressive and convincing as knowledge of
God only so long as we fail to note the many-sided dialectic in which
we are thereby inevitably entangled and in which Islam is incurably
entangled. For the cosmic forces in whose objectivity it is believed
that the unique has been found are varied. It is only by an act of
violence that one of them can be given pre-eminence over the others .
. .. Who is the first and foremost and really the one who is unique -
Allah or his prophet, Allah or his devotees? Monotheism is all very
well so long as this conflict does not break out. But it will inevitably
break out again and again.69
By contrast Christ is the unique way that God has chosen to reveal Himself
and this is what is recognised through Christian faith. It is only by reference to the
norm of Jesus Christ that humans are enabled to receive God's revelation:
the divine immanence in all its varied possibilities has its origin in
Jesus Christ and therefore its unity in Him, but only in Him, in the
diversity of its actions and stages. . . . All other unities of immanence
which we seek and think we find cannot constitute the unity of His
immanence . . ..We are simply making an idol of the ruins of His
immanence . . . and in the service and worship of this idol we can only
more and more blind ourselves to the true God present to His
creation.70
For Barth, the cause of Islam as one of the "various heathen religions" is that
it does not know or refuses to know the "ground of divine immanence in Jesus
Christ".71 Ultimately Islam is "enslavement to a false god".72 Alternatively:
Christology . . . must always constitute the basis and criterion for the
apprehension and interpretation of the freedom of God in His
immanence. The legitimacy of every theory concerning the







relationship of God and man or God and the world can be tested by
considering whether it can be understood also as an interpretation of
the relationship and fellowship created and sustained in Jesus Christ.73
Islam in Barth's Dogmatic Writings: a 'paganised' form of rabbinic Judaism
Islam is referred to in the Church Dogmatics as a "paganised" form of "the semi-
biblical religion of post-Christian Judaism", i.e. Judaism shorn of the doctrines of
election and grace.74 This statement is posited in the context of a discussion of
providence and creation, in which Barth denies that belief in a divine creator in the
three faiths of Judaism, Islam and Christianity is anything more than a superficial
similarity between them. For Barth the Christian God is different from the God of
Judaism and Islam.75 To attempt to unravel what this might mean for a possible
encounter with Islam, it is first necessary to investigate the place of Israel in Barth's
theology.
It is in the Doctrine of God that Barth deals with the question of Israel
within the context of election.76 The community of those who are elected in Christ is
73 Ibid., 320.
74 CD III/3, 28.
75
Ibid., 30
76 In the first part of his Doctrine of God, Barth explains that the freedom of God is God's freedom to
be with those who are not God. This does not imply an obligation of relation on God's part. On the
contrary, even in relationship, "God stands at an infinite distance from everything else" as God
"confronts all that is in supreme and utter independence" (CD II/l, 311). Indeed, God would still be
God without any relationship with those that are not God. Thus, if God does initiate such a relation, it
is purely a function ofGod's grace, which in turn entails a relation "between two utterly unequal
partners" (ibid., 312). Grace is "a turning, not in equality, but in condescension. The fact that God is
gracious means that he condescends," that is, God initiates a relationship with humankind "because
He alone is truly transcendent, and stands on an equality with nothing outside Himself' (ibid., 354). It
is on this understanding ofGod that Barth draws out the concept of election which is, "fundamentally,
the doctrine of God's method of encountering humankind in relationship" (Mark R. Lindsay,
Covenanted Solidarity: the Theological Basis ofKarl Barth's opposition to Nazi Antisemitism and the
Holocaust (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 214). For Barth the doctrine of election is the sum of the
Gospel because "God elects man;. .. God is for man ... the One who loves in freedom" {CD II/2, 3).
This implies a movement of God towards humanity. This, as such, is a movement of grace (ibid., 7).
This movement is personalized in its identity with Jesus Christ, the Jewish man of Nazareth. On this
point Barth diverges from earlier theological paradigms, "above all from Calvin's doctrine of
predestination" (Herbert Hartwell, The Theology ofKarl Barth: An Introduction (London: Duckworth,
1964), 105). For Barth the doctrine of election has to have its grounds in the God who is known as
Jesus Christ (Colin Gunton, "Karl Barth's Doctrine of Election as part of his Doctrine ofGod",
Journal ofTheological Studies, 25.2 (1970), 382). The very being and essence ofGod is that God
elects. For Barth this is part of what it means to be God: "in Himself, in the primal and basic decision
in which he wills to be and actually is God, in the mystery ofwhat takes place from and to all eternity
within Himself, within his triune being, God is none other than the One who in His Son or Word
elects Himself, and in and with Himself elects His people (CD II/2, 76). This election has priority
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identified as "the reality both of Israel and of the Church".77 According to Barth, the
elected community exists in this twofold form, and offers a twofold function of
witness: "as Israel ... to serve the representation of the divine judgment, ... as the
Church the representation of the divine mercy. In its form as Israel it is determined
for hearing, and in its form as the Church for believing the promise sent forth to
no
man." In this duality of form and service, the community of Israel and the Church
79is "one community of God".
[T]he community as the primary object of the election which has
taken place and takes place in Jesus Christ is one. Everything that is
to be said of it in the light of the divine predestination will necessarily
or»
result in an emphasising of this unity.
over all the acts of God. All the other things that God does - creation, reconciliation, redemption -
are, Barth says, "grounded and determined in the fact that God is the God of the eternal election ofHis
grace" (ibid., 14). The God who creates, etc., is the One who is the electing God. God's electing
grace is not an afterthought, hastily improvised after the catastrophe that overtook the first and
independent order of creation. God, as essentially the electing God, makes the universe in order that it
may be the arena in which his gracious purposes may come to pass. It is therefore the presupposition
of all God's works. "It is because of this that we put the doctrine of election ... at the very beginning,
and indeed before the beginning, of what we have to say concerning God's dealings with His
creation" (ibid., 89). Election is something God does in, with and to Godself before the election of
humanity. But this election is gracious and free. Once this inner grace and freedom are established,
an outer movement can be seen to belong inseparably to it as the binding by God of Godself to what is
not God - that is, to humanity, in and with Jesus Christ. The outcome is that God's "self-
determination is identical with the decree of His movement towards man. . . . The reality and
revelation of this movement is Jesus Christ himself' (ibid., 91-92). "It is self-giving. And that is how
the inner glory of God overflows" (ibid., 121). "Under the concept of predestination . . . we can say
that in freedom (its affirmation and not its loss) God tied Himself to the universe" (ibid., 155). "In
this primal decision God did not remain satisfied with His own being in Himself. He reached out to
something beyond, willing something more than his own being" (ibid., 168). Thus, the twofold
movement of the grace of God both comes to expression in and is the history of Jesus Christ. Christ is
both the subject and the object of election, the electing God (ibid., 103) and the elect man (ibid., 116),
for Christ is at the same time the God who elects graciously and the man who is the recipient of grace.
Barth's determination to posit Christ as both the subjective and objective grounds of election forces
him to reject the hermeneutical principle of his predecessors that replaced Jesus with the decretum
abso/utum as the content and presupposition of predestination. Mark R. Lindsay contends that for
Barth, "the idea of an original divine decree of predestination which is outside of, beyond, and prior to
Christ and ofwhich he finds especially strong evidence in Calvin, leads to uncertainty and fear on the
one hand, and an emptying of the meaning of the doctrine on the other" (Lindsay, Covenanted
Solidarity: the Theological Basis ofKarl Barth's opposition to Nazi Antisemitism and the Holocaust,
216). If election is located in the "will and decision ofGod which are hidden somewhere in the
heights or depths behind Jesus Christ and behind God's revelation", humanity is deprived of all
knowledge of election and all certainty about its election in Christ {CD II/2, 64). Barth's doctrine of
election seeks to negate this fear (ibid., 69).






The existence of this unity is a function of the fact that "the bow of the one
covenant" of grace arches over both Israel and the Church.81 Jesus Christ is the
personification of the gracious covenant under which both exist. He is:
the promised son of Abraham and David, the Messiah of Israel. And
He is simultaneously the Head and Lord of the Church, called and
gathered from Jews and Gentiles. In both these characters He is
indissolubly one. And as the One He is ineffaceably both. As the
Lord of the Church He is the Messiah of Israel, and as the Messiah of
82Israel He is Lord of the Church.
Consequently, Barth insists that the Jews cannot be called "the 'rejected' and
the Church the 'elected' community. The object of election is neither Israel for itself
nor the Church for itself, but both together in their unity. . . . What is elected in
Jesus Christ (His 'body') is the community which has the two-fold form of Israel and
oi
the Church." The one community elected by God takes two definitive forms, so
that the Church cannot exist by repressing Israel.
The difference between the two forms is that Israel is a "people" of which one
usually becomes a member through birth, whereas one becomes a member of the
Church by being called. Furthermore, although the Church may well have been
revealed at Pentecost, it did not originate there. It already pre-existed in a hidden
84form in the Israel of the Old Testament. Therefore as long as Judaism is rooted in
this Israel, it cannot seriously be a foreign body to the Church nor the Church to
Judaism. Judaism is essential to the Church because the Church as the second form
of the one community has been engrafted into God's people. It is essential for the
Church to have Jews not only around it but also in it. The presence of Jews in the
Church was represented by the first apostles, particularly Paul, who were
simultaneously Jewish and Christian. They did not abandon Judaism because of their








Though hidden except to faith in Christ, the reality of this twofold community is
not entirely imperceptible. It can be recognized, according to Barth, by its witness to
the fulfilled covenant of grace. The covenantal community is represented not only
by the Church (as classical dogmatics would have it) but first of all by Israel, and
then along with Israel by the Church as well. Eberhard Busch contends that this idea
has not always been well understood. What Barth means is that:
both [Israel and the Church] give their witness through their positions,
which they receive and truly possess through the fulfilment of the
covenant by Christ's reconciliation: as the first-chosen Israel and as
the church called to this covenant from among the Gentiles. Their
witness takes on a double form, corresponding to the double-faceted
election of grace: as the first-chosen, Israel attests that God chooses to
be a God in communion with sinners; as those who are called later,
Gentile Christians attest that God chooses sinners to be in communion
with him. Each therefore attests to a specific aspect, both ofwhich are
to be respected in their uniqueness, and each of which also fits
together under the arch of the covenant. Both attest to God's gracious
election and covenant in an irrevocably different manner but in such a
way that their testimonies need and complement each other. . . .
Therefore the church cannot be a witness to the covenant of grace
alone, but only together with Israel. By witnessing together they
85show forth the unity of the community.
The two forms of witness display the covenant's twofold fulfilment in Christ.
As a result, neither form is neutralised, but in their distinction they enhance one
another. However, Israel does not recognize that the covenant first made with it has
now been fulfilled in Christ. Israel abstracts itself from this fulfilment,86 and
therefore also from its membership in the one community. According to Barth,
however, Christ does not abstract himself from Israel. He is "primarily and
R7
supremely . . . theirs" since he has elected to make his abode in the "flesh and
blood [of] Judah-Israel".88
85 Eberhard Busch, "The Covenant of Grace fulfilled in Christ as the Foundation of the Indissoluble
Solidarity of the Church with Israel: Barth's Position on the Jews during the Hitler Era", Scottish
Journal ofTheology, 52.2 (1999), 491.




As the promise irrevocably given them with this fact is maintained
their membership of the one elected community of God is confirmed
and ratified. It is confirmed and ratified not only with respect to the
service which they cannot evade, but also with respect to the grace of
God addressed to them, which they can indeed resist but cannot
nullify.89
This promise gives the Church hope that at the conclusion of God's ways the
non-necessary divide will be overcome. Then, as Barth puts it, "the differentiation
within the community should confirm its unity".90 The Church hopes for the advent
of this fullness, because it is already a reality in Christ, even if not now manifest in
the community on earth. But the Church cannot properly hope that the difference
will be set aside. For the Church lives forever "by nothing else but the grace ofGod
directed towards Israel".91 As long as the Jews do not realize that they are
inseparably linked in one covenantal community by the same divine faithfulness that
calls and adds others to them, then the Church "must take the lead, confessing the
unity of the fellowship of God", but always with the desire "to see that Israel's
92
special service in the community is not interrupted but faithfully continued". "
Barth repeatedly returns to the inviolability of God's faithfulness and election in
the face of Israel's resistance and disobedience. "By their resistance to their election
they cannot create any fact that finally turns the scale against their own election,
separating them from the love of God in Jesus Christ, cancelling the eternal decree of
God."93 Israel cannot "by any breach of the covenant annul the covenant of mercy
which God has established between himself and man. ... Nor can Israel do anything
to alter the fact that this promise is given and applies to itself, that in and with the
election of Jesus Christ it and no other is God's elected people."94 There can be a
dishonouring of one's election, a futile attempt to live in contradiction to it, but no
such attempt can, for Barth, change the reality of the Jews' divine election which is











The most instructive of Barth's statements that confirm the Jews' ongoing
election occur in his exegeses of Romans 9-11. In speaking of Paul's analogy of the
potter (Romans 9:20-21), Barth identifies Israel as "vessels of dishonour" and the
Church as "vessels of honour", with Israel's distinctive service being to "witness to
the divine judgment".96 He is adamant, however, that this is not the final word on the
matter. There is a misunderstanding of the thrust of Paul's argument if an
assumption is made that the analogy implies "a juxtaposition of two different
purposes of God". Both are used as witnesses to Jesus Christ:
The twofold action of the potter does not by any means take place
along parallel lines, in symmetry and equilibrium, so that proceeding
from a centre of indifference . . . God will now accept and now reject.
. . [Rather] His operation eig Ti^rjv is one thing and His operation eig
azi/j.iav is another, and they stand in an irreversible sequence and
order.97
Mark R. Lindsay contends that here "there is a Yes and a No spoken, but they
are related in an unequal dialectic whereby the No exists only for the sake of, and on
the way towards, the Yes. This [is an] asymmetrical dialectic . . . whereby, on the
one hand, one cannot exist within God's covenant without also standing under God's
judgment but, in a more ultimate sense, one cannot stand under God's judgment
qo
without also existing within the covenant of life."
In other words, "[t]he harsh appearance that can descend ... as if God's
mercy and hardening, the existence of 'vessels of honour' and of 'dishonour' were
the two goals of two different ways of God - is now finally dispelled".99 To Barth's
mind, therefore, the end of the ways of God is the resolution of the dialectic in favour




Lindsay, Covenanted Solidarity: the Theological Basis ofKarl Barth's opposition to Nazi
Antisemitism and the Holocaust, 221.
99 CD II/2, 225.
53
who were standing wholly under His curse and sentence of rejection, how much
more so upon those [Israel] to whom He has already promised it!"100
This fidelity of God to God's people and promise, and the inability of
humankind to condition or delimit the efficacy of God's work, is the reason why
Barth is compelled to affirm a vital and hopeful future for Israel. "Hath God cast
away his people?", Barth quotes from Romans 11:1.101 In concert with the apostle
Paul, he replies in the negative. The question faced by the apostle is "the question
asked by Christian anti-semitism, whether the crucifixion of Jesus Christ does not
settle the fact that the Jews are now to be regarded and treated only as the people
accursed by God".102 As an "anti-Semitic question ... of unbelief, . . . those who
put this question can only be called to repentance with the utmost urgency".103 For
Barth the "remnant" of Israel, as symbolised by Elijah who, along with seven
thousand others who refused to apostatize (1 Kings 19:15), represent the ever-present
group of the faithful within an otherwise unfaithful Israel. This faithful remnant
represents "the whole of Israel" and as such is proof, in Barth's opinion, that the
election of Israel qua Israel is confirmed by God. Thus, "[i]n this remnant God's
election of Israel has found its human reflection. There is revealed in it the fact that
God's election is not simply transferred to the Gentiles. Israel is not abandoned as its
original object. Even less is there any reason to suppose that the election had never
been seriously intended as an election of Israel but that it had only the Gentiles as its
object from the very first. No . . . God's election is established as an election of
Israel."104 Indeed, the continued existence of Israel is the "presupposition without
which there would be no Church and no Gentile Christians".105
Barth's recurring theme in his doctrine of election is that humankind - not the
Jews specifically, but humankind as such - is fully deserving of rejection, but that
this rejection has been borne instead by God.106 There is no one who stands apart
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to everyone that they are elect. The proclamation of the community "will continually
call the divided together by proclaiming to believers their merited rejection and to
unbelievers their unmerited election, and to both the One in whom they are elect and
not rejected".107
Consequently, there can be belief only for unbelievers, not against them.
108
Rejection is not, for Barth, an equally open and valid course. An unbeliever
cannot be regarded as rejected. Not everyone lives according to their election but
this does not negate God's decision. According to Barth's paradigm, all exist within
the sphere of the divine election of grace, some obediently, others disobediently, but
nevertheless all. For those who exist in disobedience, their attempt to deny their
election is futile. Because God has elected Jesus to be the Rejected, it is "objectively
impossible" for anyone ultimately to triumph against their own election.109
This victory in Barth's theology of election renders the No of God against
humanity ultimately impotent in the face of the divine Yes. In McCormack's
terminology, this is the employment of a "supplementary dialectic".110 This is a type
of dialectic where "one member of a pair predominates in value and potency over the
other". As a consequence of this "imbalance" the predominant member is able to
overcome the other. At some point, "the stronger member takes up the weaker into
itself. . . , an initial situation of opposition gives way to one of reconciliation".111
Lindsay contends that "[i]n this case, it is the Yes of God that triumphs over the No,
the election over the rejection, such that all people, irrespective of their attitude and
their race, are enclosed within the sphere of election and, therefore, of grace and life.
If there exists the threat of rejection, there exists as the greater reality in which it is
112
enclosed, the promise of election."
107 Ibid., 236.
108 See for example CD II/2, 349-50, 416.
109 Ibid., 346.
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It is in this context that the "Judas passage" of §35.4, in which Barth launches
an attack upon unbelieving Israel, is set. For Barth, Judas is the archetypal figure of
rejection who, in turn, represents Israel. The implication that the Jews must be
regarded as having been fundamentally rejected by God is inescapable. But as has
already been argued, Barth insists that the object of God's election is the unity of
Church-Israel where, in effect, all of humanity exists in God's election of grace.
Lindsay contends that, in order for one to see the hermeneutical key to this
controversial passage, one must understand that for Barth any discussion of the
rejection of Israel cannot occur in isolation. "It is valid and meaningful only if the
overarching covenant of election, as the divinely-imposed limit of rejection, has been
established in advance. ... the rejection of Israel by God cannot have ultimate
113
significance."
Barth consistently refuses to regard Judas and/or Judas-Israel in isolation as
the sole ciphers of sin and rejection. On the contrary, Judas is depicted as standing in
the closest proximity to the Church. He is "undoubtedly a disciple and apostle: no
more so, but also no less so, than Peter and John; sharing as they do the same calling,
institution and mission".114 Indeed, Barth suggests that, of all the twelve, Judas is the
one most appropriately called an apostle because "he alone . . . belongs like Jesus to
the tribe of Judah, the seed of David".115 Judas was in no sense an apostle only in
appearance. He was, rather, "genuinely elect", albeit at the same time rejected.116
But far from identifying Judas exclusively with Israel, Barth insists that "Jesus was
handed over by one of His own, by one of his disciples and apostles, from within the
Church".117 Thus, at this most decisive juncture "the Church stands and acts in
identity with the Israel which rejected its Messiah, together with the heathen world
118which allied itself with this Israel, and made itself a partner in its guilt". At this
point, "the apostles have to share the guilt of Israel and the Gentile world towards










but also to Israel and the world".119 Indeed, not only was the work of Judas an act
done within the Church, but it was something which any of the apostles could have
done. "To be sure, they have not actually done it or co-operated with him. But the
1 on
point is that they obviously could have done it." To this extent, "the Church
121shares a point of contact with Israel". So, while "the basic flaw was revealed in
122
Judas, ... it was that of the apostolate as a whole". Sinfulness and the guilt of
Jesus' death cannot be ascribed either to Judas or Israel alone.
A central motif in the 'Judas passage' is that of TtapaSouvat (handing-
1 o "5
over). Barth notes that, after taking Judas' place in the apostolate, Paul continues
what Judas had begun, the task of handing Jesus over to the Gentiles. In Paul's case,
however, it is done in faithfulness through the preaching of the gospel, rather than in
treachery. In other words, Barth affirms a movement from rejection to election. He
writes: "the elect always occupies what was originally the place of a rejected, and
that the work of the elect can only be the amazing reversal of the work of the
rejected".124 By God's grace in Jesus Christ, the last word that must be said about
1 9 S
any rejected is that "in his place, ... an elect will one day stand". According to
Barth, this is as true of Israel as it is of Judas. Israel always has "the role of the
chosen people of God which finds its true fulfilment in the Church".126 As such, this
127
movement of grace represents "the victory of the election . .. over . . . rejection".
Katherine Sonderegger understands Barth's meaning to be that this
movement from the particularity of Israel (symbolised by Judas) to the universality
of Israel-Church (symbolised by Paul) implies that "the community [is] now 'open to
the nations' ". This is not a repudiation of Israel's mission - " they were called to be
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Another handing-over in this excursus is the handing over ofmen and women
by God to His wrath. Barth describes this as "the mysterious and terrible divine
'delivery' according to which God in His burning wrath . . . does to men what Judas
did to Jesus".129
There are two significant aspects to this divine 7rapa8ouvar. First, Barth
characteristically submits Jews, Christians and non-believers alike to the same
sentence. Who, he asks, are "delivered" by God? According to Acts 7:39ff, it is the
"Israelite fathers, to whom God had spoken but who disobeyed Him, who returned in
1 "30
their hearts to Egypt". According to Romans 1:18, it is the Gentiles. But, on the
basis of 1 Corinthians 5:lff and 1 Timothy l:9ff, it must also be acknowledged that
Christians are handed over by God to the punishment of God's wrath. Indeed, in the
case of the Christians, Barth is especially severe. They have been abandoned to the
power and lordship of Satan, a punishment of which Barth speaks explicitly only in
relation to Christians, and not in relation to either the Gentiles or the Israelite
fathers.131 In any event, what God visits upon all of those who are handed over in
this way is rejection (although as has been seen earlier, this rejection is always
circumscribed by the triumph of election). Clearly, to suffer God's wrath and to be
(at least in a qualified sense) rejected by God is perceived by Barth to be a valid
possibility for all, Jews and Christians alike. Neither race nor religion can be the
cause of such a fate, nor can they prevent it.
Second, the work of God's wrath is the necessary, but not ultimately decisive,
flip-side of God's grace. Barth writes that Jesus loved the disciples "unto the
end".132 This means that, by his death, Jesus bore their punishment and rejection,
thus enabling the disciples "to live as those for whom He intercedes, for whose
uncleanness He repents, and to whom He gives His purity".133 For Barth, "[wjhat is
revealed in the revelation of wrath" is the delivery and abandonment of the "Gentile"






to divine punishment.134 "But what this involves is not foreign to the love of
1 TS
God." On the contrary, it is its necessary counterpart.
Lindsay contends that here "[w]e are reminded of the unequal dialectic of
God's No and Yes, . . , in which the Yes of election to life triumphs over the No of
rejection and wrath. In the 'Judas passage' the same idea is expressed through the
concept of 'limitation'; that Jesus' loving of the disciples 'unto the end' involves a
circumscription ofwrath by divine mercy, grace and salvation."136
For Barth, the triumph of wrath and rejection can only ever be penultimate.
If the New Testament refuses to teach d7toKaxacn:aai<; (universal salvation), it also
"strikingly fails to make use of the tempting possibility of making Judas a plain and
specific example of hopeless rejection and perdition, an embodiment of the temporal
1 T7
and eternal rejection of certain men". The rejected Judas, who stands on the
graceless side of the cross, is confronted by "the overwhelming power of grace", in
face of which his human wickedness is revealed to be utterly weak.138 Barth is
unwilling, however, to affirm the ultimate salvation of Judas, stating that the New
Testament does not offer a single word to suggest that Judas is an example of
djroKaxdcrraoic;. He prefers instead to keep Judas' fate in unresolved tension.
Judas, as the representative figure of all Israel, is significant for how Barth
understands the rejection of the Jews. Is there, Barth asks, a limitation to the wrath
suffered by Israel? Acts 7 appears to indicate at first glance that "there is no such
limitation".139 A superficial reading of this section suggests that the "delivery of the
fathers is still justified in the case of their children's children".140 However, the
Christological conclusion to Acts 7 does in fact imply a "limit to Israel's
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[Israel's] divinely executed rejection, [a] necessary end of its endlessness".142 Just as
for Judas, therefore, the note of punishment and rejection for Israel gives way
eschatologically to a note of optimism. If Jesus is Victor, then Israel's rejection is
temporally circumscribed. It is true that the love of God deals with those who have
been handed over to God's wrath harshly, but:
it really is the love of God which deals with them in this way. From
this end He wills to make a fresh beginning with them. He will
awaken them from this death which they must die. He will speedily
deliver them from this distress, from which there is no escape . . .
[E]ven in His stern handing-over He actually means well to Jews and
Gentiles ... 143
The severity of Barth's expression notwithstanding, Lindsay contends that it
must be argued "that Jesus' loving 'unto the end' does not exclude either Judas or, as
the people he represents, Israel. The resolution of the dialectic in favour of God's
Yes to Israel must. . . stand as the final word."144
But on what possible basis can this be affirmed? Lindsay continues:
Simply put, it is due to the antecedent work of God in Jesus Christ, in
which Jesus is the subject of the primal and genuine handing over. . . .
Barth understands Jesus Christ to be the electing God antecedently in
himself, and ... it is according to the divine antecedent will for him to
be the true subject of both election and rejection. Now . . . Barth
[builds] on this foundation by explaining that Judas' handing over of
Jesus came after the original Tiapadouvai.145
But this does not mean that men and women are not themselves delivered
over to God's wrath. "[T]hey, too, must undoubtedly suffer punishment".146 What
this means, however, is that delivery over to God's wrath is part of God's
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Because the handing over to wrath falls, not primarily upon humanity as a whole, or
upon certain individuals, but upon Jesus: "He does not merely execute judgment
upon sin. He takes it upon Himself and suffers so that there can be no further
question of suffering it ourselves."147 Or, put in a way that permits no prioritizing of
Christians over Jews, Jesus suffers "the suffering of Israel given up to idolatry; the
suffering of the Gentiles given up to the lusts of their own hearts; the suffering of
14R
Christians given up to Satan". Jesus "alone is delivered up in this way and to this
end".149 The inevitable upshot of this is that only Jesus is the truly Rejected. No one
else has been "wholly and exclusively abandoned".150
Judas has traditionally been interpreted as the archetypal figure of rejection,
representing Israel as "those who are handed over and [are] therefore totally lost".151
But Barth's model offers a corrective to this view, insisting upon the "possibility of
salvation" for all.152
It is in light of Israel's election, then, that Barth's comments about post-
biblical Judaism are made. Its creaturely existence is located only in God's faithful
preservation of the covenant, where God's lordship over "whatever may take place"
in world history is grounded in the belief that providence is the historical
1 ST
actualization of the covenantal reality that God is for all humanity.
For Barth the connection between providence and election is lacking in post-
biblical Judaism; it lacks this content and has only abstract knowledge of the history
of salvation. Yet because of its role in the salvation of humanity, Barth considers the
history of post-biblical Judaism to be one of four "elements" or "signs and
witnesses" which affirm that God is "Lord of . . . history" and "King of Israel".154












157limitation of human life. Of all the phenomena that witness to God's providence
the history of the Jews is "the most astonishing and provocative"; of all the four
signs, the Jews' history has, in and of itself, "a very special cogency".158
Barth's understanding of who the Jews are is determined by the two events of
Jesus' death and the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in AD 70. It was after these
events that "the real history of the Jews began". "From now on the Jews will be that
which they became in the year 70."159
In other words, in their history post-AD 70, the Jews have shown themselves
to be a remarkably resilient people. That the exclusivity that they once enjoyed in
their covenant relationship with God has now changed does not negate the fact that
"[t]hey are still there".160 In spite of the rise and fall of world empires, and despite
"the destruction and persecution and above all the assimilation and interconnexion
and intermingling with other nations the Jews are still there, and permanently
there".161 The creation of the "new state of Israel", and its advances culturally,
militarily and diplomatically, is further proof of the indestructibility of the Jewish
people.162 Barth also alludes here to the Shoah; when he says that the Jews are
"usually despised for some obscure reason, and kept apart, and even persecuted and
oppressed by every possible spiritual and physical weapon, and frequently
163exterminated in part". Yet, even after "the worst disaster in all their history", the
Jews are "always and everywhere surviving".164 This is due solely to the gracious
providence and protection of God. This point is elucidated in a radio talk given by
Barth on the 13th December 1949. He begins by noting that, after the Shoah, the
Jews "seem to be in the process of founding a new state in Palestine .... How have
they, all things considered, attained this surprising position of historical permanence,
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that God is faithful to this people in spite of their unfaithfulness to Him. God, "in the
person and by the death of one of these Jews, put an end to the unfaithfulness of His
people and to that of all mankind".165
Having dealt with the fact of Israel's preservation, which, he posits, can only
be due to God's providence, Barth proceeds to examine Jewish identity. "We speak
of the Jews, and yet in the strict sense we cannot say with any certainty who and
what we really mean by the term."166 Barth refuses to define Jewishness narrowly by
merging all Jews into a seamless stereotype of racial, genetic, linguistic, cultural,
religious and historical sameness: "[t]he idea of a specifically Jewish blood is pure
imagination".167 There is no simplistic way to understand Jewish culture.
"Are the Jews", then, "really a people at all?"168 Yes, they are "really and
perceptibly there"169. They are "a people which is not a people".170 Barth elucidates
this point in his radio talk of December 1949. The Jews are a people unlike any
other, whose special characteristic lies in their ability to exist "anonymously, lacking
171in glory and having no national character of their own".
Unlike every other nation, Jewish identity and existence is determined by and
based upon election. It is as the genuinely elected nation of God that the Jews are a
people. But they are "unfaithful to [their] election".172 Because of this
unfaithfulness, the history of the Jews displays a negative, shadowy appearance.
This, however, is not the final word, as they (the Jews) "did not disappear from
i n-y
world history in the year 70". The reason for this lies in the primacy of God's
faithfulness - displayed in Christ - over against Israel's infidelity:
165 Karl Barth, "The Jewish Problem and the Christian Answer", in Against the Stream: Shorter-Post
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[F]rom the standpoint of the Christian message the reason for this is
that God's decree in His election of this people and covenanting with
it is an eternal and unshakable decree. The people was an unfaithful
people. From the very first it willed to be a people like others, to have
a king and a history like others. But this could not alter the
faithfulness of God, and it has not altered it right up to the present
time. . . . How could it be altered by the judgment in which God
finally ratified His grace towards this unworthy partner by Himself
taking its place, the judgment of Golgotha? Far from turning aside
from His people, far from allowing it to fall, in the One who died for
His people and for all men God not merely turned towards it but
accepted solidarity with it. His appointment and constitution of Israel
as the bearer of light and salvation to all nations are actualised in the
death and revealed in the resurrection of the One who is the remnant
of the Jewish remnant of Israel, and who definitely died and rose
again on behalf of this remnant, indeed of Israel as a whole.174
Thus, in their unfaithfulness, the Jews deny the very thing which makes them
a people. But the faithfulness of God to Israel's election imposes a limit on the
negation of the Jews' existence and identity. As a result, the final word must be that
the Jews are indeed a people. Indeed they are not only a people, but through the
grace of God, they are "the people of God".175 There is no other valid definition of
their identity.
Now that Barth has established the unique determination of the Jews'
existence and identity, as the continuing elected people of God, he comes to the final
part of the section, which deals with "the origins of anti-Semitism".176 Significantly,
this too is due to Israel's election. Because they are the elect of God and therefore,
like Abraham, Moses and Jesus, are strangers to the world, having "no home, no city,
no temple", the Jews "have always been looked upon with disfavour. They have
been unloved and despised and hated."177 And yet this is not how it should be. Such
hatred of the Jews is irrational, as nothing about the Jews makes them "objectively
174 Ibid. Michael Wyschogrod endorses Barth's view, both in terms of Israel's sinfulness and in terms
of God's loves for the Jews in spite of this disobedience. Hence he says that the "discovery of Israel's
sinfulness is one thing when it comes from a Christian theologian who believes that Israel has been
superseded by the Church and that Israel's sorrows are the result of its obstinacy. It is something
entirely different when it comes from a Christian theologian with roots in Judaism as deep as those of
Barth." See Michael Wyschogrod, "A Jewish Perspective on Karl Barth", in How Karl Barth
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worse, or harder to tolerate, than other peoples".178 Indeed, "all people have their
unpleasant characteristics".179 Why, then, can these be forgiven but "we can never
pardon those of the Jews?".180
Barth's answer is the universal sinfulness of humanity. "[I]n the Jew we have
revealed and shown to us in a mirror who and what we all are, and how bad we all
are."181 It is "revealed in this people what man is, man in his relationship with God,
1 R?
man before the judgment seat of God, sinful man". Thus, "[o]ur annoyance is not
really with the Jew himself. It is with the Jew only because and to the extent that the
Jew is a mirror in which we immediately recognize ourselves, in which all the
1 RT
nations recognise themselves as they are before the judgment seat ofGod." In our
encounter with Israel, we see that we too are "manifestly the enemies of God".184
But this "depresses us", and as a reaction to recognizing ourselves before the
judgment of God "we deem it necessary to punish the stranger [the Jew] in our midst,
with contempt scorn and hatred", as if by smashing the mirror we could alter the
1 RS
truth about ourselves which we see in it. This is the "most wrong-headed thing we
could do!"186 By smashing the mirror - that is, by persecuting the Jews and,
therefore, assaulting God - we prove that we are the enemies of God.
In the Jews, "we are positively confronted with the fact of God's electing
grace".187 Despite the torments of their history, the Jews remain because the grace of
God has sustained them. On the one hand, Barth believes that this provokes the
jealousy of non-Jews because, having been upheld by God, "the Jews can do
something which we cannot do. And this fact irritates us, and the more so because
we cannot explain why they can do it."188 He writes further: "In their persistence the
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too clearly that placed in the same unfavourable conditions we could never have
achieved the same persistence. . . . [T]hey are obviously preserved in such a way
189which cannot be said for other peoples." But, on the other hand, the electing grace
of God, which is reflected in the Jews, shows that the existence of the non-Jewish
nations is more than a little perilous. If it has only been by God's providence that the
Jews have survived, and if the Jews alone are the elected nation of God, how then
can non-Jewish nations hope to survive? "The existence of the Jews tells us that in
world history there seems to be neither security nor permanent abiding place for any
nation or for any individual."190
The only answer then for the nations is to be subject, alongside Israel, to the
grace and election of God. Because, however, "the elect ofGod is not a German or a
Swiss or a Frenchman, but this Jew . . .", and because "divine election is a particular
election [such] that we ourselves have been completely overlooked in the
particularity of this divine election", our election and, therefore, our security in
God's grace "can only be in and with this other".191 In other words, "[sjalvation is of
the Jews".192
If the grace and mercy and long-suffering of God are to be with humanity, if
humanity is to remain, to persist, and to be preserved, it cannot possibly avoid this
other, for the goodness of God can be to humanity only as it is first to him, and to
1 QT
humanity only in and through him.
The "other" of whom Barth is speaking here is of course "the one Jew Jesus
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A Critique of Barth's Theology of Israel: Its import for an encounter with Islam
David Fergusson has described Barth's discussion of Israel as "rich, complex and
ambivalent".196 It is the case, as Fergusson points out, that some concepts within the
Barthian corpus point toward "earlier anti-Semitic tropes":
Judas (and behind him the Old Testament figure of Saul) is the type of
the rejected in whom we see mirrored our own sin, pettiness, self-
righteousness and rebellion. The synagogue, in its persistence across
history, attests human stubbornness before the grace and demand of
God.7
Barth himself once confessed to Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt that he was
1 QR
"decidedly not a philosemite". In any personal encounters he had with "living
Jews (even Jewish Christians)", Barth recounts that he had to "suppress a totally
irrational aversion" towards them, explaining this to Marquardt as a sort of "allergic
reaction".199
The oft quoted "ambivalence"200 of Barth's theology of Israel has led some
scholars to accuse him of being supersessionist, a term that "is tainted by the
implication of anti-Semitism and its terrible consequences".201 R. Kendall Soulen,
for example, suggests that Barth's view of election remains "profoundly
supersessionistic", for Barth understands Israel as "that part of the one community of
Jesus Christ that is elected in order to be rejected and to pass away".202
Supersessionism, as defined by Hunsinger, is "the idea that Israel has been
replaced as God's people by the church. By rejecting Jesus as the Messiah, Israel
allegedly forfeited its divine election. Along with certain corollaries (e.g., that the old
covenant is nullified by the new), this notion has played a tragic role in the church's
196 David A. S. Fergusson, "Contemporary Christian Theological Reflection on Land and Covenant",
in Theology ofLand and Covenant, a report to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland of
May 2003 (Edinburgh: The Church of Scotland Board of Practice and Procedure, 2003), 13.
197 Ibid.
198 Barth, Letters 1961-1968, 262.
199 Ibid.
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George Hunsinger, "Introduction", in For the sake of the World: Karl Barth and the Future of
Ecclesial Theology, ed. George Hunsinger (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 3.
202 R. K. Soulen, "YHWH The Triune God", Modern Theology 15 (1999), 40-1. See also R. K.
Soulen, "Karl Barth and the Future of the God is Israel", Pro Ecclesia 6.4 (1997), 413-28.
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historic persecution of Jews."203 It can be argued that Barth is not supersessionist in
any classical sense. Barth himself states categorically that "Israel's mission" is not
"superseded". He notes that "through everything the Old Testament again and again
insists that God's election holds and will hold to all eternity".204 It is therefore
plausible to agree with Hunsinger when he writes:
Barth is as responsible as anyone in recent theology for recovering the
normative apostolic teaching that God has not rejected his people, that
God's gifts and promises are irrevocable, and that all Israel will be
saved (Rom. 11:1-2, 26, 29).205
An alternative to supersessionism is the idea of "dividing Jews and Gentiles
into two parallel covenants".206 Hunsinger explains this position thus:
If Jews have perhaps been unfaithful to the covenant in one way,
Christians will have been so in another. Since divine faithfulness
overrides all human disobedience (Rom. 3:3-7), the election of the
Jews is ultimately assured, as is the subsequent extension of election
to the Gentile church. Because both are covenant partners of the one
207
electing God, neither can be more or less legitimate than the other.
Barth rejects this "two-track view", believing instead that Christians and Jews
208
are in God's one covenant of grace. For Barth the "two-track view" just does not
square with the New Testament and in particular Romans 9-1 1.209 The Christian
203
Hunsinger, "Introduction", For the sake ofthe World: Karl Barth and the Future ofEcclesial
Theology, 3.
204 Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. G. T. Thomson (London: S. C. M. Press, 1949), 79.
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Rosenzweig compared Israel to the sun and the Christian Church to its rays: the sun transcends its
rays, even though the rays extend far beyond the position of the sun itself. See Franz Rosenzweig,
The Star ofRedemption, trans. W. W. Hallo (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971), 298-379.
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community of Gentiles and Jews that accepts Jesus as the Messiah does not
"supersede" the Jewish community that does not accept Jesus as the Messiah. What
it does do, however, is to offer the proper human response to the ultimate fulfilment
of the covenant as divinely appointed in Jesus. The community that fails to accept
Jesus as the Messiah does not lose its election (as in "supersessionism"), but by
definition excludes itself - albeit provisionally,210 Barth's biblically based
211 212
position" holds therefore that Christians and Jews stand in "indissoluble unity".
"To this complex eschatological situation, a term like 'supersessionism' is
irrelevant".213
A strong critique of Barth is triggered by his description of the synagogue as
part of "that dark and monstrous side of Israel's history," which is disobedient and
idolatrous towards God.214 He portrays the synagogue as the enemy of God which
practices Jewish obstinacy to the Gospel. It is "the personification of a half-
venerable, half-gruesome relic, of a miraculously preserved antique, of human
215
whimsicality" unwilling to take up the message " 'He [Christ] is Risen!' ". This
leads Sonderegger to contrast a portrait of Barth as a political supporter of Israel with
a portrait of him as an anti-Jewish theologian attached to his anti-Jewish
presuppositions. She argues that while Barth has a deep interest in Jews, he has
almost no interest in Judaism. She writes:
The solidarity between Christians and Jews that Barth so vigorously
advocates is based upon the quiet assumption that Judaism does not
exist. Jews exist, the people Israel exist, even the synagogue exists in
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Sonderegger contends that while Barth retains a place for Israel in the
economy of salvation, it is as the negative counterpoint to the Church. The Jewish
people exist because the promises of God are irrevocable and the Jews remain elect
in spite of their blindness. Barth's theology therefore, while being non-
supersessionist, incorporates anti-Semitic tropes.
Sonderegger rightly claims that Paul's letter to the Romans, and in particular
chapters 9-11, provides that background for Barth's controversial remarks about
Judaism.217 Barth's theology makes the association that present day Jews and
Judaism are to be seen in the light cast by these biblical verses. However the
Judaism known by Paul is categorically different from the latter-day Judaism that
persists today without the temple. Rabbinic Judaism as it is known today is a
completely different religious system. It does not fall within the scope of Paul's
218
argument in Romans 9-11.
Sonderegger rightly cautions the reader not to make the association between
biblical and rabbinical Judaism as quickly or directly as Barth arguably has done.
Contemporary Judaism and Jewish practice, are post-biblical and rabbinic - they are
219Judaism without "temple worship".
217 {Catherine Sonderegger, "Response to Indissoluble Unity", in For the sake ofthe World: Karl
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In a parallel vein, one should not make the hasty assumption that Islam is, in
Barth's words, a "paganised" form of "the semi biblical religion of post-Christian
Judaism".220 As has been shown, Barth had very little interest in or understanding of
Islam throughout most of his life, except in its guise as a threat to Medieval
Christendom, which he used as a cipher for National Socialism and as an example of
absolute monotheism.221 This is consistent with his general disinterest in and
impressionistic understanding of world religions in general. It could also be argued
that Barth's limited understanding of Islam as a "paganised" form of post-Christian
Judaism corresponds to his residual anti-Semitism. This can be seen most clearly in
his understanding of Ishmael, which in many ways parallels his understanding of the
Synagogue.
Ishmael, who according to Islamic tradition is the progenitor of the Arab
nations and, along with Abraham, the co-founder of the Ka'bah (the central
sanctuary of Allah) in Mecca, is described by Barth as being excluded by God in
favour of Isaac as the "repetition and establishment" of God's election of
Abraham.222 But Ishmael is not rejected because of some fault of his own.
Consequently Barth recounts that Ishmael is not forsaken by God, but instead will in
time become the founder of a great nation.223 For Barth, Ishmael is clearly aligned
224
with the "refractory Synagogue" of those who are rejected within elected Israel.
But like that of Judas, Ishmael's rejection is "superceded and limited"223 because of
Jesus Christ, "who died on the cross for the justification of God".226 In fact, the
future of the lost people of Israel, which according to Barth's logic must include
Muslims as paganised Jews, is present in the calling "of the Gentiles", which -
22V
according to Barth - justifies "the God of Israel even as the God of Ishmael".
Theologically, then, it would seem that the Church not only justifies the future of
Jews but also justifies the future of Muslims. This contention is strengthened by
Barth himself when he encourages the reader "to recognise Jesus Christ not only in
220 CD III/3, 28.
221 This point was emphasised to the author in a conversation he had with Hans Kiing in Tubingen,
August 2006.









the type of. . . Isaac and his sacrifice but also in the very different type of Ishmael
and his expulsion and miraculous protection . . . not only in the type of the Israelite
nation but also in the very different type of the excluded and yet not utterly excluded
heathen nations".228
Conclusion
Even with Barth's misplaced association between biblical and post-biblical Judaism
and his residual anti-Semitism, he sees the existence of Judaism today as a sign of
hope for the salvation of all. In this sense Lindsay is right to argue that "for Barth
the Church has no genuine independence as the people of God apart from the
Synagogue". But this view should also be extended to include a mutual
dependence between the Mosque and the Church.
While there is negative stereotyping of both Judaism and Islam in Barth's
works there are other resources available within the same corpus to overcome this
difficulty and to recognise the aforementioned dependency. One such resource is
provided by Barth's account of extra-ecclesial truth in his Doctrine of Reconciliation,
230in particular his discussion in §69.2 entitled "The Light of Life". While one must
7T1
concede that Barth did not "develop a specifically Israelite contour" in this
paragraph, in order to build a relationship between Judaism and Islam on the one
hand and Christianity on the other, nevertheless there are however mechanisms
within these few pages which can help the Church recognise Jesus Christ in both
228 Ibid., 366.
229 Mark R. Lindsay, Barth, Israel and Jesus: Karl Barth's Theology ofIsrael (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2007), 105.
230 In a paper delivered to the Karl Barth Society ofNorth America on Friday 17th November 2006 in
Washington D.C., Wolf Krotke observed that the beginning part of a deleted paragraph of the Church
Dogmatics entitled "God and the gods" presents an early form (some fifteen years early in fact) of the
"doctrine of the little lights" found in §69.2 of CD IV/3. Here, in this paragraph, the question about
revelations of God in the creaturely world is set within the context of the theme of "God and the
gods". In contrast to the "Lichterlehre" to which we will attend in chapter 4, this discussion is
explicitly set within the context of the religions. Krotke argues that "if this 'doctrine of the little
lights' is valid, these religions can scarcely be thought to wander about in creation entirely outside the
revelations ofGod ... At least an 'impression' of God is to be anticipated in the world." See Wolf
Krotke, "A New Impetus to the Theology of Religion from Karl Barth's Thought", paper presented to
the Karl Barth Society ofNorth America on 17th November 2006 in Washington D.C. (and
forthcoming in the Scottish Journal ofTheology).
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Judaism and Islam. Chapter 3 will argue that this paragraph provides the Church
with criteria to receive words of the Kingdom from other religions. Chapter 4 will




Truth extra muros ecclesiae I - "secular words" of the Kingdom: providing the
Church with criteria to receive words from other religions
Introduction
Though Barth's disturbing characterising of Islam is analogous to his residual anti-
Semitism, there exists in principle for Barth the possibility of witness to the
revelation of the Word of God occurring outside the confines of the Church. This
chapter will argue that this possibility includes witness which may come from within
the context of either rabbinic Judaism or Islam.
Barth's concept of "secular words" of the Kingdom provides the Church with
criteria in order to receive words from other religions - by evaluating them and by
determining what use the Church is to make of them. Access to this revelation is
wholly dependent on the divine initiative whereby God commandeers secular words
and words from other religions to become "parables of the kingdom".1 Such witness
to the revelation of God occurs then in an uad hoc and ephemeral" way. Hence
Barth's concept provides theological justification to conceive how the words (and
actions) of Judaism and Islam might be affirmed as "signs" or "parables" of Jesus
Christ.
Witness to the revelation of the kingdom of the Word occurring outside the
confines of the Church
In the Gottingen Dogmatics, Karl Barth argues that one must be cautious when
considering the question of the possibility of witness to revelation extra muros
ecclesiae. On the one hand, he is unwilling to side quickly with Luther and Calvin in
their vehement condemnation of Zwingli for being so eager "to people the Christian
3 •heaven with a whole series of noble pagans". For Barth, "[t]o shout 'Impossible'
might be a sign of culpable obduracy".4 The Christian has "properly no reason to
maintain the absoluteness of Christianity. It is revelation that is absolute."5 Yet, on
1 Paul Louis Metzger, The Word ofChrist and the World ofCulture: Sacred and Secular through the
Theology ofKarl Barth (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 125.
2 Ibid., 127.





the other hand, he is quick to point out that if "pagans" are to meet the test of bearing
witness to the truth, it must be shown that they bear witness to:
the one revelation at all events, that is, indirect communication of the
hidden God who is as such the revealed God, God's encounter with
us, and hence the cross and the resurrection, offense and faith. This is
the issue in the canon, in the OT and the NT. This is what the witness
to revelation, to the incarnation, to Christ, is all about.6
It does not make sense then "to shut the gates of the castle", nor "to tear down
the gates as though this were always self-evidently the issue throughout religious
history".7
While Barth does not rule out the possibility of witnesses to God arising
outside the walls of the Church, all such witnesses must be ruled by the particularity
of the "indirect communication" of God, the incarnation, that is, revelation in Jesus
Christ.8 The scandal of the particularity of revelation is "the criterion by which to
judge potential claims. But the indirectness of revelation as the incarnation proves
equally scandalous from another angle in that it negates the possibility of
accessibility to this revelation by means of a supposed native capacity for revelation.
Accessibility to revelation is wholly dependent upon the divine Word's
condescension in the event of revelation."9
Paul Louis Metzger observes that Protestant thought has traditionally been
marked by its emphasis on the Word of God.10 Such is the case for Barth, "whose
theology can be described as a theology of the Word, namely, the living Word as
witnessed to by the Word's written and spoken forms".11 Stuart McLean is in
concert with Metzger when he writes, "Barth implies that the auditory and the
temporal analogies more faithfully depict the essential character of the relationships
between God and man, and man and man" than do "visual" and "spatial" ones.









importance of the Word and preaching, and Roman Catholic thought, substance and
the beatific vision".12
Metzger contends that Barth's theology of the Word goes hand in hand with
his rejection of the analogia en lis.13 Metzger explains that Barth rejects the analogy
of being because he (Barth) believes the concept "expresses a form of relation
whereby static, necessary, substantial threads of continuity exist between God and
the creation, including an innate capacity of the mind for apprehension of things
divine".14 For Barth the analogy between God and the world is an event of language:
"As God creates all things out of nothing by his Word, so too, he creates analogies
between himself and the world by that same Word in the history of revelation. In
this light, Barth replaces the analogia ends with the analogia fidei,"15
The analogia fidei expresses that event wherein God in God's grace creates
correspondence between Godself and that reality which is totally different from God.
This event of correspondence endures only so long as God sustains it. McCormack
argues that the analogia fidei is "an inherently dialectical concept", signifying the
veiling and unveiling of God in both the event of revelation and the witness to that
revelation.16 The incarnation of God in history in the person of Jesus Christ both
wholly reveals God and wholly hides God at the same time.
Exposition of §69.2 - the "parables of the kingdom"
Barth's treatment of "parables of the kingdom" forms part of his broader analysis of
the prophetic work of Christ. As Barth elucidates Christ as prophet, it becomes clear
that he has retained the exclusivist focus on Jesus found in § 17 ("The revelation of
1 n
God as the abolition of religion"). "Jesus Christ is the light of life," he proclaims.
"To underline the 'the' is to say that He is the one and only light of life. Positively,
this means that He is the light of life in all its fullness, in perfect adequacy; and
12 Stuart McLean, Humanity in the Thought ofKarl Barth (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1981), 13.
13
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negatively, it means that there is no other light of life outside or alongside His,
outside or alongside the light which He is."18
Alternatively, "Jesus Christ as attested to us in Holy Scripture is the one
Word ofGod whom we must hear."19 Barth recognizes that this claim is "a hard and
"70
offensive saying which provokes doubt and invites contradiction". But he is
careful immediately to highlight that this exclusivity does not eliminate but delimits
"what is also to be said of other prophets, teachers and witnesses of the truth, or of
21the prophecy entrusted to the Christian community and each individual Christian".
None of these prophecies are themselves the one Word of God. This is even more
the case, says Barth, of the "outside sphere" where "even though it is perhaps
incontestable that there are real lights of life and words of God, ... He alone is the
Word of God . . . and these lights shine only because of the shining of none other
light than His".22 Barth summaries his position:
We recognise that the fact that Jesus Christ is the one Word of God
does not mean that in the Bible, the Church and the world there are
not other words which are quite notable in their way, other lights
which are quite clear and other revelations which are quite real.23
Firstly, to say that Jesus Christ is the one Word of God means that "He is the
total and complete declaration of God concerning Himself and the men whom He
addresses in His Word."24 This does not mean, of course, that what Christians say
about Jesus is identical to the one Word of God. Jesus Christ may be the complete
and final revelation of God, but "our hearing of [His Word] is profoundly
incomplete". While both the Bible and the message, life and activity of the Church
bear witness to the fact that Jesus Christ is the one Word of God, they are not
themselves the Word of God. Secondly, that Jesus is the one Word of God means













challenge to His truth, any threat to His authority".26 Third, one may not make
God's Word in Jesus Christ part of a supposedly broader system, which encompasses
that Word and other words. Such attempts at systematization "imply a control over
Him to which none of us has any right, which can be only the work of religious
arrogance".27 Finally, to assert that Jesus Christ is the one Word of God implies the
?o
finality of this Word: "His prophecy cannot be transcended by any other". One
does not expect new and different words, which will supersede what has been said
and done in Jesus.
The proclamation that Jesus Christ is the one Word of God does not grant any
special privilege or status to the proclaimer. The proclamation "looks away from the
non-Christian and Christian alike to the One who sovereignly confronts and precedes
both as the Prophet. As Jesus Christ is its content, the one who confesses it in no
9Q
sense marks himself off from those who do not."
The claim that Jesus is the light of life, that he is the one true Word of God,
of necessity raises the question of the truth of all human words, for "can we think of
any word actually spoken, or any conceivable word which might be spoken, that says
what the life of Jesus Christ says?"30 Are there in fact such "true words" distinct
from the one Word of God, Jesus Christ? At this point Barth introduces the concept
of "parables of the kingdom". Whereas the kingdom of God is Jesus Christ, human
words can, by God's grace, disclose the kingdom. As such, the secular words of the
world become parables of the kingdom. All parables of the kingdom are similar to
those parables of Christ in the gospels. Although the parables of Jesus themselves
arise from the "everyday sphere", the characters employed by Jesus "are very
strangely shaped, and their actions no less strangely directed, by an invisible hand
which obviously estranges them from the everyday sphere in which they are set".31
32
Jesus employs the ordinary, giving "them the mark of the extraordinary". "The one










utters, or rather creates, these parables, speaking of the kingdom, of the life, and
therefore of Himself, and doing so in stories which it might seem that others could
tell, yet which they are unable to do, because His Word alone can equate the
T-5
kingdom with such events." Hunsinger notes that the very words Barth deploys in
discussing the truth of human words about God - "signs", "parables", and
"attestations" - indicate their provisional status.34
One set of "parables of the kingdom" is found in Scripture and the Church's
proclamation. The word of witness as Scripture is entitled the "direct witness",
whereas the word of witness in the Church is labelled the "indirect witness",
reflecting the relative proximity of each to the Word of Christ. Scripture, Barth
argues, is true to the extent that it is directed and guided by the Word, while Church
proclamation is true insofar as it receives its shape from Scripture.36 One must stress
yet again that Scripture and Church proclamation in and of themselves are not God's
Word. They can only become so to the extent that they are taken up into Jesus Christ
by His free, gracious action.
But what of parables of the kingdom, true words of God, extra muros
ecclesiae: can they exist?
In response to the first question, of the possibility of the existence of secular
"parables of the kingdom", Barth gives an unequivocal affirmation. If Scripture and
Church proclamation constitute an "inner sphere" of a circle with Christ as the
centre, then the secular world constitutes an "outer sphere": true words can be found
in both.37 To deny this possibility is tantamount to trying to control God's free grace.
"Does it not necessarily lead to ossification", Barth asks, "if the community rejects in
-30
advance the existence and word of these alien witnesses to the truth?" There are no
prima facie theological reasons, Barth asserts:
not to accept the fact that such good words may also be spoken extra
muros ecclesiae either through those who have not yet received any
effective witness to Jesus Christ, and cannot therefore be reckoned
33 Ibid., 112.
34
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with the believers who for their part attest Him, or through more or
less admitted Christians who are not, however, engaged in direct
confession, or direct activity as members of the Christian community,
but in the discharge of a function in world society and its orders and
tasks.39
To reject out of hand the possibility of secular parables of God's Word would
be to dictate from a human standpoint what is and is not possible for God. If one
cannot rule out a priori the possible existence of secular parables of the kingdom,
one must still ask what the positive theological basis is from which Barth can count
on the existence of these parables. One can expect such words in the secular sphere,
he asserts, on the basis of the universality of Christ's Lordship and the objective and
universal reconciliation effected in and through Him. Barth reminds his reader that
"according to the witness of His prophets and apostles grounded in His resurrection,
the sphere of His dominion and Word is in any case greater than that of their
prophecy and apostolate".40
Barth distinguishes between two types of secularism: "between a secularism
which approximates to a pure and absolute form and another which is mixed and
relative".41 Absolute or pure secularism refers to those who "stand unwittingly in
full isolation from the Gospel in its biblical and churchly form" and whose "reaction
to it" would likely "be hostile" 42 Relative secularism, on the other hand, denotes
nominal Christianity.43 Barth adds that it is possible, contrary to what might be
assumed, that the nominally secular sphere may actually be more resistant to the
gospel, given its familiarity with and ability to acquiesce to the Word in certain ways
while in other ways remaining virtually unaffected by the Word due to its subtle
opposition to the gospel. Regardless, the Word as Jesus Christ is able to raise up
witnesses both from the "closer" and "more distant periphery" of this "narrow
sphere"44 Because of Christ, Barth holds out hope for the twofold secular
dimension, since "for Him neither the militant godlessness of the outer periphery of









barrier".45 Because no "Promethianism can be effectively maintained against Jesus
Christ", there can be "no secular sphere abandoned by Him or withdrawn from His
control".46 The Word is able to commandeer these words just as He does those of
Scripture and the Church. What unites the manifold forms of witness that arise from
within these various spheres is their inclusion in Christ by grace. What distinguishes
them is their relative proximity to the Word coupled with their awareness or
unawareness of their inclusion.
Christians must not take any pride in themselves for proclaiming Jesus Christ,
because witnesses to revelation, whether sacred or secular, are not by nature able to
bear witness to God or God's Word. As Barth writes,
Nothing could be further from our minds than to attribute to the
human creature as such a capacity to know God and the one Word of
God, or to produce true words corresponding to this knowledge. Even
in the sphere of the Bible and the Church there can be no question of
any such capacity. If there are true words of God, it is all miraculous.
How much more so, then, in this wider field! What we have in both
cases is the capacity of Jesus Christ to raise up of the stones children
to Abraham, i.e., to take into His service, to empower for this service,
to cause to speak in it, men who are quite without any capacity of their
own.47
Barth develops the Augustinian distinction between the visible and invisible
Church to warn the Church not to assume complacently any position of privilege
over the world:
If the Church is visible, this need not imply that we actually see it in
its full compass, that the dimensions of its sphere might not be very
different from what we think we know them to be. God may suddenly
be pleased to have Abraham blessed by Melchizidek, or Israel blessed
by Balaam or helped by Cyrus. Moreover, it could hardly be denied
that God can speak His Word to man quite otherwise than through the
talk about Himself that is to be found in the Church as known or as yet
to be discovered, and therefore quite otherwise than through
proclamation. He can establish the Church anew and directly when







Not only should Christ's lordship over all of creation prompt one to expect
secular parables of the kingdom, but the objective and universal character of His
salvific work should lead the Christian to the same expectation: "[D]e iure all men
and all creation derive from His cross, from the reconciliation accomplished in Him,
and are ordained to be the theatre of His glory and therefore the recipients and
bearers of His Word."49 One need not, then, have recourse to a natural theology to
claim that true words can be found outside of Church walls: secular parables can be
grounded exclusively in the revelation of Christ. That secular parables of the
kingdom have their basis in Christ's lordship and atoning work and not in some
general revelation available universally is underscored by the fact that these parables
are spoken by people "quite apart from and even in the face of their own knowledge
or volition, something which they could never be of themselves, namely His
witnesses".50 The parables in this secular sphere are, in Hunsinger's words,
"unwitting witnesses".51
Because secular parables of the kingdom are grounded not in the subjectivity
of those who speak them but in the objectivity of God's reconciling work in and
S9
through Jesus Christ, reconciliation for Barth is itself revelation.
We cannot first speak generally and abstractly of the fact that
revelation, as the revelation of the reconciliation of the world to God,
takes place (as it did and will take place), and then come back to Him
as the One who is perhaps no more than the prominent Revealer.5'
Barth goes on to say that, "[a]s the reconciliation takes place in Him, its
revelation takes place through Him".54 Christ the reconciler lives. And because he
lives, "He is His own authentic Witness". Moreover, he alone is responsible for
creating knowledge of his life, "making it actual and therefore possible".55 Not only




Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 265.





also actualizes witness from without given that he himself bears witness to his own
life of paramount glory and power.
At the close of his subsection on parables of the kingdom Barth writes:
Reduced to the simplest formula, what we have said is that Jesus
Christ was, is and will be the light of life, and because the light of life,
of His own reconciling life, therefore and to that extent the one light
incomparable in its majesty and authority.56
For Barth, Jesus Christ is pre-existent to the historical person called by that
name. The historicity of Jesus' life, Barth emphasizes, is real. But, as George
Hunsinger has observed, Barth's Jesus is not fully reducible to His historicity:
... he is not encapsulated in this historicity in an unqualified way.
For his historicity is indissolubly connected with his eternality. It is
therefore at once affirmed, negated, and reconstituted on a higher
plane. Its mere historicity is transcended and overcome. Its
distinctive particularity is at once preserved and yet overcome by,
being integrated into the periochoresis of eternity. It is made integral
to the eternal life of Jesus Christ and therefore acquires a
differentiated presence and distinctive power in relation to all other
historical moments and beings.57
The key term in Hunsinger's analysis is "perichoresis". Because Jesus
Christ's humanity takes part in the Trinitarian interplay and its communication of
properties, it shares in all of the qualities of the three "persons" of the Trinity. Thus,
for example, Barth can speak of Jesus Christ as the "ground of divine immanence".
Because Jesus Christ is this basis of the divine immanence throughout history and
creation, "nothing is to be conceived in which Jesus Christ is not coinherent and,
which in turn is not somehow coinherent in him."59 Hunsinger proposes the image of
a circle to grasp Barth's Christology on this point. Christ forms not only the centre,
but also the outer edge: "Center and periphery ... are regarded as two forms of
55 Ibid., 135.
57
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single truth."60 All of history and creation is encompassed by this circle, and so
whatever truth can be found in history and creation can be said to be in Christ. It is
thus distinct from Jesus Christ while not being outside or alongside of Him.
In a key paragraph Metzger elucidates Barth's position:
The Word who is present to all points in time, the mediator who
mediates all things to God in his person, raises up witnesses to himself
in his role as prophet, not only in Scripture and the church, but also in
broader culture. There is one who reconciles all things to God. And
although there is one great prophet, namely, he who also reconciles,
the possibility exists that this Word will raise up other words from the
world reconciled to God to bear witness to his life, and this by means
of indwelling them. Such words of witness need not be sacred words
because the Word of life has reconciled all things to God, being
present to the whole of history. His dominion knows no bounds. The
Word of God as Jesus Christ is the centre of creaturely reality as the
truth. But he is also present to the circumference of creaturely reality
throughout history as the one who indwells words of witness whereby
they manifest truth. Christ is present to the whole of creation and
human culture, serving as both the centre and as the one who is able to
indwell words on the periphery, causing them to bear witness to
himself.61
There is hope then for witness from God-fearers among the Gentile nations,
such as Naaman, the wise men, and the Queen of Sheba, and hope still that all others
f\9
will someday bear witness with their words and lives to the light of life. The basis
for this hope is Christ as "the light of the world. And therefore to be man is always
zr-5
to stand already, even if with closed or blind eyes, in this light, the light of life."
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Christ is the light of all life. In the reconciliation accomplished in the history
of Jesus Christ, God has altered the general human situation. There is a difference
between the Christian community and the world at large, between the particular
situation in which Christians stand in relation to God, and the general one between
God and the world.64 But the basis for both the particular and general situations is
the same, namely, the reconciliation of the world accomplished in Christ Jesus.65 So,
Barth says, "there are no clear boundaries between them".66 Jesus Christ is the light
67of life in whom all stand, knowingly or unknowingly, "called" or "to be called".
The basis for the hope of "biblical universalism", over against that counterfeit
zro
universalism, or the "historical relativism" of Nathan the Wise, is found in "the
human situation as universally altered and redetermined by the act and Word of God,
by the existence and work of Christ",69 whose light shines even in the dark regions
beyond the Christian sphere of witness to his light. Therefore: "religions of
heathendom" may "come about because man simply does not know or refuses to
know the ground of divine immanence in Jesus Christ", but this does not mean that
those religions cannot speak true words, which are "in" Jesus Christ.70
But how does Barth propose that secular words be evaluated to determine If
they are true words of God, real parables of God's kingdom?
Secular words which are distinct from that of Jesus Christ are "true" insofar as they
stand "in the closest material and substantial conformity and agreement with the one
Word of God".71 Parables of the kingdom can share in the content and truth of God's
Word in Christ "only to the extent that they declare nothing of their own, but in their
utterance and emphasis are prepared to attest this one Word exactly as it is, without
79
subtraction, addition or alteration". Yet how can human words "ever succeed in
attesting and corresponding to the one Word of God, or even try to do so?"













truth of secular parables of the kingdom depends on whether or not they point to
Jesus Christ. As they point to Christ, they do not embody Christ's truth fully, but
rather "express the one and total truth from a particular angle, and to that extent only
implicitly and not explicitly in its unity and totality".75 When the consummation of
God's reign in Christ occurs, all words will fully reflect the light of Christ, but until
then:
there can be no question of anything more than signs of His lordship
or attestations ofHis prophecy, whether in Scripture, in the confession
and message of the community, or in such true words as pierce the
secularism of the worldly life surrounding it in closer or more distant
proximity.76
While all human words can only attain to the truth of God's Word, one can
still delineate several guidelines for evaluating whether or not a secular word is a
parable of the kingdom. Foremost is the question of the "agreement [of these secular
words] with the witness of Scripture".77 No direct prefiguration is expected, but
rather harmonization; true secular parables must not bring anything different from or
contradictory to Scripture.78 A true secular word "will not lead its hearers away from
Scripture, but more deeply into it".79 It will "materially say what [Scripture] says,
80
although from a different source and in another tongue". This does not mean that
secular words must consist only in a straightforward repetition of Scripture in order
to be true. As Hunsinger explains: "the issue is simply one of compatibility or
logical consistency. Secular words are not expected flatly to repeat what is already
known of the content of scripture, but rather to cast light on scripture by being
compatible with it."81 William A. Christian has described this test as "an extended
principle of consistency": if Christians are to suppose that non-Christian words are
really true, then what is said in them must not be inconsistent with Christian
87









Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 267.
82 William A. Christian, Doctrines ofReligious Communities: A Philosophical Study (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1987), 215.
86
importation of value-laden substance that is anti-Biblical or pagan, i.e., not only in
origin or language different from but in content counter to the understanding of God,
of human community and morality, or of nature inherited by the apostolic church
from its Hebrew antecedents".83
A second criterion for evaluating the truth of secular words involves their
compatibility with the dogmas and confessions of the Church. While secular
parables should in general harmonize with these dogmas and confessions, in this
sphere some newness is permissible. Secular parables can extend and fill in existing
84Church dogmas, and might even provoke dogmatic revision. Dogmas are a step
removed from Scripture, and are thus more amenable to change. One must also ask,
Barth suggests, what fruits these secular words bear in the world at large: if they
have a generally salutary effect, the chances are greater that they might be parables
of the kingdom than if they have generally negative consequences. Barth would also
test the effect that secular words have on the Church. For them to be parables of the
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kingdom, they must offer both comfort and correction for the Church. The Church,
in other words, will not only be both challenged by secular parables to repent for past
sins and to live up to its calling but will also be confirmed in that calling, i.e., in its
submission to its Lord, Jesus Christ.
What use are Christians to make of secular parables?
First, Barth claims, they should serve to remind the Church of its failure in its
mission. Their existence should prompt the Church to ask itself why it "has lagged
behind when it ought to have been in the van? Why has it not told itself what it must
now learn from the children of this world?"86 Barth thus contends that the reception
of secular parables should not alter the Church's fundamental mission, the
proclamation of what God has done in Jesus Christ, but instead make it more faithful
to that duty.
83 John Howard Yoder, "The Disavowal of Constantine: An Alternative Perspective on Interfaith
Dialogue", in The Royal Priesthood: Essays Ecclesiological and Ecumenical, ed. Michael G.
Cartwright (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 249.




As useful as secular parables may be for the Church as corrective and
comfort, they cannot become norms for the Church, unlike the Bible, for "they lack
the unity and compactness and therefore the constancy and universality of His self-
revelation as it takes place and is to be sought in Holy Scripture".87 In the first
volume of the Church Dogmatics Barth noted that although true words appear in the
secular sphere, Christians are not thereby obligated or authorized to canonize such
free words of grace:
God may speak to us through a pagan or an atheist, and thus give us to
understand that the boundary between the Church and the secular
world can still take at any time a different course from that which we
think we discern. Yet this does not mean, unless we are prophets, that
we ourselves have to proclaim the pagan or atheistic thing which we
have heard.88
The Church's use of these secular parables will always be provisional and on
an ad hoc basis. The free words from outside of the Church's orbit are always
context-specific, coming to the Church in a specific time and situation. Furthermore,
their reception by the Church is never, in practice, an affair of the whole community.
Because, Barth argues, "the right use of . . . free communications of the Lord can
never be regarded as other than extraordinary", secular parables "cannot be fixed and
OQ
canonized as the Word of the Lord". To canonize secular parables would mark a
failure to exercise the cautious scepticism proper to the reception of such
extraordinary words. Those in the Church who hear true words from outside should
not insist that they become new dogmas for the Church catholic, but should instead
"show themselves to be such as have heard a true word and been radically smitten by
it. They should bring forth the appropriate fruits."90 Barth concludes his treatment
of secular parables by cautioning that one should not claim too much for secular
parables, for "all such phenomena are doubtful and contestable"; conversely, he also
warns that one should not claim too little for the prophecy of the Lord Jesus Christ
and its "almighty power to bring forth such true words even extra muros ecclesiae
and to attest itself through them".91
87 Ibid., 131.
88 CD 1/1,55.




A Recourse to Natural Theology?
The most striking example of the claims that, in CD §69.2, Barth has returned to the
natural theology he had once rejected are associated with Hans Kiing. Kiing claims
that Barth's account of extra-ecclesial truth constitutes a "new evaluation of the
knowledge of God from the world of creation and from 'natural theology' ... a new
Q9
evaluation of the world religions". He contends that Barth concedes "that in the
final analysis there are in fact, 'other lights' alongside the one light of Christ ('tail
lights', as it were, of the one light), that there are 'other true words' alongside the one
QT
Word". He suggests that Barth's "so cogently constructed dogmatic world had
been, at least in principle, exploded (though most of the Barthians had failed to
notice this)" and that the "revelational positivism" that "Dietrich Bonhoeffer had
once criticised from his Nazi prison cell. . . had had the bottom knocked out of it".94
James Barr's 1991 Gifford Lectures, Biblical Faith and Natural Theology,
also attempt to set the acknowledgment of extra-ecclesial words against a detailed
reading of Barth's early polemic against natural theology.911 Barr welcomes Barth's
idea of the extra-ecclesial words as "perhaps . . . something" with respect to the
"recognition of natural theology".96 What constitutes this "something" for Barr is the
claim by Barth that there are other words alongside the one Word.
For Barr natural theology deals with a knowledge of God that is inherent in
human beings and whose function is preparatory for "the special revelation of God
97 • r*made through Jesus Christ, through the Church, through the Bible". By virtue of
this "natural" knowledge of God:
people can understand Christ and his message, can feel themselves
sinfiil and in need of salvation, because they already have this
appreciation, dim as it may be, of God and of morality. The "natural
knowledge" of God, however dim, is an awareness of the true God,
92 Hans Kiing, Theologyfor the Third Millenium: An Ecumenical View, trans. Peter Heinegg (New
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and provides a point of contact without which special revelation
would never be able to penetrate.98
Barr recognises that such natural theology as he describes was originally
denied any legitimacy by Barth.99 Barr describes this denial in terms of Barth's
rejection of any preparatory knowledge of God:
The revelation of God did not fit into a point of contact with what was
already there: it made its own new contact, quite independently of any
previously existing contact point.100
Barth's rejection was linked to a refusal to acknowledge a source of
knowledge "previous to, or separate from, or supplementary to, the revelation of God
in Christ".101
What is problematic in Barr's assessment of Barth's position on natural
theology is Barr's attempt to equate the recognition of "other words alongside the
one Word" with a possible recognition by Barth of a natural theology which might
> 102
presuppose the independence of these "other" words vis a vis the one Word.
The discussion in CD §69.2 of the relationship between the words and the
Word indicates that Barth does not allow for any word that is independent of the
Word. Barth's rejection of any independent source of revelation reflects, in turn, his
consistent adherence to a particular theological position which, it turns out, is a
foundation both of the rejection of natural theology and of the affirmation of extra-
ecclesial truth.
Barth alludes to this issue in his famous essay, "No": "If there really is such a
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unaffected?"10j In Barth's Gifford lectures natural theology is linked to the modern,
autonomous, Cartesian human104 who claims to occupy "an independent and secure
position over and against God".105 For Barth such a human and the God whom
he/she presupposes are abstractions in equal measure.106
This link between natural theology and the human desire for autonomy is
given an even higher profde in Barth's most considered account of natural theology,
found in CD §26, "The Knowability of God."107 Indeed, it is precisely this link that
Barth cites as the key reason for the persistence of natural theology within the history
of the Church. Barth claims that even the Christian persists in abstracting his/her
own existence from that of Jesus Christ, thus taking up a position over and against
Him. This strikes at the very heart of the gospel. Faith "would have to be annulled
and the Church . . . would have to be shattered, if even for a single moment man
108could and should again exist as such independently".
It is not, however, as if such independence is prohibited only within the
Church. Barth insists that the Church has no right to address non-believers as if they
existed independently of God. It is not true that any unbeliever "stands and upholds
himself'.109 On the contrary, Barth says, "the truth of his existence is simply this -
that Jesus Christ has died and risen again for him. It is this and this alone which is to
be proclaimed to him as his truth."110
The basic objection to natural theology for Barth is that God is
incomprehensible apart from God's dealings with humanity, and cannot be found
apart from those dealings. It is this same basic understanding, used in the 1930's
against natural theology, that is now used as one of the foundations of Barth's
103 Karl Barth, "No", in Emil Brunner and Karl Barth, Natural Theology, trans. Peter Fraenkel
(London: Geoffrey Bles, 1946), 85.
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account of extra-ecclesial words. The very possibility of extra-ecclesial words is
grounded, in part, in Barth's claim that:
while man may deny God, according to the Word of Reconciliation
God does not deny man. Man may be hostile to the Gospel of God,
but this Gospel is not hostile to him. The fact that he is closed to it
does not alter the further fact that it is open for him. Nor does the fact
that he does not recognise the sovereignty of Jesus Christ, and if he
did would perhaps rebel against it in his autonomy, result in its losing
any of its validity even in relation to him.111
Such words emerge, therefore, as a particular instance of God's covenantal
union with men and women. As Hunsinger comments:
. . . the possibility of secular parables was explained without recourse
to positing any innate human capacities and therefore without
recourse to natural theology. Secular parables, like any true human
words (including those of the Bible and the church) find the condition
for their possibility strictly in the miracle of grace. They are free
actualizations of a possibility which belongs to (and remains with)
Jesus Christ alone. "If there are true words of God, it is all
miraculous" (p. 118[C£> IV/3]).112
Barth wishes to affirm two things. First, the Word of Christ is the truth; and
second, He is the basis for all true words about God and humanity.113 Barth writes
that the truth as Jesus Christ "is the truth, in which all truths, the truth of God
particularly and the truth of man, are enclosed, not as truths in themselves, but as
rays or facets of its truth."114 Metzger contends, however, that the question may still
persist in the mind of the reader though as to the "cogency of Barth's claim that there
exist non-particular words of witness to the particular Word".115 Metzger refers to T.
F. Torrance's comment on Barth's discussion of Jesus Christ as ascended in Church
Dogmatics IV/3, writing: "Christ seemed to be swallowed up in the transcendent
Light and Spirit of God, so that the humanity of the risen Jesus appeared to be
111 CD IV/3, 119.
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displaced by what [Barth] called 'the humanity of God' in its turning toward us".116
Metzger comments that "in spite of Barth's concern to champion particularity over
against abstraction as witnessed in his rejection of the logos asarkos, and in spite of
his own denials, his discussion of secular witness may suggest to many"117 that Barth
is himself guilty of promoting the very thing he seems to oppose - "abstract
impartations".118
Barth argues that the "abstraction" of non-particular words is "only apparent"
since they point beyond themselves to the one Word of God, the "centre and totality,
and therefore to Jesus Christ".119 "They do not express partial truths" for the one
1 90
Word of God, Jesus Christ, "declares Himself in them". Thus, through his
121
indwelling presence, "they express the one and total truth from a particular angle".
They may bear witness to the Word from the angle or standpoint of pointing to "the
goodness of the original creation", or the "jeopardising" of the creation, "its
122
liberation", or its future glory. Even so, even from such "particular" angles, they
are witnesses of the one truth because they bear witness to the one kingdom of God
revealed in his Word.123 Their witness is implicit, not explicit.124 These words of
true witness "indirectly point" to Him, the Word, who "indirectly declares" Himself
in them.12:1 Nonetheless, their witness faithfully reflects "the one light of the one
116 Ibid. See also T. F. Torrance, Karl Barth, Biblical and Evangelical Theologian (Edinburgh: T&T
Clark, 1990), 134.
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reason for the latter's natural theology - which is a mistake. At the hands of Brunner, "the Logos
becomes an abstract principle" (ibid). By contrast, the Logo.? for Barth is always concrete and
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truth" as a "particular refraction".126 These words are words of witness, true words
bearing witness to the Word who is the truth, their truthfulness being conditioned,
"presupposed and implied" in view of their "connexion with the totality of Jesus
127Christ and his prophecy".
Metzger explicates Barth's position thus:
It is because the Word as Jesus Christ indwells these words that they
bear witness. Moreover, one only comes to know that such words
bear witness to the Word by proceeding from the Word himself to
these words (or from the Word as he manifests himself in the more
direct forms of witness in Scripture and the church), rather than from
these words to the Word. In view of the Word who causes them to
bear witness, and through whom one knows that they bear witness,
however indirectly, one knows they bear witness, not abstractly, but
concretely from the standpoint of their "particular orientation". How
though does one actually discern which words in the secular
community bear witness to the Word of Christ? How will one know
which words in the secular sphere bear witness to the particular Word
when such words do not explicitly reflect that particularity? For
Barth, these words demonstrate their truthfulness by calling the church
to the Word of Christ. Such witnesses are attested by Scripture and
"will not lead us away from, but more deeply into, the communio
sanctorum of all ages which is attested in these documents".128
The importance of Barth's concept of "secular words" for inter-religious
encounter
Metzger is correct when he says that:
It appears safe to assume that implicit in Barth's statements ... is the
idea that witnesses may . . . emerge from within the context of the
non-Christian religions. Here then "secular word" is taken to refer to









Metzger's position is validated by Thompson. Thompson, in his unpublished
PhD thesis, recounts a conversation he had with Kiing in 1992. During this
conversation Kiing stated that Barth had confided to him "that although he [Barth]
had not explicitly referred to them, he did have the other religions in mind when he
was writing the account of extra-ecclesial truth".130
Barth's concept of secular parables of the kingdom therefore provides
theological justification for a way of conceiving how the words (and actions) of non-
Christian religions might be affirmed as "signs" or "parables" of the one Word of
God, Jesus Christ.
Hunsinger points to the sovereign freedom of the Word as the way in which it
can and does declare itself in the secular sphere:
Insofar as the one Word of God declares itself in this way, in the form
of secular parables, it becomes clear that, despite all ambiguity, the
real contextual whole in which these words participate is only
apparently secular; in reality it is actually christocentric.' 1
Thus, like Christian words, secular (or non-Christian) words must be "taken
up" into Jesus Christ for them to be true. However, unlike Christian words they are
"unwitting witnesses" to Jesus Christ: only in Christianity does the speaking of true
words have an epistemological dimension. Not only is Christian proclamation true
due to its being taken up into Jesus Christ, but the proclaimers are granted knowledge
of that which they proclaim, i.e., they are granted the knowledge of the name of Jesus
Christ.
Because the Church's reception of parables of the kingdom should always be
"ad hoc and ephemeral",132 one cannot claim on their basis anything positive for non-
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Christian religions or philosophies taken as a whole. "We may listen quietly to
others," Barth counsels:
We may hear what is said by the whole history of religion, poetry,
mythology and philosophy. We shall certainly meet there with many
things which might be claimed as elements of the Word spoken by
Jesus Christ. But what a mass of rudiments and fragments which in
their isolation and absoluteness say something very different from this
Word!133
Although one can affirm the presence of true words of God in non-Christian and
secular words, one may not infer from these signs of God's free, overpowering grace
that non-Christian and secular words are all therefore equally valid paths to truth and
of Barth's strategy by alluding to the definition of theology in the opening pages of the Church
Dogmatics. There, Thompson states, "Barth declares that theology is a self-critical task performed
within the Church which presupposes both the presence of Christ in the Church and the fact of
Christian confession. It is this confession which theology subjects to scrutiny by the measure of
Christ" (Thompson, " 'As open to the world as any theologian could be . . .'?: Karl Barth's Account of
Extra-Ecclesial Truth and Its Value to Christianity's Encounter with Other Religious Traditions", 38).
As such, theology "follows the talk of the Church to the extent that in its question as to the correctness
of its utterance it does not measure it by an alien standard but by its own source and object" (CD 1/1,
4). Here is the foundation of theology as internal self-description. Frei speaks of this self-descriptive
task as re-description: theology is the community of faith seeking to re-describe its first-level
assertions: "It is an exploration not usually of their truth, but of their meaning; it is their re-description
in technical concepts rather than their explanation" (Frei, Types ofChristian Theology, 81). Yet, says
Frei, the question that then emerges "is whether theology in this sense subordinates or eliminates all
relation" to other enterprises (ibid., 39). Frei's answer is clear: Barth's theology is characterised not
by elimination of such relations but by the subordination of such other enterprises to theology. In a
passage that gives credence to Frei's analysis, Barth says: "A free theologian does not deny, nor is he
[sic] ashamed of, his indebtedness to a particular philosophy or ontology, to ways of thought and
speech. These may be traditional or a bit original, old or new, coherent or incoherent. No one speaks
exclusively in Biblical terms. . . . [The theologian] is a philosopher 'as though he were not' and he
has his ontology 'as though he had it not' . . .. His ontology will be subject to criticism and control by
his theology and not conversely" (Karl Barth, "The Gift of Freedom", in The Humanity ofGod, trans.
John Newton Thomas (London: Collins, 1961), 92-3). In Frei's analysis, what emerges from this
particular form of interaction between theology's "first-level assertions" and the "technical concepts"
of other disciplines is a total of three different levels of discourse: "Barth .. . finds the heart of
theological discourse in the constant transition between first-order Christian statements, especially
biblical confession and exegesis, and their second-order redescription, in which description as internal
dogmatic description makes use of third order free, unsystematic, and constant reference to conceptual
patterns of a non-Christian, non-theological kind - including phenomenology, conceptual analysis,
Hegelian philosophy, analyses of contemporary culture, and so on" (Frei, Types ofChristian
Theology, 43). The usefulness of Frei's analysis to this thesis is in his distinction of the different
levels of discourse. As Thompson states: "In an instance of ad hoc correlation, the text... is a
second-order redescription of first-order, theological convictions making use of third-order, non-
theological concepts" (see Thompson, " 'As open to the world as any theologian could be . . .'?: Karl
Barth's Account of Extra-Ecclesial Truth and Its Value to Christianity's Encounter with Other
Religious Traditions", 39).
133 CD IV/3, 108.
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salvation. Not, however, because Christianity as a human religion is the one true
path to salvation, but because all truth and salvation is contained within and comes
through the one Word of God, Jesus Christ.
What type of encounter between Christian and non-Christian (Jew or Muslim)
could find warrant from Barth's framework?
Bruce Marshall is correct when he states:
Dialogue with the adherents of other views of the world can give the
Christian community compelling reasons to change its own
established beliefs, without requiring it to surrender its identity by
epistemicly decentralizing the gospel narratives. . . . The community
cannot reasonably accept truth claims which are simply incoherent
with its own most central beliefs, but it may expect that significant
claims and good reasons for accepting them can come, in principle,
from virtually any quarter.134
Marshall continues:
Whether and to what extent Christians share non-trivial beliefs with
adherents of other worldviews, or encounter in other worldviews
compelling reasons to change their established beliefs, is a strictly
empirical matter. This is not at all to say that the Christian community
should not expect to share, or come to share, significant commitments
with other communities (in some of which its own members will, of
course, also participate). But to try to stipulate what this shared
content or these convincing reasons should be in advance of actual
dialogue between communities and worldviews is to fall prey to a
generalizing strategy which . . . invites distortion of normative
meaning on both sides of the dialogue. This is especially pertinent in
regard to Christian dialogue with other religious communities, whose
webs of belief are as comprehensive as its own and with which it
shares no members (as it regularly does, for example, with political
communities). The degree to which the Christian community will find
in the claims of other communities compelling reasons to change its
own beliefs cannot be decided a priori, but can only be discovered on
a case by case basis, by actual dialogue with those communities. This
dialogue has the best chance of success - of identifying without
distortion of either community's outlook the actual points of shared
belief, of deep-seated difference, and of reasons which might lead to
134 Bruce D. Marshall, "Truth Claims and the Possibility of Jewish-Christian Dialogue", Modern
Theology, 8 (1992), 235.
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change - when it is rooted in a quasi-ethnographic attempt to
understand the other community on its own terms. .13
Marshall further contends that: "[a]s the Christian community undertakes
dialogue with other religious communities in this case by case fashion it may
discover that there are some with which it shares more than others, and which offer it
more numerous and more compelling reasons to change its own established
beliefs."136 Marshall's "case by case fashion" corresponds to Barth's "ad hoc and
ephemeral" situations.
It is precisely in this respect that Marshall believes the relation of Christianity
1 T7
to Judaism is unique. The Church shares with Israel a canonical text. There is no
other community with which the Church has this particular relationship, and indeed
this allegiance of two different communities to the same normative text is without
parallel among world religious traditions. By sharing a canonical text with Judaism,
Christians "should expect that dialogue with Jews will not only disclose a range of
common beliefs and commitments already in place, but will consistently give
1 TO
Christians reasons to change their own beliefs".
It is Marshall's belief that Christians can learn from Jews how to read their
own scriptures. They can learn how to interpret the text they share with Jews in
ways which are more deeply formed by the details which cumulatively give the text
its shape, and so be given "reasons of the most forceful kind for modifying their own
belief and practice".139
Marshall's understanding of the unique relationship between Christianity and
Judaism corresponds to Barth's view of who constitutes the community of those who
are elected in Christ. But it must be recognised that Barth's view of Israel is not
shared by contemporary rabbinic Judaism as a whole. For instance, Michael









which Israel's God simply has not done: "Jewish faith does not testify to it".140 The
incarnation is a story which Judaism "does not hear".141 More radically, Michael
Goldberg argues that the incarnation is an act which is incompatible with the identity
of the God attested in the Tanakh.142
Despite these positions within rabbinic Judaism, it is acceptable to believe, in
concert with Marshall, that "the fact that Jews and Christians share a canonical text,
one which shapes and corrects the particular nexus of belief and practice which
constitutes each community, is the chief condition for . . . a dialogue in which
Christians can learn from Jews about how to be Christians".143 In tandem with the
conclusion to Chapter 2, this position should also be extended to include Islam -
Christians can and should learn from Muslims about how to be Christians.
Conclusion
From Barth's framework, words from other religions can and should be tested
against Scripture and Church dogmas in order to "include" those words from other
religions which are true within the light of Christ.144 Through the dialogical process,
Christians can come to discern, exegetically and a posteriori, whether or not these
words are parables of God's kingdom.
140 Michael Wyschogrod, "Why was and is the theology of Karl Barth of interest to a Jewish
theologian?", in Footnotes to a theology: the Karl Barth Colloquium of1972, ed. Martin H.
Rumscheidt (The Corporation for the Publication of Academic Studies in Religion in Canada, 1974),
100.
141 Ibid.
142 See Michael Goldberg, "God, Action, and Narrative: Which Narrative? Which Action? Which
God?", The Journal ofReligion, 68.1 (1988), 39-56.
143 Marshall, "Truth Claims and the Possibility of Jewish-Christian Dialogue", 238. Sonderegger
echoes Marshall's position. She writes: "Barth, I think has real concrete Jews in mind - not the
delicate 'ancient Hebrews' ofmuch Protestant imagination - and these Jews have an authentic history.
. . . The events of post-biblical history - the destruction of the Second Temple, the rise of rabbinic
Judaism , the medieval ghetto life, the Jewish life in dispersion - they all gain significance in Barth's
work because they are 'facts', they happened in our world. . . . The Jews are historically serious
because ... [t]hey are 'mediators' between Jesus ofNazareth and those who believe in him. They
'reflect' Jesus, because they, like him, are Jews; they 'reflect' humanity, because they, like all flesh,
are sinful." See Sonderegger, That Jesus Christ was born a Jew: Karl Barth's "Doctrine ofIsrael",
69.
144
Hunsinger contends that Barth's position is inclusivist in the sense that it holds that truth is where
one finds it. True words may by found outside the Church which need to be heard within the Church.
Such words might pertain to any aspect of the Church's belief or practice. His position is
uncompromising in the sense that subjectivism, pluralism and relativism (three compromises
associated with inclusivity) are all ruled out (see Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 279).
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The discovery of parables of the kingdom will always occur in an ad hoc
fashion. But, Alain Epp Weaver writes, "since they have only provisional status, the
theologian should not attempt to order them into a static system or develop a fixed
method by which to discern them. . . . Scripture, in other words, will test words
from other religions to determine if they are parables of the kingdom or not."145 But,
as Johnson contends, Scripture is not "the Word of God per se", it "is a sign that
seeks to bear witness to who God is."146 Weaver writes further: "since scripture does
not consist of a method or a set of rules, but comprises rather multiple narratives of
human proclamations about God's free grace towards humanity, the results which
this 'test' of scripture will produce can never be known in advance of the Christian
community's prayerful consideration of the significance of non-Christian words in
the light of the biblical text."147
Not only would such an inter-religious encounter with the other Abrahamic
faiths serve the purpose of giving Christians a deeper understanding of scripture; it
1 48
could also function as a critique of Christian dogma and practice. Revisions made
because of the reception of these parables must, of course, be compatible with
scripture - "what is seen and heard" 149 must be tested by this norm. As Hunsinger
explains: "It will be necessary for the community to learn new things for the future
which go beyond the past and which could not have been taught when the dogmas
and confessions were formulated."150 Nonetheless, these new things "will somehow
be an extension of the line visible in the dogmas and confessions".151 Therefore, in
the midst of innovation, continuity with the past will not be broken, but will be taken
up and continued "with new responsibility on the basis of better instruction".152
This approach thrusts Barth's ideas into the current theological debate about
Christian encounter with the other Abrahamic religions, in particular Islam. It
145 Alain Epp Weaver, "Parables of the Kingdom and Religious Plurality: with Barth and Yoder
toward a Nonresistant Public Theology", The Mennonite Quarterly Review, 73.3 (July, 1998), 437.
146
Johnson, The Mystery ofGod: Karl Barth and the Postmodern Foundations of Theology, 32, 185.
147
Weaver, "Parables of the Kingdom and Religious Plurality: with Barth and Yoder toward a
Nonresistant Public Theology", 437-8.
148 Barth allowed for secular parables to revise existing Church dogma (cf. CD IV/3, 127).
149 CD IV/3, 125.
150
Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 268.
151 CD IV/3, 127.
152 Ibid.
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provides potential for Christian preconceptions concerning the content of Scripture to
be challenged, thus bringing about new, fresh interpretations that are consistent with
the Word of God, whilst also allowing for the possibility of discerning God's
presence in the other Abrahamic faiths. It also provides an equally strong
commitment to acknowledging the genuine diversity of those other religions whilst




Truth extra muros ecclesiae II - the "little lights of creation" as analogous to
the just state: providing the Church with an arena for inter-religious encounter
Introduction
Most discussions concerning Karl Barth and truth extra muros ecclesiae focus on
that part of §69.2 known as "The Word and the words".1 Thompson is correct to
believe that for the purposes of inter-religious encounter, any discussion concerning
Karl Barth and truth extra muros ecclesiae should be extended to include what is
commonly termed "Creation and its Tights' ".2 Here one finds a second and less
commonly noticed sense of Barth's understanding of truth extra muros ecclesiae, one
which points to aspects of the created order and human creativity that relate
indirectly to Jesus Christ.
While Barth never gave an example of a secular parable of the Kingdom of
God, this chapter will argue that the text known as "Creation and its Tights' " stands
in continuity with Barth's understanding of the just state. His essay "The Christian
Community and the Civil Community" almost exactly parallels his argument for the
lights of creation in CD §69.2 and is Barth's most concrete expression of the just
state.
The just state is a state which strives for justice, peace and the common good
for all of its citizens, Christians and non-Christians alike. Christians submit to the
authority of the state as this is the ordered context within which the "collective life"
of humanity can be maintained, and the Gospel preached. The service of the Church
to the state is therefore directed towards the establishment of a just political order.
The Church must always hope for a just state which is interested primarily in human
beings and not in abstract causes, which is constituted by a commonly acknowledged
1
See, for example Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape ofHis Theology, Metzger, The
Word ofChrist and the World ofCulture: Sacred and Secular through the Theology ofKarl Barth and
David Lochhead, The Dialogical Imperative: A Christian Reflection on Interfaith Encounter (London:
SCM, 1988).
2 This view is also held by Michael Welker who believes that this section is crucial to any discussion
of inter-religious encounter. He expressed this opinion to the author in a conversion in Heidelberg on
29th July 2006. (The titles "The Word and words" and "Creation and its 'lights' " are borrowed from
Thompson's article "Religious Diversity, Christian Doctrine and Karl Barth", 3-24).
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law which protects all citizens and from which no citizens are exempt. The Church
must always hope for a just state which recognises that it must also have special
responsibility for those citizens who are socially and economically weak and
threatened, and which guarantees its citizens an equality of responsible freedom, i.e.,
freedom properly balanced by duties to the common good. In striving for such
justice, Barth believes that members of the Church can make similar political
decisions to "non-Christians" because of their mutual dependency upon God. This
mutual dependency parallels the mutual dependency of the Abrahamic faiths argued
for in Chapter 2. This chapter therefore interprets Barth's term "non-Christians" to
include those from the other Abrahamic faiths.
Within Barth's understanding of democratic society, the potential exists for
inter-religious encounter to have concrete expression. His work provides a model for
pluralist European society where the Christian community can make common cause
with those from the other Abrahamic religions, specifically Islam, in striving for
justice and the common good of all citizens.
Creation and its lights
Though Barth explains how secular words of truth demonstrate their truthfulness, he
does not give examples of such secular witness. His reasoning for this is that he does
not wish to "make pronouncements on matters on which" Jesus Christ "has already
spoken or will perhaps do".3 He simply wishes to point out that Christ is able to
"bring forth such true words" of witness "even extra muros ecclesiae". 4
Having said this, though, Metzger contends that "Barth points to Mozart as
one such parable ofwitness":5
In its own particular way, the music of Mozart may, in the light of the




Metzger, The Word ofChrist and the World ofCulture, 139
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a parabolic veil, calling the church "more deeply into . . . the
communio sanctorum " of the ages.6
In principle Barth would also be open to receiving such parables from other
areas of life which might include "political, social, intellectual, academic, artistic,
literary, moral or religious life".7 As Chapter 3 has shown, the potential exists within
Barth's framework to be able to receive a word form other religions. So it is
reasonable to believe, for the purposes of encouraging inter-religious encounter and
the subsequent quest to discover an arena for that encounter (where possible secular
parables from other religions can exist for Christianity), that one should investigate
the section called "Creation and its lights".8
In addition to the statement about Jesus Christ as the one light, Barth feels
that another statement has to be made about the light or lights that relate indirectly to
Jesus Christ. These are the lights or truths or words of creation. The ensuing
discussion is introduced as a "delimitation"9 not simply to the discussion of true
words, but to the whole Christological discussion of CD §69.2. Barth describes it as
a "second statement"10 which is only indirectly Christological but which is "essential
to a true and keen yet also confident understanding of everything thus far said".11
Barth highlights this delimitation by insisting that he is now addressing himself to the
creatura which "[i]n the words of Calvin ... is the theatrum gloriae Dei" or, in his
own words, "the external basis of the covenant which conversely is its internal
12basis". The fundamental point is that creation has its own lights which declare the
truth of the reality and continuing existence of creation. The truth of these lights is
grounded in, but quite distinct from the truth of the one Word and its constitutive
words: these lights "cannot be regarded as identical with, or even a parable of. . . the
6 Ibid. See also Karl Barth, "Mozart's Freedom", in Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart, trans. Clarence K.
Pott (Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns, 1986), 56-7.
7 CD IV/3, 135.
8
Geoffrey W. Bromiley contends that here Barth reconsiders the question of a second and subsidiary
line or strand which he considered in CD II/l (see Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Introduction to the Theology
ofKarl Barth (Edinburgh, T&T Clark, 1979), 221). In a conversation the author had with Dr. Hans-
Anton Drewes at the Barth Archiv in Basel on 8th August 2006, Drewes stated that he understood this
short text to be a "silent conversation" between Barth and Hans Urs von Balthasar.







kingdom of heaven". He continues immediately: "The world as such can produce
i -5
no parables of the kingdom of heaven".
The most telling distinction between the words and the lights "which must be
underlined"14 is that between the unity of all the words with each other and the Word
on the one hand, and the partial and discrete character of the lights on the other. The
words are themselves segments of a periphery and as such "point to the whole of the
periphery and therefore to the centre";15 the lights "make themselves known only as
partial truths . . . none of them is the one whole truth".16
The Basic Claim
Barth's basic claim in this short section of §69.2 is that there are truths which belong
to creation qua creation. There are various features of creation which, accessible
through "the application of the good but limited gift of common sense",17 point to the
18order of creation itself as something "lasting, persistent and constant". They are
"created lights which shine and may be seen ... in and with the being of the
creaturely world".19 They declare the "orders", "limits" and "directions" in which
90
human and all other creaturely life is lived." As they point to the order and being of
creation, they are reminders that creation is creation and not chaos: they "shed a
certain brightness in the darkness and resist the onslaught of gloom".21
Barth does not specify particular lights in detail; instead he describes the
features of creation which gives it its luminous character. Firstly, he refers to the
existence (Dasein) of the whole cosmos as an existence of reciprocal objectivity and
subjectivity between its constituent parts.22 Secondly, this existence is said to be










Ibid., 157. This is also intimated in Barth's exposition of the creation of the heavenly lights in
Genesis 1:14-19 (see CD III/l, 156-158).
21
Ibid., 142.
22 See ibid., 143-4, KD IV/3, 162.
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rediscovery".23 Thirdly, "the rhythm of existence" is difficult to describe in neutral
terms; it is predicated on a certain "inner contrariety" (inneren Gegensatzlichkeit) in
creation.24 Fourthly, there is the susceptibility of the world to its partial description
9 S
by "natural and spiritual laws". Fifthly, and, most importantly, as well as revealing
"occurrence", the world summons and invites its "active ordering and shaping of
things and therefore . . . freedom".26 Alongside "contemplation and apprehension"
27there is "choice and volition", as well as "decisions and action". The creature is
thus engaged in "teleological interpretation, planning and creation" and is thus also
9R
"free in the distinguishing, seizing and realising of its own hidden possibilities".
Sixthly, there is a feature which exercises a critical function with respect to the
29
others, namely the "depth" or "unfathomable mystery" of creation. Barth strongly
asserts that this is not the mystery of God, but a mystery immanent to the world. Its
critical function is a dual one:
The mystery of creation gives salutary peace to the extent that it is a
direction to keep to what we know and can do within the limit set for
us, but also salutary dispeace to the extent that it is obviously a
direction within this limit to ask daily what more might be known or
what might be done better.30
Central to Barth's argument is the fact that creation has this luminous, self-
declaratory character. Equally important, however, is that such luminosity is actually
perceived. Here Barth develops the idea of a "reciprocity of converse between
creature and creature".31 The human creature knows "this world and itselfwithin it.
. . with the eyes and ears, with reason, emotion and conscience".32 But the human
being does not simply know creation, she is also addressed by it:
the world created by God does not merely exist but also speaks to one
at least of its creatures, i.e., to man, giving itself to be perceived by
23 Ibid., 144.
24










him. And in this creature, in man, it does not merely exist but hears
itself speak, receiving the message which it imparts.33
This conversation is to be understood as the context in which there is issued a
"summons and invitation to the active ordering and shaping of things".34 It is a
conversation between the intelligible and intelligent world: "the encounter of the
intelligible with the intelligent cosmos" which "awakens and stimulates ... a
spontaneous work of ordering and fashioning corresponding to the particular way it .
. . is the cosmos". The implication is that the lights of creation provoke and
stimulate creaturely activity which in turn yields practices and insights which
"correspond" to the being and existence of the cosmos. To the extent that they do
correspond to the being and existence of the cosmos, such insights and practices can
also be described as true. For example, referring to the laws and formulae which are
"discovered" and "established" on the basis of creation's luminosity, Barth declares
that they too, within the relativity that constrains all such creaturely activity, can
36"claim to be constant and continual. . . truths".
The reference to "laws and formulae" is not the only concrete example of
insights and practices which Barth gives in the core text. Elsewhere in CD IV/3
Barth offers other examples which further illuminate his thought in this regard/7 In
38
one list described as "lights which illumine the cosmos", he includes "[sjcientific
discovery, artistic intuition and creation, political revolution, moral reorientation and
rearmament". In another list, under the heading of the "essential constants of
human existence",40 he includes the "state", "work", "trade", the "different forms of





37 See Thompson, "Religious Diversity, Christian Doctrine and Karl Barth", 15.





The truth of the lights
The "truth" of the lights ultimately rests in God in terms of their unity with the one
light and of their distinction from it. Everything which Barth says about the unity of
the lights with the one light is conditioned by the utter supremacy of the latter.
God's self-declaration in Jesus Christ is not "a mere irruption of some higher,
original and true light".42 Instead, it is the "one true light of the one truth above or
alongside which there can be no other rival truth".43 Thus he asks, "Are there truths
outside this one?"44 He answers affirmatively by appealing analogously to the fact
that "the creature has its being and existence outside God".45 Just as God is the
source of that which is external to himself, so He is the source of the truth which is
associated with the creature. Although God and the world "are not two elements
related on one and the same level",46 they nevertheless
co-exist in such a way that in free grace God gives it to the world that
it should be what it is as such in the way it is, deriving its own being
and existence only from this gift. The same is true of the relationship
between the one light of the self-declaration of God and the many
lights which declare the being, existence and nature of the world
created by Him.47
Barth illustrates this claim by employing the image of a light and its rays.
Negatively, Barth denies that the relationship is that of "two rays [Brechungen] from
one and the same light, or two sides, aspects or parts of one and the same truth".48
Positively, the lights of creation, as rays, refract the one light of God's self-
declaration.
Refraction always involves varying degrees of distortion. The refracted
image is not the same as the original. To see a created light is, therefore, to see
something which owes its origin to the one light of life, but it is not to see that one
light. As the one light rises and shines in the cosmos, "it kindles the lights with
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service".49 But despite this kindling and empowering, the lights do not participate in
the declaration of the covenant. As refractions of the light, their service is not that of
the witnesses to the Word,50 but of creation's own self-witness:
the service of the self-witness of the world that in its existence and
nature it is a real world, which is sustained and upheld, which has a
basis of constancy as the sphere of the occurrence and revelation of
the grace of God in Jesus Christ, and which as such may have
continuing essence and existence.51
Another way to conceptualize this unity and distinction is to talk about
"constancy" and "history" in both creation and covenant respectively. Although
"constancy" is invoked as a defining feature of the lights, Barth does not allow it to
divide creation from covenant, characterized as covenant is by "history":
On a theological estimation the important thing in the existence of this
theatre and setting is not the fact that histories are found in it too, but
that, even when seen and understood as history, it is a sequence and
repetition of the same or very similar events . . . [And] if there are not
lacking lines and continuities and constants in the life and work of
Jesus Christ too, the theologically significant thing in this case is that
along these lines we are dealing with history, with concrete events, not
with the general features which they share but the particularity with
which they take place in this way here and now.52
It is therefore possible to affirm that "[t]he one order [Die eine Ordnung] at
stake is not just uniform but multiform"; it "does not exclude the many, the
particular, the change, the alteration, the diversity"53 but quite definitely includes
them. The Light and the lights are "not to be thought of as at cross purposes".54
They can "co-exist in such a way that in free grace God gives it to the world that it










The truths of creation persist therefore even after the advent of reconciliation.
As the drama of reconciliation unfolds, it does not dispense with the stage of
creation. This point is made in tandem with an assertion of the persistence of
creation even when it is assailed by human sin:
Even the sin of man cannot shake its constancy, whether by way of
diminution, addition or alteration. But as it was and will be, it
becomes a corrupted world by reason of man's sin, falling under the
divine curse and being enveloped in darkness. Again, its constancy
and essence are not altered even by reconciliation, even by the
establishment, realisation and fulfilment of the covenant of grace
between God and man, even by the life and work of Jesus Christ. . .
Creatura, the creaturely world as such, persists both as the sphere and
place of sin and also the sphere and place of the reconciliation
accomplished and being accomplished in Jesus Christ.56
Even more fundamentally, the co-existence of the Light and lights is itself
grounded within the life of God. God is and remains the Creator as He reconciles the
world to Himself: "If what He does as the Founder and Lord of this covenant is not
the same as what He does as Creator, He does not do either without the other, but
does both simultaneously and in co-ordination."57 This emphasis on the persistence
of God's identity as Creator and on his work of creation establishes, in turn, a link
between the truths of creation and God's providential care of creation:
The work ofHis creative grace has in view His reconciling grace. But
the converse is also true, so that He is always the Guarantor, Sustainer
and Protector of His creaturely world, of the cosmos or nature, thus
giving it constancy in the being with which he endowed it at
creation.58
The functions of the lights
Barth ascribes two different sets of functions to the lights. The first set are the
functions which they exercise in the role given to them as lights of creation per se.
The second set are the functions which they acquire in the process which Barth






Firstly, then, their function as lights of creation per se is limited. Their
limited power and authority is repeatedly contrasted with the absolute power and
authority of the one light. Barth acknowledges that these lights enlighten the human
condition: its "possibilities, situation and environment".60 Yet he equally insists that
even as they enlighten, they "bring ... no shattering news of promise" nor any
"shattering word of command".61
Notwithstanding their relativity, these lights nevertheless perform the
constructive function of establishing the "orders", "limits" and "directions" of
creation.62 Again, Barth seeks to distinguish such order from monotony, uniformity
and the absolute absence of history. It is the mutuality of its history and its
constancy that distinguishes creation and its lights from brute fate. It is for this
reason that creation's luminosity can evoke the human response and action which
contributes to the establishment of order in the world.
What Barth also does is link this order-sustaining function of these lights with
the language of his doctrine of providence. They are a force, albeit a relative one,
against "chaos".63 Their light is real light and, although it does not conquer the
darkness, it nevertheless confronts the darkness, and in so doing, constrains and
limits it. As these lights "point to this order . . . they shed a certain brightness in the
darkness and resist the onslaught of gloom. They draw attention to something that
counts, and must always be taken into account."64 Their function thus parallels and
is, in fact, intrinsic to the relative but indispensable function of God's providential
relationship to the world marred by human sin:
And for all the conceivable and actual error of man concerning God,
his fellows and himself, their terrestrial truth in all its relativity is at
least an obstacle to the onrush of chaos into the terrestrial life so









Secondly, the main thrust of Barth's comments on the function of these
lights, and their "institution and integration" into the one light, is that what they once
did relatively, they now do absolutely.66 Whether it be with respect to their only
relatively binding character, their discrete and partial nature, or their lack of finality,
the constant refrain of this discussion is that "what they lack may be acquired".67
They can acquire "absolutely binding"68 force; they can speak of the "unity and
totality declared in the Word of God; they can blend their voices with that of God".69
They can also be "invested with the glorious finality of God and His action towards
man".70
In short, whereas the lights, as lights of creation, are never described as
witnesses to the one Truth, Barth now states that "what is lacking to the self-
attestations of the creature . . . they can acquire as and when God Himself begins to
speak and claims and uses them in His service".71 In other words, they "achieve
72what they could not be or do of themselves". This achievement rests on the fact
that they are "taken [erhoben], lifted [aufgehoben], assumed [angenommen und
hineingenommen] and integrated [integriert] into the action of God's self-giving and
self-declaring"73 to humanity and to the world. In the power of this integration they
are "instituted, installed and ordained to the ministerium Verbi Divini",74
75This is the language of true words or parables. These parallels are
reinforced when Barth links this process of institution and integration to the process
of disclosure and concealment which characterises every event of the knowledge of
God. The limited power of the creaturely lights "can be invested with the absolute
power of the Word of God, or conversely ... the absolute power of the Word ofGod
can invest itself with the limited power of creaturely self-witness".76 The Word can,
says Barth, "conceal its divine force, value and validity in the relative force, value
66 Ibid., 156.
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and validity of such creaturely self-witness, and yet in this very concealment be
God's self-declaration and as such absolutely binding".77
But how should the Church relate to the lights ofcreation?
Later in CD IV/3, in §72.4, "The Ministry of the Community", when Barth is
considering the limits of the community's ministry, he briefly returns to the issue of
the lights of creation. He acknowledges that they can legitimately be "recognised,
acknowledged, confessed and attested".78 But it is not the Christian community that
attests them. That task, he says, "is to be left to their own authorised or unauthorised
prophets".79 But nor is the Christian community licensed to ignore them. He even
allows them - within certain parameters - to be "significant" for the community:
They may, of course, be significant to the community and worthy of
its consideration. Nothing human can be wholly out of place in the
sphere of its own task. According to the circumstances of the case all
the factors and lights which under God's providence are operative in
the sphere of His creation and important to man deserve its serious
and even zealous attention. But it does not stand in the service of any
of the factors or lights in question. ... It cannot appropriate them nor
inscribe them on its own banner.80
The parallel argument that the just state is a parable of the Kingdom
Even though Barth does not explicitly state that the lights of creation can become
parables of the kingdom of heaven, Thompson correctly believes that the argument in
which they are set "almost exactly parallels" that which is associated with Barth's
81
application of the just state as a parable (analogy) of the Kingdom of God:
Barth makes it very clear that if the State is a Gleichnis of the
Kingdom of God, it is a product first and foremost of God's
providential rule and bears no mark of revelation. Indeed, it is
precisely this insistence on denying the State any revelatory function
that must be set beside the claim that as a Gleichnis the State
89
corresponds to the Kingdom of God.
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In Hunsinger's words, the state, as part of "redeemed creation", exists as "a
theatre for the glory of God".83 As a theatre and one of "the essential constants of
human existence",84 it is an arena for the parables of the Kingdom of God;85 in
particular the highly "significant" basic human desire for justice.
The relationship between the State and the Church
For Barth, the command of God to humanity has a "political form" which is "the call
of God to the state" and should be considered "in the context of the doctrine of
reconciliation".87 The state is therefore "not an order of creation"
(.Schopfungsordnung), but "a genuine and specific order of the covenant"
(.Bundesordnung)^ Willis contends that "[t]his means that the State and the
command of God to it are ordered exclusively along the lines of the reconciling grace
OQ
by which humanity is justified in Jesus Christ" . The power of the state is given
continuance and meaning only as an "ordinance of God and the kingly rule of His
Son".90 In Hunsinger's words, the state is "a part of the redeemed creation . . .
because all power in heaven and on earth has been given to our risen Lord, Jesus
Christ".91
Willis believes that when "the State is viewed from the perspective of
92
redemption ... it is placed in a definite parallelism with the Christian community".
Barth writes that both the Christian community and the state are provisional orders
"of divine grace".93 As Willis notes, then, [tjhey are indicative of the patience of
83
George Hunsinger, "Karl Barth and Radical Politics: Some further considerations", Studies in
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ofthe State, trans. D. Bruce Hamill and Alan J. Torrance (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1992), 28-9.
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God in allowing man time to respond to the event of reconciliation, and so form the
counterparts, in the anthropological sphere, to the continuing prophetic witness and
self-manifestation ofChrist in the Holy Spirit."94
Within the present action of Christ, the Christian community recognises the
"true political authority" of the state and "its special mission includes sharing the
responsibility for the execution of this [the state's] authority".95 Every member of
the Church, "because of the mercy of God", must submit to its political authority.96
Echoing the argument for the lights of creation, Barth argues that the state provides
the ordered context within which the "collective life" of humanity can be maintained,
and the Gospel preached.97 Although the state is established only by the grace of
God's patience, it is itself a "graceless order", one of "the sword, compulsion and
fear", directed by "the rule of law". This is because the "grace of God is not yet
98
known and exalted" here. It has not yet found obedience.
Willis contends that the fact that the state and the Christian community are
both placed under the present rule of Christ over the world means that they will not
be free or able to carry out their activities independently of each other:
There is a mutual orientation of the Christian community on the State,
and of the State on the Christian community. Each in its own way,
and in continuous interaction with the other, is put to the direct service
of God. Naturally, this will mean rather different things for each, for
the State participates in reconciliation, and so in the kingly rule of
Christ, only de iure, while the existence and action of the Christian
community marks the occurrence of a transition from a participation
"in principle" in reconciliation to an involvement in it "in fact". It
follows from this that the State will have a real, though unrecognized
and unacknowledged task to perform vis-a-vis reconciliation, which
places a corresponding task upon the Christian community as regards
the State's fulfilment of its task. It is at precisely this point that the
political responsibility of the community becomes clear, and that its
Barth, Christengemeinde und Biirgergemeinde, Theologische Studien, Heft 20 (Zurich: Evangelischer
Verlag A.G. Zollikon, 1946), 9.
94
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distinctive service to the State, which is correlated with the service of
the State to the Church, can be indicated."
The Christian community is called to the political service of the state by
virtue of its knowledge that the latter "belongs originally and ultimately to Jesus
Christ".100 In its "comparatively independent substance, in its dignity, its function,
and its purpose", it is "to serve the Person and the Work of Jesus Christ and therefore
the justification of the sinner".101 The power of the state is legitimate because it
comes wholly from God. The state manifests "the operation of a divine ordinance . .
. an exousia which is and acts in accordance with the will of God".102 Even the
power of a corrupt state, such as that represented by Pilate, is still ordained and
preserved by God. Just as there is no such thing as a "perfect political system", so
too even the worst state can never be termed "wholly diabolical".103
The service of the Christian community to the state is directed toward the
establishment and maintenance of a just political order. Christians can only "will
and affirm a state which is based on justice".104 A Christian "cannot avoid the
question of human rights".105 It is in light of this fact that the community recognizes
and accepts the authority of the state, and intercedes for it in prayer. It does this
knowing that the state "is not in the habit of praying"; but it prays, making itself
responsible for the state.106 Willis contends that this does not mean that "the Church
retreats into quietism in the political sphere, nor that it is prepared to sanction any
form of political order".107 He continues:
The fact that the service of the community to the State is marked
initially by subordination and prayer indicates that the Church brings
99 Willis, The Ethics ofKarl Barth, 392- 3.
100 Karl Barth, "Church and State", in Community, State and Church (Garden City, New York:
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Shorter Post-War Writings 1946-1952, trans. R.G. Smith and S. Goodman (London: SCM, 1949), 81.
mCD 11/1,387.
105 Ibid.
106 Barth, "The Christian Community and the Civil Community", 159.
107 Willis, The Ethics ofKarl Barth, 394.
116
no ideological program of its own into the political sphere. It does not
need - indeed, is forbidden - to play off opposing ideologies against
each other.108
Although the state has a service to perform to the Church, and so to all
humanity, the subordination and prayer which the Christian community gives the
state is not dependent on the state's prior fulfilment or recognition of the service
required of it. Indeed, "the most brutally unjust State cannot lessen the responsibility
of the Church for the State: indeed, it can only increase it".109 In Willis' words:
The Church will always hope for and expect the best from the State,
but it will continue to render obedience to it, and pray for it,
regardless. The prayer and obedience of the community function as
signs of its recognition of the divine grounding of the State, and of its
willingness to be activelyfor its well-being.110
The freedom of the community from ideological commitment in the political
sphere does not mean that it has no criteria by which to measure the validity or
invalidity of a given political form. The recognition and obedience given by the
Church to the political community do not always mean active support and
encouragement for its practices. Indeed, the "intercession" of the Christian
community on behalf of the state can, on occasion, take the form of "criticism", and
even "resistance".111 This is done "not against the State but as the Church's service
for the State".112
Echoing his argument for the relationship between the Word and words,
Barth sees the relationship between the Christian community and the civil
community as likened to two concentric circles where "the State forms the outer
circle within which the Church, with the mystery of faith and the gospel, is the inner
108 Ibid.
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circle".113 They share a common centre directly related to "the order of divine
salvation and grace".114 Willis describes their relationship thus:
Within the creaturely sphere, both Church and State are placed in the
service of God as "agents of reconciliation", for both are called into
existence at the point ofman's justification. The task of the Christian
community is the continuous proclamation of that event in its witness
and service to the world in its varied activities: preaching and
teaching, the celebration of the sacraments, prayer, and its common
participation with all men in the spheres and relationships that make
up the context of creaturely occurrence. The task of the State is that
of providing and maintaining a framework within which the common
life of humanity may be carried on in an atmosphere that is marked by
an active concern for, and defence of, justice.11
Though it "is not yet the order of faith and love", the correct order of the state
must be "outward justice, outward peace and outward freedom".116 As the state is
claimed by the Christian community for preservation of justice, peace and freedom,
it must "remain within the bounds of justice and within the bounds of its task".117
Put succinctly, the service to which the civil community is called is:
the safeguarding of both the external, relative and provisional freedom
of the individuals and the external, relative peace of their community
and to that extent the safeguarding of the external, relative and
provisional humanity of their life both as individuals and as a
community.118
When the state remains faithful to the service required of it, and provides a
political order in which humanity's individual and corporate life is grounded in a
concern for justice, it also ensures the one thing needed by the Church for its
particular activity of proclamation: the preservation of freedom.119 When this
condition is fulfilled, the Christian community can cooperate actively in the life of
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the state - praying for it, encouraging it and affirming its general policy and
direction. It can do this only when:
the significance of the State as service of God is made clear and
credible to us by the State itself, by its attitude and acts, its intervening
on behalf of justice, peace and freedom and its conduct towards the
church.120
The state cannot claim more than the co-operation of the Church. It cannot
legitimately make an "inward claim" upon people either through the imposition of a
"particular philosophy of life (Weltanschauung)", or by exacting a response of
121"love" from its people: "love is not one of the duties which we owe to the State".
Nor can there be any confusion or exchange of the respective tasks given the state
and the Christian community. The state cannot undertake to instruct the Church in
the performance of its task of preaching the Gospel, nor seek to effect a reform in its
122
order and life. The state cannot "gradually develop . . . into a Church". By the
same token, the Church cannot attempt to become a political power in its own right,
lobbying for special attention and privilege. Nor can it wish to turn the state into an
extension of itself by fostering the development of a "Church-State"
(Kirchenstaat),123 Its sole task lies in the proclamation that "by grace, once and for
all, God has gathered up sinful [humanity] into the person of Jesus ... He has set
[humanity] free for the enjoyment of life . . ,."124 Within the political order, the
Church will always be a "napondcT, an "establishment among strangers".125
No state is wholly just or wholly unjust. There are, however, in the political
sphere, guidelines that enable the Christian community to distinguish between the
relative merits of possible arrangements, and to participate "in the human search for
126
the best form, for the most fitting system of political organization". It is by
participating in an ordinary, human way in the search for a political order in which
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"subordinates" itself to the political community, and "calls the State from neutrality,
127
ignorance and paganism into co-responsibility before God".
The most complete statement of the guidelines marking the direction in which
justice is to be sought in the political order is given in Barth's 1946 essay, "The
Christian Community and the Civil Community" {Christengemeinde und
Biirgergemeinde).m Barth establishes these guidelines by analogy. The justification
for this procedure lies in the fact that "a simple and absolute heterogeneity" between
the Christian and civil communities on the one hand and "a simple and absolute
129
equating" on the other is simply "out of the question" as regards their relationship.
They are unified ontologically in Jesus Christ, and the reconciliation of all humanity
that has taken place in him:
The only possibility that remains ... is to regard the State as an
allegory, as a correspondence and an analogue to the Kingdom ofGod
which the Church proclaims and believes in. Since the State forms the
outer circle within which the Church, with the mystery of its faith and
gospel, is the inner circle, since it shares a common centre with
Church, it is inevitable that, although its presuppositions and its tasks
are its own and different, it is nevertheless capable of reflecting
indirectly the truth and reality which constitute the Christian
community.130
The hope of the future promised to humanity in Christ, in the "new age"
already "dawning in power", provides the point at which the Christian community is
united with the state, and enables it to discern the activity of God in the provisional
127 Ibid., 162, 171.
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efforts of humanity to secure "rights of citizenship" for all in the political order.131
In choosing from "[a]mong the alternatives open at any particular moment [the
Church] will choose those which most suggest a correspondence to, an analogy and a
reflection of, the content of its own faith and gospel".132 The Church will always
support the decisions of the state which clarify rather than obscure "the Lordship of
133Jesus Christ". The concern of the Christian community is that the political
decisions taken by the state "point towards the Kingdom of God, not away from
it".134 In general terms, the Church proceeds to the task of political decision by
distinguishing
between the just and the unjust State, that is, between the better or
worse political form and reality exhibited at a given time; between
order and caprice; between government and tyranny; between freedom
and anarchy; between community and collectivism; between personal
rights and individualism; between the State as described in Romans 13
and the State as described in Rev. 13.135
These general considerations can be made more specific by deeper use of the
principle of analogy. Because the Church is "based on the knowledge of the one
eternal God", the Christian community will be "interested primarily in human beings
and not in some abstract cause or other" - not even when the abstraction in question
is labelled "progress".136 The human counterpart to divine justification is the
relative, provisional justice that can be secured in the context of politics. The
Church, as the "witness of the divine justification", will favour the state that is based
on "a commonly acknowledged law" under which no one is exempt and which
137
provides equal protection to all. That means that "the Church will be found where
all political activity is . . . regulated by law" (as in a constitutional state), and never
1
found on the side of "anarchy or tyranny".
131 Barth, "Church and State", 123, 125.
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The Son of Man came to "seek and to save the lost".139 The Church will
therefore concern itself particularly with those who are "poor, the socially and
economically weak and threatened" and will always insist upon the state's "special
responsibility" for these weaker members of society.140 In doing so it will choose
from one of the "socialistic possibilities" which ensures the "greatest measure of
social justice".141 The Christian community is "the fellowship of those who are
freely called by the Word of grace and the Spirit and love of God to be the children
of God".142 For Barth this means that, in political terms, the Church is concerned
with the safeguarding of individual liberty of expression and decision.143 It will not
necessarily oppose a "partial, and temporary limitation of these freedoms", but it will
stand resolutely against "any out-and-out dictatorship such as the totalitarian
State".144
The individual and corporate dimensions of the Christian community are
creatively united through the common loyalty of its members to Christ. The
analogue to this in the civil community is that neither "individualism" nor
"collectivism" can be given "the last word".145 Both the interests of individuals and
of the "whole" (the state) are subordinated to the "being of the citizen, the being of
the civil community before the law".146 This will best limit and preserve humanity's
existence in both its individual and corporate manifestations.147
The Christian community, because of its "Baptism in one Spirit", is a visible
sign of the unity of all humanity in Christ.148 Within the political sphere, then, the
Church will "stand for the equality of the freedom and responsibility of all adult
citizens".149 This means that there can be no legitimate restriction of the equality of













racial background or sex.150 The Church manifests in its life a "variety of gifts and
tasks."151 The analogue to this in the state is that proper separation be maintained
between its various functions and "powers" - legislative, executive and judicial152:
"Justice in the body politic is more readily approximated when these are
decentralized."153
Since the Church lives by the truth revealed to all in Jesus Christ, it will
oppose "all secret policies and secret diplomacy", and will work for "freedom and
responsibility" and the creation and preservation of a political order in which
officials are willing (and able) "to answer openly for all their actions".154 The
Christian community is "established and nourished" in the completely free Word of
God.155 It will therefore stand for freedom of expression in the civil community, and
will oppose attempts to regiment, control or censor this freedom.156
The Church is called into existence only to serve God and its fellow-
humanity. Legitimate ruling of the state as potestas will always be a form of service
to the people.157 The Church will therefore oppose political orders grounded only in
the exercise of "naked power" (Macht an sich) which is "directly evil".158 As the
people of God called to service in the world, the Christian community is by nature
ecumenical, and so open to all humanity without limitation. The corollary to this in
the political order is a sensitivity to the wider contexts and dimensions of political
responsibility that lead beyond "parochial politics" (Kirchturmpolitik).159
Finally, although it may be necessary from time to time to sanction "violent
solutions" to conflicts that arise within the political community - whether in the form
"police measures" or "law court decisions", or a revolt against an unjust state - these
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and the only possibility available".160 A definite restriction of force to those
situations in which, ultima ratio, no other course of action is possible, forms the
analogue, in the political order, to the fleetingness of God's anger as contrasted with
his mercy, which is "for eternity".161
The Christian community performs its necessary service to the state when it
assists in the formation and maintenance of a political order in which these
guidelines have at least a partial embodiment. In this way, the state is supported (by
the Church) in its attempt to fulfil the command of God to strive to achieve justice.
Democracy
The "Christian choices and purposes in politics" set out by Barth in "The Christian
Community and the Civil Community" demonstrate a tendency towards a democratic
1 f\")
state. For example, in The Church and the Political Problem of Our Day, Barth
exclaims that democracy bestows "the power and blessing of justice, of freedom and
of responsibility"163 where democratic justice is "that heavenly gift", "that remnant
of a free humanity . . . and ... of the freedom of the Gospel".164 He argues that for
Christians the fulfilment of political duty means, not mere passive subjection, but
"responsible choice of authority, responsible decision about the validity of laws,
responsible care for their maintenance".165 Therefore, it is no accident that "in the
course of time "democratic" states have come into being, states, that is, which are
based upon the responsible activity of their citizens".166 The "democratic conception
of the State" is in fact "a justifiable expansion of the thought of the New
Testament".167
But the just state, according to Barth, is not merely democratic: it is also
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in the lives of all men and to set certain bounds for their conduct".168 It also serves to
check humanity's "presumption" to sin and the destructive consequences to which
this "presumption" can lead.169 To this negative function Barth adds a positive one -
the promotion of peace and social democracy.170 The Christian concept of "the
righteous state . . . contradicts and withstands all political, social, and economic
tyranny and anarchy. . . . democracy comes nearer to that ideal state than
aristocratic or monarchical dictatorship, socialism than an untrammelled capitalistic
171*order". The just state therefore concerns itself not merely with justice but with
172social justice.
173
However, there is no such thing as a perfect political system for Barth.
There will never be a perfect constitutional state this side of Judgement Day.174 In
this present, sinful age,175 in which the world needs redemption,176 no state is
177immune from the temptation "to become at least a little Leviathan", nor is any
state without sin. On the contrary, "it requires and will always require
restoration".178 Consequently, even a just state cannot hope to achieve more than "an
external, relative and provisional humanisation of man's existence".179 It is only a
provisional order. At best, then, it will constitute "an allegory ... a correspondence
180and an analogue to the kingdom of God"; reflecting it, but never exactly being it.
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Strictly speaking then, for Barth no state can be properly called "just", if by
"just" what is meant is something absolute and direct. On this account, John Howard
Yoder criticizes the translations of Rechtfertigung und Recht and Christengemeinde
101
und Bilrgergemeinde in the collection edited by Will Herberg:
Herberg's texts consistently translate Rechtsstaat in ways which
contribute to reinforcing a wrong concept. Sometimes it is rendered
"legitimate state" and sometimes "just state". For each of these, a
different German expression would be used. Each of these fosters the
idea of ruling that certain other states are unjust or illegitimate, and
the state we approve is somehow positively righteous. This is not
what Rechtsstaat means. . . . What is meant is that a state is thought
of as recognising, implementing and being bound by some thinkable
justice beyond itself and its arbitrary judgements. The "justice-state"
is the modest, self-limiting state. It will still not be just or righteous;
but it has set its moral limits. The alternative to Rechtsstaat is not
"unjust state" or "illegitimate state" but arbitrary authority.182
Biggar contends that Yoder is correct in arguing that Rechtsstaat means a
state which recognizes the claims of justice upon it and is committed to its
implementation:
A Rechtsstaat is a State which intends justice; not one which enjoys
identity with it. However, this absolute intention does manifest itself
in the relatively effective rule of law over power by which the rights
of the individual are balanced against the claims of the community.
The intention is made visible in political forms. . . . "it can be
measured in the formal commitments of both persons and structures".
For that reason, it is appropriate to translate Rechtsstaat as
"constitutional state".183
Biggar points out that although the Rechtsstaat will never be perfectly just, its
intention of justice - "expressed with greater or lesser success in the constitutional
and legal forms that govern and shape its political practice - and its concomitant
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legitimacy make it sufficiently distinguishable from the Unrechtsstaat, and
especially from its tyrannical form, the Totalstaaf :184
. . . this visible distinction between order and caprice, between
government and tyranny, between freedom and anarchy, between
community and collectivism, between personal rights and
individualism, is a moral distinction, albeit a relative one; a distinction
between the morally better and the morally worse and, in that sense,
between just (rechte) and unjust (unrechte) States. The absolute
intentional distinction between States expresses itself in a relative
moral one. Therefore, "in the better kind of state" (in jenem jeweils
"Besseren", im jeweils rechten Staat) we are able to glimpse the
purpose or intention of the divine ordinance. ... A State which is a
Rechtsstaat may be only relatively recht, but it is positively so; and
that is how it can be "better" than a State which is an Unrechtsstaat
and therefore unrecht. . . . the Rechtsstaat will never be anything
other than "better"; it will never be the "best".185
Barth rightly believes that all political forms and systems have their
limitations, and no one political concept - even that of democracy - can be played
off against all others.186 The form of state most approximate to the Christian concept
may equally well assume the form of a monarchy or aristocracy or "occasionally
even ... of a dictatorship", as that of a democracy. No democracy as such is
immune from degeneration into anarchy or tyranny and from becoming a "bad
State".187 The order, justice, and freedom absolutely required by the Christian
concept of the state can be frustrated under the better, democratic form of
government, and can be honoured even under the worse, dictatorial one,188 provided
• 189that such dictatorship is limited and provisional, not totalitarian.
Nevertheless, the Christian concept of the Rechtsstaat tends toward
democracy;190 and "on the whole towards the form of state, which, if it is not actually
realized in the so-called 'democracies', is at any rate more or less honestly clearly
intended and desired".191 Therefore, "the assertion that all forms of government are
184 Ibid., 171-2.
185 Ibid., 172.
186 Barth, "The Christian Community and the Civil Community", 161.
187 Ibid., 181.
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equally compatible or incompatible with the Gospel is not only outworn but false. . . .
[l]t is not true that a Christian can endorse, or seek after a mobocracy or a
dictatorship as readily as a democracy."192
Barth believed that his own nation state of Switzerland was a Rechtsstaat in
the sense described above. He made this judgement because he believed that
Switzerland allowed itself to be confronted by the Gospel of divine justification, and
thereby showed that it genuinely intended justice:
Its constitutionality, its (social) democratic structures and procedures,
its balancing of the rights of the individual against the claims of the
community, its pluralism, and its representation of the memory and
hope of such a political order for Europe as a whole - all these Barth
deemed to be expressions of its intention of justice. Because
Switzerland is a Rechtsstaat, its national autonomy is bound up with a
divine commission to attest to divine justification and therefore to real
i • • 193human justice.
Assessment of Barth's model of the just state
Barth's model of the just state and subsequent Church-State relations has often been
accused of "sectarianism, fideism, and imperialism".194 Indeed Timothy Stanley
contends that many scholars have decided that Karl Barth's theology is little more
than "otherworldly ecclesiocentrism"195 which "showed his disinterest in engaging
192 Barth, "Church and State", 144 n. 34.
193
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the real world".196 Stanley is correct to argue that this interpretation needs to be
challenged in light of subsequent Barth scholarship. In addition to Barth's own
197
statements, Stanley points out that the works ofMarquardt and Helmut Gollwitzer
have "drawn out the implications of socialism upon Karl Barth's theology".198
More recently, Nigel Biggar and John Webster have both shown the inherent
connection between Barth's theology and his ethics and politics.199 Biggar, for
instance, draws upon subsection 78, "The Struggle for Human Righteousness", of the
unfinished last volume of Barth's Church Dogmatics. Though Biggar believes
Barth's position on political leadership became more nuanced in his later work,200
Stanley observes that "he nonetheless draws upon the ongoing and consummate
201interest Barth had in politics and ethics":
The question is never whether or not Barth's theology was oriented
around political and ethical action, but how and to what degree.202
Similarily, Webster points out the way Barth saw his theology as the
foreground for an ongoing political subtext. He draws on an example from the end
of Barth's life: In a letter to Eberhard Bethge, Barth "suggested that ethical and
196 See for instance Charles C. West, Communism and the Theologians: Study ofan encounter
(London: SCM Press, 1958), 313.
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political concerns were presupposed - even if they remained somewhat subterranean,
at least in his published writings - during his first two professorships":203
In Germany, however, burdened with the problems of its Lutheran
tradition, there was a genuine need in the direction which I now
silently took for granted or emphasized only in passing: ethics, fellow-
humanity, a serving church, discipleship, socialism, the peace
movement, and in and with all these things, politics.204
Stanley rightly contends that "Barth was deeply invested in the political and
ethical nature of theology. This compounded with the historical weight of Barth's
involvement with the Confessing Church in Germany during World War II gives
90S
ample evidence that Barth was by no means politically complacent".
Barth's use of analogy
What is of primary interest to this present study is Barth's attempt to provide ethical
guidelines, by means of analogy, that could assist the Christian community in the
"discerning of spirits"206 necessary to decide from the available political options in
the direction of justice for everyone in society.
For Barth, human knowledge of God is analogical, a relationship of
proportionality, of correspondence. But whilst acknowledging a correspondence
between humanity and God, Barth denies any correspondence based on being. As
Chapter 3 has affirmed, humanity's relationship to God does not derive from an
analogy of being, an analogia ends, but an analogy of faith, an analogia fidei?®1
All conceptions of natural law are based on a relationship of analogia ends.
Here the category of being applies equally to humanity and to God. A prior
203
Webster, Barth's Moral Theology: Human Action in Barth's Thought, 4.
204
Ibid., 4-5, citing Barth, Letters 1961-1968, 251.
205
Stanley, "From Habermas to Barth and Back Again", 117. See for instance the Barmen
Declaration, which opens: "In view of the errors of the 'German Christians' and of the present Reich
Church Administration, which are ravaging the church and at the same time also shattering the unity
of the German Evangelical Church, we confess the following truths" ("Theology for the Christian
Community: The Barmen Declaration", 148-9).
206 Barth, "Church and State", 120.
207 For Barth's critique of analogy's historical development see: CD II/1, 237-243. For his critique of
analogia ends see: ibid., 75-93. For his critique of natural theology as it relates to analogia ends see:
ibid., 93- 128.
130
relationship exists between Creator, creation and creature that can be known and
formulated apart from the knowledge ofGod as revealed in Jesus Christ. Being acts
as an intrinsic foundation in nature, supporting the development of anthropologically
based theologies. Grounding the theological task in the analogia entis means that:
... all specifically Christian truth will be only a modification of the
general truth of being ... of a being the closer interpretation of which
will be abandoned to our own tender mercies, to the change and
development of the different views of what deserves to be called true
being. It may perhaps be moralistic being, or spiritual, or
transcendental, or empirical, or humanistic, or individual. One day it
may even be "German" being.208
Barth, in response, states categorically that, "We possess no analogy on the
basis of which the nature and being of God as the Lord can be accessible to us."209
The basis of human analogies and correspondences do not come by right or by virtue
of creation.
910
For Barth, God relates to humanity by way of the analogia fidei. An
analogia fidei is the movement of the totaliter aliter for humanity. "Beyond, trans:
that is the crux of the situation; that is the source of our life. Our little within
belongs to the realm of analogies, and it is from beyond that realm that we draw our
211life. There is no continuity leading from analogy over into divine reality." Due to
this eschatological separation, initiation into a relationship of analogy occurs by a
free act of divine grace - "[i]n the Bible ... it is not a being common to God and
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them, but God's grace." This movement of free grace is decisive. In particular
this is God's graceful action in the person and work of Jesus Christ:
In His revelation, in Jesus Christ, the hidden God has indeed made
Himself apprehensible. Not directly, but indirectly. Not to sight, but
to faith. Not in His being, but in sign. Not, then, by the dissolution of
His hiddenness - but apprehensibly . . . The word was made flesh:
this is the first, original and controlling sign of all signs.214
Jesus - the God-man - comes into the world as a human signification: "Jesus
Christ and His visible kingdom on earth: this is the great possibility, created by God
Himself, of viewing and conceiving Him, and therefore of speaking about Him".215
Jesus enters the world as a human being, "and therefore enters the world with all of
its politics" showing humanity "that God, though totally other, is interested in
humanity".216 Hence humanity relates to God via an analogy of God's activity in
Christ.
A Political Analogy
Barth's understanding of the analogia relationis is given and acknowledged by the
analogia fidei. He develops the concepts of solidarity and common humanity from
his understanding of the analogia relationis. These concepts are discussed in light of
ethical action in the world which is intimately tied to the meaning of political action
where God is understood to have universal rule over all people and by analogy
exemplifies this rule in Christ as a rule of love and freedom.217 From the analogia
relationis Barth argues for a common humanity which forms the basis for his notions
of solidarity: "The individual, as important as he is, stands under the divine
command together with his fellow-man a"s a joint-covenant partner elected by grace
212 CD 11/1,243.
213 "The grace ofGod wills and creates the covenant between God and man. It therefore determines
man to existence in this covenant. It determines him to be the partner ofGod. It therefore determines
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in Jesus Christ. Without this communality, ethics can become detached,
irresponsible, and uncaring".218
The notion of all people being under God's purview forms the basis for Barth
to say that Christian people can act in communal ways that affirm the humanity in
219others. Solidarity, according to Stanley, is for Barth:
. . . rooted in God's sovereign call to all humanity, whether people
recognize God's calling towards them or not. God's universal calling
takes shape in the world through the church which recognizes that the
content of God's call is towards co-responsible reconciliation with
God and all people. The drive and impetus for solidarity is connected
to the very core ofwhat Jesus' death and resurrection exemplify.220
In "Jesus Christ and the Movement for Social Justice", Barth clarifies this:
"[f]or Jesus there was only a social God, a God of solidarity; therefore there was only
a social religion, a religion of solidarity".221 It is Barth's concept of solidarity which
Robert E. Hood believes directs "the ethically responsible Christian engaged in
222
political praxis to the non-Christian in the world".
God's sovereignty "encompasses the world and all its dimensions, including
223both nature and politics". Barth does not attempt to prove the object of this
world's faith, but rather clarifies the necessity of this understanding for life and
existence: "Theology is neither a storming of the gates of heaven nor a sacrificium
intellectum. It does not seek to establish the 'general possibility' of the object, nor
does it require a surrender of reason. It starts from an actuality and arrives at an
understanding of its rational necessity."224 Here, Hunsinger believes Barth develops
a theological pragmatics whereby theology enters into political activity as if its
218 Robert E. Hood, Contemporary Political Orders and Christ: Karl Barth's Christology and
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analogy of faith is completely realistic - as if Jesus and Christian communal
practices are paradigms for civic as well as ecclesial action.
But is Barth's method of analogy realistic in a political and civic context?
Will Herberg believes not, describing Barth's method as "arbitrary", "unconvincing",
99 c
and "pretty much out of line" with the rest of his "theological work". He suggests
that Barth constructed his theological scheme upon a prior conception of the ideal
state; he "adjust[ed] his 'Christological' arguments to conclusions already reached
997
on other grounds". Barth's commitment to the Swiss democratic system is an
evident example of this, according to Herberg's critique.228 Emil Brunner goes
further:
... in the embarrassment which ensues when he tries to move from
Christology to concrete norms for the State, he seizes a new principle,
by the aid of which he hopes to fill up the awkward gap, the principle
of - analogy! Per analogiam, Barth now derives norms from the
Christian Church for the civil community, but he evidently does not
notice that anything and everything can be derived from the same
principle of analogy: a monarchy just as much as a republic (Christ the
King), the totalitarian State, just as much as a state with civil liberties
(Christ the Lord of all; man a servant, indeed a slave of Jesus
Christ).229
To Barth's assertion that his analogies illustrate the teleological direction of
the Church's public involvement, Werpehowski responds:
the route is finally not plotted successfully. . . . [T]he analogies are
simply indeterminate regarding very different political arrangements.
By themselves they could be employed to support any number of
disparate strategies and arrangements - libertarian, liberal, socialist -
because the crucial categories of "equality," "freedom," and "duties of
social responsibility" are not integrated with respect to one another in
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terms of some concrete vision of the ends of political life in their
relation to the human beings who would flourish within it as
citizens.230
Werpehowski concludes by saying that "the great failure of Barth's political
ethics is that this application is never accomplished with clarity or rigor".231 Willis
recognizes this difficulty and highlights one occasion in which Barth comes
perilously close to suggesting an analogical justification for totalitarianism:
God above all things! Sovereign even over the legalistic
totalitarianism of your state! You fear it? Fear it not! The limits of
that system where its representatives must halt or else be destroyed is
set not by its totalitarianism, but by its legalism which makes the state
totalitarian in an ungodly and inhuman way. "Totalitarian" also, in a
way, is the grace of the gospel which we all are to proclaim, free
grace, truly divine and truly human, claiming every man wholly for
itself. To a degree the Communist state might be interpreted and
understood as an image of grace - to be sure, a grossly distorted and
darkened image. Indeed, grace is all-embracing, totalitarian,232
In view of the guidelines Barth derived for the just state in "The Christian
Community and the Civil Community", which led clearly in the direction of
constitutional democracy, Barth implies at this point that there might be such a thing
as a godly and human totalitarianism. Willis believes that though Barth argues that
"practical reason [should be] given more of a place in special ethics, its relationship
to the command remains elusive".233
It would appear that Barth's rational procedures for making sense of political
analogues are unsatisfactory. As Stanley states: "Barth relates all people as common
under God's rule, but the ecclesial community is the only one that seems to recognize
this".234 Willis notes:
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Until this is clarified, both the place of rational deliberation in ethics,
and the line of continuity, within a particular ethical situation, between
Christians and non-Christians, will remain dubious.235
An application of Barth's model of the just state for the purpose of inter-
religious encounter
Hunsinger, believing that there has never been a "theologian either before or since
who has so firmly grasped not only the complexity but also the simplicity of the
task"236 at hand, cautions against any over-hasty assumptions about Barth's model of
the just state and in particular his essay "The Christian Community and the Civil
Community":
It is important to recognise, as the critics of this essay have not always
recognized, the self-imposed limitations under which Barth was
operating. He was simply experimenting in what he believed to be the
church's proper use of political reason. His experiment was meant to
provide examples of a rational or analogical process by which the
church could move from theological reflection to political application.
What he wanted to establish . . . was the "possibility and necessity of
comparisons and analogies" between the spiritual and the political
spheres. His examples of this analogical transition were meant to be
suggestive rather than definitive.237
In tandem with this, Willis states:
None of the guidelines that Barth sets forth can legitimately be taken
as more than that - they are not unyielding principles or rules to be
applied automatically to the political situation. If they indicate a
direction, they do not supply the Church with an ideology of the "just"
State.238
In concert with both Hunsinger and Willis on this point, it is correct to
believe that what these analogies actually do is give a "sense of the direction in
which Christian political decisions will move".239 They suggest "roughly the
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contours of a political order in which the importance ofjustice is both recognised and
given provisional exemplification".240
An example of how Barth sees Christians going about the business of making
political (and hence theological and ethical) decisions that is highly significant for
inter-religious encounter today, is in a monograph he wrote in 1952, "Political
Decisions in the Unity of Faith".241 The discussion unfolds against the specific
question of "political responsibility" posed by the remilitarization ofGermany and its
inclusion within NATO at the beginning of the Cold War.242 Evangelical Christians
in Germany were divided on this issue. This provides the model for saying
something generally about the nature of Christian political (and hence theological
and ethical) decisions.
Barth argues that political responsibility is made real contextually by the
action of individuals, not in official Church pronouncements. He writes:
If the political mission of the Church is to be turned to practical
account at all and in good time, it can only take the form of comments
and declarations by individual members of the Church, made in the
freedom and commitment of their personal responsibility as
Christians.243
However the individual Christian does not act in isolation from the Church.
Her action will always constitute "a call and a summons in the Church to the Church
- as an invitation to all the members of the Church . . . first of all to realise that
neutrality is out of the question, that it is a matter of obedience and disobedience . . .
[and secondly] as an invitation 'to prove what is that good, and acceptable, and
perfect, will of God' ",244 This is a "risky undertaking"245 as it will inevitably
provoke "groans and criticisms".246 It could cause tension and threaten the unity of
240 Ibid.
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the Church,247 because this will be an action grounded in the immediate response of
faith and obedience that the individual finds unavoidably required of her at a given
point. The action of the individual Christian must therefore proceed without regard
to the issue of unanimity, for it will represent her particular judgment about a
situation in which she is called upon "to choose between life and death, God and
idols".248 This does not mean that she has no concern for the Church - indeed, it is
precisely because of her concern that she must proceed in her decision and action:
The unity of the faith can maintain its spiritual truth and reality only
by constant renewal. It can and will be renewed only if Christians do
not try to avoid crises in their fellowship with one another, but are
determined, whatever the outcome, to see them through. . . . [I]n
practice the Church can only choose between using its political
responsibility and thereby exposing itself to the risk of crises, and
sparing itself the crises and thus failing to do justice to its political
mission.249
Other Christians should see this therefore as an opportunity to examine their
250
own faith. This is because: "[n]o one can believe in another's place or allow
anyone else to do [her] believing for [her]. Therefore no choice made in obedience
to the faith can be taken over unexamined by anyone else and turned into [her] own
choice and decision."251 No one should consider themselves exempt from this
process; no one should consider themselves exempt from "listening in all freedom
but with a humble and open heart and mind to the testimony of a fellow-
Christian".252
As they are addressed to the Church, the political decisions of individual
Christians will manifest the openness and joy, but also the resoluteness, indicative of
the freedom in which they (and all humanity) stand. They will "demand from those
who make them and commend them to others an extreme degree of political sobriety
247 Ibid., 155.
248 Ibid., 154. For emphasis of this point see 156 n. 1: "If in 1934 we had had to wait for the
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and theological insight". Effective decisions and actions, those that manifest clear
overtones of authority and truth, will always be marked by "a good deal of common
sense and a spark of prophecy . . . something of the all-seeing love of Christ".254
In one respect, the political decisions of Christians will resemble those of
their non-Christian neighbours. They will always be grounded in a careful
assessment of alternatives, and in a consideration of the arguments for and against
the particular issue at hand. Thus, they will demand the full employment of the
255
powers of rational deliberation at one's command. The point of difference
between Christian and non-Christian political decisions is that the former take place
not in a space apart from his Christian faith, but before God - and not
before any god, but before the God who speaks to the world, to the
Christian community and therefore to the individual Christian, in the
gospel of Jesus Christ.256
In her political decisions, then, the Christian "will look for a decision which
is not arbitrary or just clever in a human sense, but which is made in the freedom of
obedience to God's command".257 These decisions are placed on "the extremely
narrow frontier that divides the world from the Kingdom of God", and must aim at
hitting the precise point "where common sense speaks the language of the Holy
Spirit and the Holy Spirit the language of common sense".
In the end, there can be no guarantee of a favourable reception by the
Christian community at large ofwhat the promptings of common sense and the Holy
Spirit suggest to the individual to be the best (indeed, the required) course of action.
But political decisions will always entail the willingness to take a confessional
stance, "and to summon other Christians (and non-Christians!) at all costs to take the
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The mutual dependence of Christians and non-Christians upon God in this
1952 monograph parallels the mutual dependency argued for in Chapter 2 between
Christians, Jews and Muslims. In this understanding, there is no reason to suggest
that Barth's term "non-Christians" should not be interpreted to include Jews and
Muslims. Within Barth's paradigm then, Christians, Jews and Muslims are able to
make similar political decisions, albeit for different reasons.
As a parallel argument to "Creation and its lights", Barth's model of the just
state (as a parable of the Kingdom of God) promotes an understanding of democratic
society which respects freedom and difference. It represents the desire for a political
community "which transcends racial, national, economic, and ideological
interests"260 in the quest for justice for all citizens. As Biggar suggests, "it represents
the hope for a European order ... in which the rights and liberties of its constitutive
961
peoples [including Jews and Muslims] are guaranteed". This is because "each
constitutive group and each of its members is assured of the freedom to live and
grow and act, provided that they respect and co-operate with other such groups -
whether linguistic, regional, social, or confessional - and their members."262 In this
understanding then, Christians, Jews and Muslims are not only able to make similar
political decisions, they should also be able to co-operate with each other and make
common cause with each other for the betterment of society.
Conclusion
As Chapter 3 has shown, for Barth there is genuine witness to God extra muros
ecclesiae in the form of secular words or parables. Chapter 4 has argued that the
little lights of creation can also become truth extra muros ecclesiae for the Church.
As a parallel argument to the lights of creation, the just state is a parable (analogy) of
the Kingdom. In the quest for justice, then, Barth believes that a political decision
made by a Christian (which should always be understood theologically and ethically)
is not necessarily dissimilar to one made by a non-Christian in society. This decision
making process is completely viable in an ad hoc and ephemeral way. Both can
point to Christ. Chapter 3 has argued that genuine witness to God extra muros
260
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261 Ibid., see also Barth, "Im Namen", 209-210.
262 Ibid.
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ecclesiae in the form of secular words or parables should also include the genuine
witness of the other Abrahamic religions. This chapter has argued that the Church,
from Barth's perspective, can also make common cause with those from the other
Abrahamic faiths in the desire for a just society. Inter-religious encounter can
therefore occur, from Barth's perspective, within the public arena of democratic
society.
Chapter 5 will argue that Barth's theology is relevant for "our current social
scene" in Britain and Europe today. His work gives a vision for Western
democratic, secular and pluralist society in which theological beliefs can be
translated into political activity which serves as analogies, parables of the Kingdom
of God.
Thus Green is right to surmise that:
. . . one Lord of all translates into a state where all citizens have equal
freedom and responsibility; not arbitrarily restricting people because
of their religion, class, race or ... sex.264
This vision is particularly relevant to contemporary British and European
Christian communities and their relations to their Muslim fellow citizens.
263 David A. S. Fergusson, "Theology in a Time ofWar: John Baillie's Political Writings", in God's
Will in a Time ofCrisis, ed. Andrew Morton (Edinburgh: The Centre for Theology and Public Issues,
1994), 44.
264 Clifford J. Green, "Public Theology and Political Ethics: The Christian Community and the Civil




Bringing Barth's theology to Islam in the contemporary European context
Introduction
Near the end of Barth's life he mentioned a desire to devote himself to the history of
world religions. Integral to this history would be the relation between Judaism and
Islam. Chapter 5 will argue that the foundation of Barth's planned inter-religious
enterprise would have been found within his understanding of God's Covenant with
Israel and its fulfilment in Jesus Christ. Chapter 5 will argue that the ontological
unity of Christianity and Israel, which Barth argues for, should be interpreted to
include Islam. Any inter-religious encounter among the Abrahamic faiths should be
fundamentally ethical in nature - demonstrating a responsibility to struggle for
justice, both individually and corporately, before God.
As Chapter 4 has shown, a case can be made for promoting democratic
society which respects freedom and difference on the grounds of Barth's theology.
Chapter 5 will argue that Barth's understanding of democratic society can
accommodate religious pluralism where members of the Abrahamic faiths can strive
together for justice and the common good of all. This is of particular importance to
Muslim communities as they struggle for acceptance and recognition in European
societies. Barth's work provides an understanding of truth claims which offers
unexpected potential for inter-religious encounter and co-operation with Muslims.
This potential can be explicated through Geoff Thompson's interpretation of John
Cobb's understanding of pluralism, which provides a framework for such encounter
and co-operation. Hence, in this understanding, Muslims can contribute to a just
society and interact with the Church in ways which are theologically fruitful for the
Church's own life.
Bringing Barth's theology to the contemporary context
For Barth, the state exists as "a means of getting things done".1 Its purpose is "to
contribute to the new creation, the reconciled and reconciling humanity willed and
chosen by God in God's decision to be humanity's God in Christ".2 It fulfils this
' Rowan Williams, "Barth, War and the State", in Reckoning with Barth: Essays in Commemoration
of the Centenary ofKarl Barth's Birth, ed. Nigel Biggar (Oxford: Mowbray, 1988), 187.
2 Ibid.
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purpose by "resisting disorder, restraining, by compulsion where necessary, the
mutual destructiveness of sinful human beings, creating equity", harmony and
justice.3 The Church announces to the state the good news that "it has a right to exist
because God is God, and is God as Jesus Christ", and that therefore the state has a
legitimate task of service to perform to Jesus Christ.4
But, while Fergusson affirms a distinctive Christian ethical witness such as
Barth's which is based on the Lordship of Jesus Christ, he is also right to recognise
that this is problematic in democratic societies which "attach a high premium to
values of tolerance and pluralism".5 Whilst "faithfulness must take priority over
considerations about effectiveness . . . this must happen without isolation in an
ecclesiastical enclave".6 Hunsinger encapsulates this tension when he suggests:
The Church does not confront the world in absolute antithesis and
mutual exclusion (sectarianism), nor does it simply surrender itself to
the world's agenda, as if it were merely a valuable resource for the
accomplishment of secular ends (acculturation). The Church's
solidarity with the world allows it to seek valid forms of
contexualization while guarding against flaccid conformism. Yet its
precedence over the world requires it to maintain its essential
distinctiveness without retreating into rigid isolation."7
Hence, while Barth's writings certainly provide a model for a just, peaceable
and democratic Europe, what needs to be recognised in any attempt to bring Barth's
theology into the contemporary context is the fact that European democracies today
are more secular and pluralistic than those of Barth's time. Switzerland, for instance,
used by Barth as an exemplar of the just state, though "[tjraditionally a multicultural
society", had until the 1970's fewer than 20,000 Muslims living within its borders.8




Fergusson, Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics, 33.
6 Ibid.
7
George Hunsinger, "To Yoder: Hoping without a Recipe", in Barmen and the Confessing Church
Today, ed. James Y. Holloway (Lampeter, Edwin Mellen Press, 1995), 292, as cited by David
Fergusson, Community, Liberalism and Christian Ethics, 33.
8 Hans Mahnig, "Islam in Switzerland: Fragmented Accommodation in a Federal Country", in
Muslims in the West: from Sojourners to Citizens, ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2002), 72, 73.
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than ever before. In fact Jane I. Smith states that it "is now second in number to
adherents only to Christianity in almost every western country".9 An added factor in
Islam's presence in Europe is that "since 9/11, a great deal of theological effort has
rightly gone into the delicate work of Christian-Muslim reconciliation" as the single
biggest theological issue of today.10
Hence the question is posed: if Barth were alive today, what role would he
play as "the greatest Protestant theologian since Luther" in assisting, or "in the view
of his critics hindering", the reconciliation between Christians and Muslims?11
It is well documented that Barth corresponded and conversed with Christians
and others on many current theological, social and political issues throughout his
life.12 As Hunsinger states:
In his early ministry he [Barth] was known as the "red pastor" for his
labour-organizing efforts to improve wages and working conditions
among local industrial workers. Then, in opposition to his teachers'
support for the "pre-emptive" German aggression against Belgium
that helped to spark World War 1, he broke with modern academic
theology. In midcareer, as the principal author of the Barmen
Declaration, he became the intellectual leader of the evangelical
resistance to Hitler. During the cold war he emerged as an outspoken
critic of anticommunism, urging the church to a neutralist stance
"between East and West". Having backed military action against the
Nazis at a time of indecision, he later opposed postwar German
rearmament and the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe.
During his final years he was increasingly anti-imperialist,
antimilitarist, and antinuclear, as the pacifist tendencies of his early
career resurfaced.13
Lindsay also makes the salient point that Barth had
9 Jane I. Smith, "Introduction", Muslims in the West: from Sojourners to Citizens, 3.
10
Lindsay, Barth, Israel and Jesus: Karl Barth's Theology ofIsrael, ix.
11 Ibid.
12 See for example Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Lifefrom Letters and Autobiographical Texts,
trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976)
13
Hunsinger, "Introduction", For The Sake of The World: Karl Barth and The Future of Ecclesial
Theology, 7-8. For more comprehensive surveys of Barth's political activity see Deschner, "Karl
Barth as Political Activist", 55-66; Gorringe, Karl Barth: Against Hegemony, Green,'Introduction' in
Karl Barth: Theologian of Freedom, 11-45; Jehle, Ever Against the Stream: The Politics of Karl
Barth, 1906-1968.
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. . . significant relationships with individual Jews through whom he
also became acquainted with contemporary Jewish thought. If, in the
early 1920s, he kept these acquaintances at a respectable scholarly
distance, the Nazi years- particularly as the persecution of the Jews
intensified to genocidal proportions - saw him adopt a far more
positive perspective, from which he was able to stand in both
theological and humanitarian solidarity with the persecuted kinfolk of
Jesus. In the words of Rabbi Geis, "Who, other than Karl Barth, could
have demonstrated more clearly the struggle and courageous
resistance that develops from grace?"14
Surprisingly, Barth also began to show an interest in world religions near the
end of his life.15 Werner Kohler states that in the summer of 1964 Barth expressed to
him his regret that he (Barth)
could not reach his goal to study the non-Christian religions. His
intention was to write his Church Dogmatic in order to start after
completing Vol. V with a confrontation [italics mine] with the non-
Christian religions.16
In particular, Barth expressed an interest in Islam. After the 1967 war
between Israel and five Arab nations - the so-called the Six Day War - Barth
expressed publicly his remarkable yet controversial position in support of the state of
Israel.17 Reflecting on Israel's victory, Barth understood it as God's faithfulness to
14
Lindsay, Barth, Israel and Jesus: Karl Barth's Theology ofIsrael, 35. Though Barth never
travelled to Asia, Hoekema contends that Barth's theology was of interest to many Asian and
especially Japanise theologians: "[N]ot only the issue of religion as unbelief draws attention, but also
Barth's digression about the Jodo Shin Shu school within Buddhism; motives from the Zen-
Buddhism; a comparison of das Nichtige (Nothingness) in his Church Dogmatics with Nothingness in
Buddhism; religious pluralism; socio-political issues like the question of guilt of the Japanese
churches; eschatology; and finally humanizing as a central concept within both Barth's anthropology
and Confucianism" (see Alle Hoekema, "Barth and Asia : 'No Boring Theology' ", 129).
15 In a conversation the author had with Dr. Robin Boyd on 3rd October 2007, Boyd commented that
he believed that Barth began to show an interest in world religions because his son Christoph had, up
until the mid 1960's, been teaching in Indonesia.
16 Werner Kohler, "Toward a theology of Religions", Japanese Religions, 4 (1996), 13.
17
Marquardt writes: " 'The Jewish-Christian Solidarity' of that period must be understood by those
here to call unconditionally for 'Jewish-Christian Solidarity' today! That must be expressly stated
because recently a group of otherwise respectable Christians - I mean the Working Committee of the
'Prague Christian Peace Conference' held on July 3, 1967 in Sagorsk . . . has sent out into the world a
Pronouncement of the East-West Crisis of which I can only say that I actually missed any deep
theological meaning as well as any practical-political reason in its negative position on the struggle for
the existence (Daseinskampf) of the state of Israel. ... The good direction taken in those days must
today be held to theologically and politically; it must not be broken off again today under any pretext
. . ." (Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt, "Christentum und Zionismus", Evangelische Theologie, 28
(1968), 654 as translated and cited by Sonderegger, That Jesus Christ was born a Jew, 136-7).
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his promise for Israel rather than as an analogy to the conquest of Canaan under
Joshua.18 However, he was not blind to the political reality in Palestine. His concern
about Islam is evidenced in his dialogue with J. Bouman from Lebanon. In a letter to
H. Berkhof in Leiden (1968), Barth reports on his conversation with J. Bouman: "In
the theological appreciation of situation there [in Lebanon] ... we were . . .
completely in agreement" that "a new communication about the relation between
Bible and Koran is an urgent task for us". 19 In the letter Barth expresses the belief
that his dream of developing a "theology of the Holy Spirit" was a dream which he
20could "only envisage from afar, as Moses once looked on the promised land".
Busch suggests that Barth "was thinking of a theology which, unlike his own, was
not written from the dominant perspective of christology, but from that of
pneumatology, and in which the concerns of the theology of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries were not so much repeated and continued as understood and
91
developed further."
Another glimpse of Barth's increasing awareness of both rabbinic Judaism
and Islam comes in his book Ad Limina Apostolorum (1967). Here Barth devotes
himself to serious study of the sixteen Latin texts of Vatican II, especially those
concerning Israel and non-Christian religions. For Barth "later and contemporary
22
Judaism (believing or unbelieving)" is the sole natural proof of God. Instead of
regarding Jews as separated brethren to Christians, Barth posits: "Would it not be
more appropriate, in view of the anti-Semitism of the ancient, the medieval, and to a
large degree the modern church, to set forth an explicit confession of guilt here,
9-5
rather than in respect to the separated brethren?" Such confession would also be
appropriate, in Barth's view, with regard to Islam, because of the deplorable role of
the Church in the "so-called Crusades".24
18 Cf. Stephen R. Haynes, Prospects for Post-Holocaust Theology (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 81.
19 Karl Barth, Gesamtausgabe: Briefe 1961-1968, ed J. Fangmeier and H. Stoevesandt (Zurich: TVZ,
1975), 504-5, as translated by Chung, "Karl Barth's Theology of Israel: An Impasse in Jewish-
Christian Relations".
20 Busch, Karl Barth: His Lifefrom Letters andAutobiographical Texts, 494.
21 Ibid.





Chung states that Markus Barth reported that his father Karl Barth had a plan
on devoting himself to the history of world religions.25 The following relative plan
was crucial: a relation between Christendom and Judaism, a relation between
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Judaism and Islam, and finally a relation between Buddhism and Hinduism. Of
particular interest to this thesis is the proposed relation between Judaism and Islam.27
It is plausible to believe that the foundation of Barth's inter-religious plan would
have been found in his understanding of God's Covenant with Israel and its
fulfilment in Jesus Christ.
For Barth the innermost mystery of the existence of the Jews is their election
from among all people by God to be joined with God in this covenantal relationship.
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The "whole Bible bears witness" to the history of this covenant: "It is with freely
25
Chung, "Karl Barth's Theology of Israel: An Impasse in Jewish- Christian Relations". Barth's
intent is also supported by Jiirgen Fangmeier: "Als ich im September 1968 das letzte Mai bei Karl
Barth sein konnte, sprach er davon, womit er sich beschaftigen wiirde, wenn er noch Jahre
theologischen Schaffens vor sich hatte. Und er nannte nach dem romischen Katholizismus die
Ostkirchen und dann die nichtchristlichen Religionen; aber, fiigte er hinzu, ganz anders, als man in der
Regel darangehe: nicht so, daB das Allgemeine die Basis sei, auf der sich dann vielleicht Jesus
Christus als der Gipfel hochster erheben soil, sondern so, daB Jesus Christus der Grund sei, von dem
her mit den Religionen vielleicht ein noch ganz neues Gesprach zu eroffnen ware" (Jiirgen Fangmeier,
Der Theologe Karl Barth (Basel: Friedrich Reinhardt Verlag, 1969), 62).
26 See Bertold Klappert, Versohnung und Befreiung: Versuche, Karl Barth kontextuell zu verstehen
(Neukichen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1994), 48. Compare this sequence with Luther's view of
the similarities between Jewish and Muslim ceremonies: "The Jew can agree more readily with the
Turk than with the Christian. The Jew and the Turk agree on the truth of God; neither believes the
Trinity or Baptism. Both agree on circumcision and on other external ceremonies." (Quotation cited
by Rajashekar, "Luther and Islam: An Asian Perspective", 177). Luther also saw Islamic doctrines
and practices as "a patchwork of Jewish, Christian, and heathen beliefs. He [Mohammed] gets his
praise of Christ, Mary, the apostles, and other saints from the Christians. From the Jews he gets
abstinence from wine and fasting at certain times of the year, washing like the Nazarites (Num. 6: 1-2)
and eating off the ground. And the Turks perform the same holy works as some of our monks and
hope for everlasting life at the Judgment Day, for, holy people that they are, they believe in the
resurrection of the dead, though few of the papists believe it" (ibid.).
27 A similar plan to Barth's plan of investigating the relations between Christianity and Judaism, then
between Judaism and Islam, and finally between Buddhism and Hinduism is described by Klaus
Berger in an article entitled "Gentiles, Gentile Christianity". Berger describes a concentric circle
model where some religions and worldviews are considered especially close, such as Islam's relation
to Judaism which in turn is "hardly inseparable from Christianity". In this model these religions form
an "inner ring" as they have many things in common. Buddhism and Hinduism are considered "a
little more distant". "Finally others are more remote and can gain most from Christianity's innovative
power." Of particular interest is Berger's contention that "all definitions of the relation to other
religions should reflect the fact that the hands of Christians are tied to some extent by the fact that
they have been incorporated into the history of the Jewish people of God. Hence they also must
always take into account the relation of Israel to other religions" (see Klaus Berger, "Gentiles, Gentile
Christianity", in The Encyclopedia ofChristianity, Vol 2., E-I, trans and ed. Geoffrey Bromiley
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 384).
28 CD IV/l, 56.
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electing love that according to the witness of the Old Testament Yahweh concluded
7Q
His covenant with Israel." Election means "not that Israel has chosen Him but He
TO
Israel." In God's election, Israel has no advantage over other nations: "Yahweh is
not just the national God of Israel, but the sovereign Lord of all peoples and their
•3 i
history". Israel's own electing can consist only of acknowledging after the fact the
covenant that has been made - or not doing so. The covenant is two-sided to the
extent that - regardless if Israel were worthy of it, or how Israel relates to it - its
connectedness with God is enclosed in God's connectedness with it. The covenant is
"the historical reality with which the Old Testament is concerned whether it actually
•30
uses the word or not". It rests on the divine pronouncement: " 'I will be your God,
and ye shall be my people' (Jer. 7:23; 11:4; 30:22; 31:33; 32:38; Ezek. 36:28)."33
"Just as there is no God but the God of the covenant, there is no man but the man of
the covenant".34 In this pronouncement God has pledged Godself to this people -
God has firstly bound Godself. In this promise God has also bound this people to
Godself, making it the partner in God's covenant, the people ofGod.
God is faithful to this promise and no human unfaithfulness can dissolve the
covenant. Hence the covenant is a lasting one. "God does not cease to be the . . .
"3 r
covenant-partner" of humanity. Thus "man . . . does not cease to be the creature
and covenant-partner of God. ... As he has not instituted the covenant, he cannot
•3 z
destroy it or even contract out of it as though it were a free compact." For Barth
the promise of a new covenant in Jeremiah 31 cannot mean the replacement of the
old covenant with Israel by a different one. It has to mean the "revelation and
confirmation of what He had always willed and indeed done in the covenant with
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Israel." The promise, however, does aim at a "complete change in the form of the
covenant which is to take place in the last days and therefore beyond the history of
29 CD IV/2, 768.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 CD IV/1, 22.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 43.
35 CD IV/2, 484.
36 Ibid.
37 CD IV/1, 34.
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Israel considered in the Old Testament."38 Then it will be so "filled" with grace that
TQ
the "covenant with Israel is made and avails for the whole race."
For Barth then, there is in Christ there no new or different covenant made
with the nations. Busch contends that "this is Barth's basic thesis. This is the issue
for him, and not that the covenant with Israel is replaced by a different one."40 Barth
writes:
There is no question of repeating the covenant. For Peter, for John,
for Paul, for the churches in Corinth and Rome, it was concluded in
Christ. It was quite unthinkable that it should have to or could be
concluded anew with Peter or John or Paul or the Corinthians or
Romans. There can be no question of anything but their inclusion in
the one covenant.41
Through Christ the covenant has now become a truly "perfect covenant",
perfect in that it is now God's covenant not only with Israel but with humanity in
general.42 The fact that the "world" is now reconciled to God means that, through
this "perfect covenant", "as an act of God . . . the men of all times and places. . .
[have] their situation . . . objectively [and] decisively changed, whether they are
aware of it or not".43
In the incarnation humanity is "encountered by the One who is no other than
the 'covenant God' who bound himself to Israel, but now his definition as the
covenant God has become definitive, in that it is made precise in a deepened
38 Ibid., 33.
39 Ibid., 35.
40 Eberherd Busch, The Great Passion: an Introduction to Karl Barth's Theology, trans. Geoffrey W.
Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 99.
41 CD 1/2, 105. For Barth, the name Jesus Christ opens the door into the world where: "the
spaciousness of the world leads out from the narrowness of Israel" (Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, 73).
Under this name "God Himself realised ... the self- giving ofHimself as the Covenant-partner of the
people determined by Him from and to all eternity" (CD II/2, 53). God assumes human form; not just
the form of any man. God assumes into nature with Godself and God's being, Jesus ofNazareth, "this
one man as opposed to all other men" (CD IV/2,48). In this one man, humanity as a whole is
assumed and accepted by God, and hence, accepts God. Jesus Christ is therefore the fulfilment of the
covenant between God and Israel (Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, 76, 78).
42 CD IV/1, 33. The general, universal truth which embraces all humanity is that the God of the whole





sense". 4 That deepened sense is Jesus Christ: "the Messiah of Israel ... the Saviour
of the world".45
That God has in fact accepted humanity in Jesus Christ is attested in the
world by the visible "community" of those accepted by God who are gathered
together by and through him in order to bear witness to the world that they belong to
him. "[T]o say 'Christ' is to say 'Christ and His own' - Christ in and with his
fullness, which is His community. As His community (His body), this cannot be
merely a passive object" of all that God does to it within his covenant and its
fulfilment 46 Barth writes:
the people of Israel in its whole history ante et post Christum and the
Christian Church as it came into being on the day of Pentecost are two
forms and aspects ... of the one inseparable community in which
Jesus Christ has his earthly-historical form of existence, by which he
is attested to the whole world, by which the whole world is summoned
to faith in Him. For what the Christian Church is, Israel was and is
before it - His possession (Jn. 1:11), His body. . . . We are dealing
with two forms, two aspects, two 'economies' of grace. But it is the
one history . . . having its centre in Jesus Christ .... It is the bow of
the one covenant which stretches over the whole. ... To try to deny
this unity would be to deny Jesus Christ Himself.47
The Church that confesses Jesus Christ would deny Him and make its witness
"pointless" if it did not confess its unity with all Israel and instead saw itself in
4o
detachment from Israel. "For what does the Church have which the Synagogue
does not also have, and long before it (Rom. 9:4-5) - especially Jesus Christ Himself,
who is of the Jews, who is the Jewish Messiah, and only as such the Lord of the
Church?"49 For Barth the Church is the historical environment of Jesus because
44
Busch, The Great Passion: an Introduction to Karl Barth's Theology, 101.
45 CD IV/2, 260. See also Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, 76.
46 CD IV/2, 634.
47 CD IV/1, 669-71. Busch contends that at this point Barth opposes Schleiermacher's influential
thesis that biblical Judaism and Christianity are two different religions. Busch argues that
Schleiermacher's thesis is countered by the fact that Israel should be seen as the natural environment
of Jesus, because he "is - primarily and supremely - theirs", because he elected "flesh and blood from
Judah-Israel to be His tabernacle", and thus their election is confirmed. Israel is gathered from both
Jews and Gentiles {CD II/2, 210-11). See Busch, The Great Passion: an Introduction to Karl Barth's
Theology, 255.
48 CD II/2, 213-33, 267.
49 CD IV/1, 671.
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people are called into it: "[t]he Gentile Christian community of every age and land is
a guest in the house of Israel. It assumes the election and calling of Israel. It lives in
fellowship with the King of Israel."50 In all their distinctiveness, Israel and the
Church are the one community of God. They are both, in their distinctiveness,
witnesses ofGod to one another and together to the rest of the world.
In its election to be the people of God, which initially excluded the Gentiles,
Israel bears witness to the "judgment of God", namely, to God's judgment on
"natural theology" with its assertion that there is in all of humanity an inherent
preparedness for God - this denies the grace of God. The existence of Israel shows
that the covenant rests only upon God's gracious self-determination for fellowship,
upon God's readiness to turn aside and take upon Godself God's No to the
unworthiness and anti-grace hostility of the covenant-breaking partner. The Church,
however, bears witness to the "mercy of God", namely, to the mercy with which God
called into the community of God those who were originally excluded from God's
election.51 The existence of the Church shows that all its sin and remoteness from
the covenant cannot prevent God from receiving humanity and honouring it with
God's fellowship with it, so that humanity has no other option on its part than to
accept God. Busch writes: "What makes Israel and the church into one community
and unites their two witnesses is precisely what Israel outside the church cannot
perceive in its no to Christ: Jesus Christ." Through Christ's reconciliation the
dispute between Israel and the Church is now a "settled dispute" in the eyes of
God.53
The fact is that Israel and the Church need each other. But not only do they
need each other, they are in union with one another, "a unity which does not have to
be established but is already there ontologically" because of their common
foundation in grace.54 For Barth a relationship between Christianity and Judaism
exists ontologically. "Moreover", as Lindsay argues, "this unity is not merely a relic
of the biblical age, but remains in force; the Jews . . . remain loved and elect by God
50 CD IV/3, 877.
51 CD II/2, 205-33.
52 Busch, The Great Passion: an Introduction to Karl Barth's Theology, 255.
53 CD 11/2, 208.
54 CD IV/1, 671.
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right up to the present day, irrespective of their attitude to Jesus."55 Lindsay
continues: "If Judaism needs the witness of the Church, so too the Church needs the
witness of the Synagogue as the indispensable root from which it has sprung and in
which it must remain if it is to be complete."56 But more than this: rabbinic Judaism
"testifies to divine grace in ways that are positive, salutary and capable of
contributing constructively to the theological and ethical self-understanding of the
church".57
As has been argued in Chapter 2, Islam should also be addressed on its own
terms and not as a derivation of rabbinic Judaism. It is therefore reasonable to agree
with Bertold Klappert when he argues that Barth's dream of a theology of the Holy
Spirit should be an ecumenical and inter-religious plan; a plan which not only
extends to Jews but which should also extend to Muslims (and others). Klappert
writes:
Konturen einer okumenischen Theologie des Heiligen Geistes deuten
sich hier bei Barth an. Sichtbar werden ebenfalls Konturen eines
Dialogmodells im Kontext einer okumenischen Theologie des
Heiligen Geistes, innerhalb dessen, begrtindet in der universalen
Prophetie Jesu Christi in Korrelation zur messianischen Prophetic der
ganzen Geschichte Israels, der Dialog nicht nur mit dem von Barth zur
Okumene gerechneten Judentum, sondern auch mit den Muslimen und
den anderen Religionen (Buddhismus) gefiihrt werden sollte. Er
miiBte namlich gefuhrt werden, weil durch die messianische Prophetie
Jesu Christi die AusgieBung des Geistes auf alles Fleisch bereits
erfolgt ist: Der Geist ist verheiBen!58
Klappert argues that this "ecumenical theology of the Holy Spirit"59 should
be fundamentally ethical in nature - incorporating a responsibility to struggle for
human justice, both individually and corporately before God.60 This is a
55
Lindsay, Barth, Israel and Jesus: Karl Barth's Theology ofIsrael, 109.
56
Ibid., 109.
57 David A. S. Fergusson, "Contemporary Christian Theological Reflection on Land and Covenant",
13.
58 Bertold Klappert, Versdhnung und Befreiung, 50.
59 Ibid., 48.
60 Bertold Klappert, "Abraham eint und unterscheidet: Begrundungen und Perspektiven eines notigen
Trialogs zwischen Juden, Christen und Muslimen". This lecture was delivered in Heidelberg on 12th
August 1995 on the occasion of Prof. Dr. Theo Sundermeier's 60th Birthday. It was emailed to the
author on 26 September 2006 by Professor Dr. Klappert. (An edited version of this lecture can be
found as a chapter in Bekenntnis zu dem einen Gott? Christen undMuslime zwischen Mission und
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responsibility which Christians, Jews and Muslims all share because of their
connection to Abraham and God's promise to him.61 This is in harmony with the
radical inclusivity of Barth's theology that suggests a mutual interdependence and
concern for the other; a mutual dependence and ontological unity between the
Church and the Synagogue and finally but most importantly - a mutual dependence
and ontological unity between the Church and the Mosque.
One can legitimately suggest that Barth's theology opens the possibility for
the Church today to interact with Muslims who share a common commitment with it
Dialog, ed. RudolfWeth (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 2000), 98-122.) Thesis 5 of the lecture,
entitled "Die Ethik der Nachfolge Abrahams", states: "In der Lebensbeziehung zum judischen Volk
und zur Abraham-Gemeinschaft der Muslime nimmt die okumenische Christenheit aus alien Volkern
teil am WEG Abrahams und seiner Nachkommen: (1) an Abrahams Appell an den Richter aller Welt,
Recht zu iiben (Gen 18), (2) an Abrahams Kampf um die Rettung des einzelnen Menschenlebens,
durch den er 'Freund Gottes' genannt wird (Jes 41,8; Jak 2; Sure 9,35) und (3) an Abrahams Offenheit
und Toleranz aus Identitat, sich von Melchisedek ('Mein Konig ist Gerechtigkeit') segnen zu lassen.
An die Stelle der Dialogmodelle der Exklusivitat, Uberlegenheit und Toleranz ohne Identitat tritt so
die Beziehung in Unterscheidung: (4) das Denken von den anderen her (E. Levinas) und die
Faszination durch den Reichtum und die Schonheit der anderen." Chung's opinion is in concert with
Klappert's position when Chung argues: "For Barth Jesus Christ is the basis from whom a completely
new dialog with other religions can occur. Jesus Christ as 'the partisan of the poor' endorses Barth's
stance toward Judaism and other religions for the sake of mutual peace and social justice. ... [A]
particular confession to Jesus Christ as a Jewish representative ofGod's covenant with Israel and the
representative of the suffering humanity for the partisanship with the poor does not preclude
Christians from being radically open toward the voice of God in the outside world." See Chung,
"Karl Barth's Theology of Israel: An Impasse in Jewish-Christian Relations".
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Bowering contends that the Abrahamic faith in monotheism is what unites "Judaism, Christianity
and Islam" as consecutive articulations of trust in God: "As Abraham migrated, he broke with the
old gods and did not accept the gods of the new land. Rather, he put his trust in the nameless God,
beyond all gods and without locale, who had called him out of his land to a new home. This
religion of trust in God became the common root of Judaism, the religion of hope; Christianity, the
religion of love; and Islam, the religion of faith" (Bowering, "Christianity - Challenged by Islam",
106). Bowering contends that Islam sees itself both at the end and at the beginning of this
development: "In one sense, Islam is the final link in the chain of the three revealed religions,
confirming Torah and Gospel, the messages of Moses and Jesus, through the Qur'an proclaimed
by Muhammad. In another sense, Islam goes back behind Judaism and Christianity, undercutting
its sibling religions, by tracing its origins to the primaeval religion revealed to Adam and brought
back from oblivion by Muhammad, who finds his model in Abraham's submission to the one God"
(ibid). Bowering suggests that because Islam and Christianity have been "[bjlinded by their nearness
to one another", they have been unable to see their geographical and theological similarities:
"While Judaism is based on the belief that God has spoken to Israel, his chosen people, Christianity
has seen the word of Christ Jesus as the messianic fulfilment of its predecessor, Judaism. Islam,
however, has defined itself from the outset as superseding its twin forebears by returning to the
original religion ofAbraham" (ibid.). For Bowering, Christianity is like a middle sibling, seeing itself
covenantly tied to Judaism but "at a loss to define itself towards Islam coming after it" (ibid.).
Klappert's proposal, that an "ecumenical theology" from Barth's perspective should incorporate a
responsibility to struggle for justice, in many ways alleviates Christianity's predicament as described
by Bowering. It also serves to alleviate somewhat Migliore's concern in his Gunning lecture, that the
Church is currently not prepared for any encounter with Islam, by focusing Church resources on
justice issues as a major goal in any Muslim-Christian encounter.
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against oppression and violence and for the promotion of social and economic justice
for all the citizens of Europe. The Church could also benefit in its own life from
such an encounter. But in order to facilitate such an encounter it is first necessary to
understand the context ofMuslims in Europe.
Recognition, acceptance and understanding of Islam in the West
Smith contends that societies in the west are "just beginning to think about the
62ramifications for Western society of the growing numbers of Muslims". There are
now "many new social, educational, and legal issues that have come to the fore as a
result of the presence of Islam and of Muslim efforts to practice their faith" in
Europe.63
Of central importance to Muslims is the acknowledgment by non-Muslim
Europeans of their presence in Europe. This involves both general awareness and
acceptance on the part of the non-Muslim citizens of Europe as well as official
recognition which, Smith contends, "still has not been granted in a number of
places".64 This desire to be recognised and accepted focuses on a number of very
specific requests for understanding which involve the public practice of Islam.
Among them Smith lists: "[t]he building of mosques", "[cjemeteries", "Islamically
acceptable food", employment issues, facilities for observing the practice of Islam,
"[appropriate appearance and dress", and religious rights in public schools.65
One of the biggest challenges for Muslims in Europe is "finding proper
spaces for meeting and worship".66 Mosques have been part of the landscape in
some European countries for centuries, but "the past ten years or more have seen a
great increase in the number ofmosques built for that specific purpose, as well as the
f\"l
conversion of other buildings for worship". Smith contends that "[s]ome non-
Muslims have objected to new construction on the basis that the architecture is







times of prayer, and so on".68 Coupled to this is the need for Muslims "to have either
plots of land that are specifically designated as Muslim cemeteries or sections of
existing burial grounds where they can lay the dead to rest according to Islamic
custom".69
Another very visible sign of the Muslim presence in Europe, one which has
caused much controversy, is the head covering worn by Muslim women. Smith
contends that there are reports of women being discriminated against, "including
being fired from their jobs for wearing the hijab",70 The salient point she makes is
that many Muslims believe this code of dress is necessary in order to follow the
71
practice of the Prophet Muhammad.
In many respects attitudes towards these overt symbols of Islam reveal the
fears of non-Muslims. These have been conditioned to a certain extent by the
historical legacy initiated in the Middle Ages by the Crusades, but also by current
perceptions "based upon 'essentialized' images of violent and changeless Islam,
holdovers from the colonial past".72 Such perceptions "are reinforced by the constant
73
barrage ofmedia reports about Muslim extremist activity".
An issue which is central to Muslim identity and which needs addressed by
wider society is that "while many Muslims were brought to European countries
specifically to meet demands for certain kinds of labour, often unskilled, the fact
remains that in a number of places unemployment among Muslims is high and that
the jobs they are able to get are not commensurate with their skills or educational
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Having said this, many places of employment and public institutions, such as
schools, recognize the need to accommodate the appropriate practice of Islam, which
includes "facilities for washing and preparation for the prayer, a place for the prayer
itself, consideration of time off for the observance of Islamic religious holidays or
participation in the pilgrimage to Mecca, and special consideration of Muslims who
are fasting during the month of Ramadan".76 It is also now more commonplace to
see halal (Islamically acceptable) food available in public institutions such as schools
and hospitals.
Some Muslim parents choose to put their children in private Muslim schools,
and others choose to educate them at home, but the majority of Muslim children
attend public schools. Smith points out that "[mjany Muslims are now requesting
that recognition be given to some of the special requirements for their children, such
as the need for girls to wear appropriate dress for physical education, the need to
avoid unnecessary mixing of girls and boys and single-sex sports, and the creation of
opportunities for Muslim children to celebrate and tell their classmates about their
religious holidays".77
What is of central importance for many younger Muslims in Europe today is
a recognition and acceptance by the wider European population of "a genuinely
no
European . . . Islamic community". Second and third generation Muslim
immigrants are attempting to develop a positive relation of Islam to European
society, and of "discovering ways to create a new European Islamic culture different
from but integral to that of the prevailing cultures".79
Classical Islamic definitions of the world have generally portrayed it as
divided between the abode of war (dar al-harb), where Islam is not practiced, and
the abode of Islam or peace (dar al-islam) when Islamic law is the rule for society.
Although, as Smith contends, these divisions have not been functional for many
centuries, "the idea that Islam cannot be truly practiced in a foreign environment, or







Muslim societies, has been powerful". What is happening amongst European
Muslims is that western countries are now "being understood not simply as
appropriate, though non-Islamic, places for Muslims to live, but that the very
environment is being reinterpreted specifically to be an 'abode of Islam' ",81 Smith
contends that for "this idea to fully take root it will take serious efforts on the part of
immigrant Muslims in developing a new fiqh (jurisprudence) appropriate to the new
87
situation". It will also require "concerted attempts on the part of host cultures in
Europe to rethink current legislation in ways that respond to Islam not as a monolith
but as a representation of a range of different practices and interpretations".83
Kathleen M. Moore rightly believes that if western countries begin to
recognise, accept and understand issues such as those mentioned above then this will
go a long way toward helping "reform the dichotomous structure of how we view
84Muslims' place" in Europe. This would also bring greater clarity to any Christian-
Muslim encounter.
Engaging Barth in the "secular" sphere
The aforementioned requests by Muslims seem to be expressions Jeffery Stout would
welcome in "a religiously plural society" as pleas for deeper understanding between
oc
religious communities which in turn would benefit all concerned. For Stout:
Part of the democratic program is to involve strangers and enemies, as
well as fellow citizens, in the verbal process of holding one another
responsible. This means taking norms that originated in one tradition
and applying them across cultural boundaries, in the hope of drawing
undemocratic individuals and groups into the exchange of reasons.86
In terms of this thesis, Stout's reasoning suggests that when Christians and
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and understanding of each other, God speaks: "If God may speak through godless
Communism, why not, then, through the words both Christians and non-
Christians speak when holding one another responsible democratically for the
87
justice and decency of their institutional arrangements?"
C. C. Pecknold understands Stout as proposing, in a "post-9/11" democracy, a
"refraining [of] the question about religion's role in the terms of an 'expressive
freedom' (the freedom to press any and every cultural-linguistic particularity in
political argument) which can transform political arrangements through conversation,
88
through a democratic exchange of reasoning across difference". Pecknold points
out that a "reasonable person" for Stout is anyone "who participates responsibly in
[this] process of discursive exchange".89 Inherent in this process is a concern for the
other - citizens should enjoy equal standing "in political discourse", deserve respect
as "individuals" and "have a personal stake in the exercise of expressive freedom",90
Pecknold is right to understand Stout as proposing a "vision" of contemporary
pluralistic democracy in which "diverse coalitions and equally full expressions of
differences remain possible" in a public conversation which mixes normal discourse
and improvisational, "ad hoc immanent criticism in overcoming momentary
impasses". 1
Stout's "vision" resonates strongly with Barth's understanding of how
Christians can make political decisions with non-Christians (and, this thesis argues,
religious others) in an ad hoc and ephemeral way for the common good of society.
Indeed, Pecknold points out that Stout rightly "makes much of the 1934 Barmen
92
Declaration", the conceptual expression of Barth's understanding of the just state.
It is in this context that Stout contends that "democracy will suffer greatly ... if
orthodox Christians are unable to find a way to maintain their own convictions while
87 Ibid., 109.
88 C. C. Pecknold, "Democracy and the politics of the Word: Stout and Hauerwas on democracy and
scripture", Scottish Journal of Theology, 59.2 (2006), 201, 200.
89 Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 82. See also Pecknold, "Democracy and the politics of the Word:
Stout and Hauerwas on democracy and scripture", 200.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., 90-1. See also C. C. Pecknold, "Democracy and the politics of the Word: Stout and Hauerwas
on democracy and scripture", 200.
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also taking up their responsibilities as citizens" in contemporary Western
Q-5
democracies. Philip G. Ziegler contends that Stout understands Barth's theology to
be "a close relative to the kind of 'expressive rationality' of which he [Stout] is an
advocate".94 Ziegler interprets this understanding of theology as:
not so much an explanation or systematic translation of Christian
claims into one or more putatively universal academically rigorous
vocabularies as it is an exercise in thoughtful self-description. As
such, it involves ad hoc conceptual elaboration of the particular ratio
or grammar of Christian life and its first-order modes of discourse
(such as prayer and proclamation).95
Ziegler contends that, according to Stout, Christian theology is properly "
'public' not because it imitates or adheres to some more general form of thought
outside its own tradition, but simply because it goes about its business of making its
reasons explicit while adopting an ad hoc range of prudent and fitting communicative
tactics".96 In this way "such theology benefits democratic discourse by resisting the
unnecessary thinning out of moral vocabularies and impoverishment of moral
reasoning."97 Stout writes:
There are many circumstances in which candor requires full
articulation of one's actual reasons. ... It is precisely when we find
ourselves in an impasse . . . that it becomes most advisable for citizens
representing various points of view to express their actual reasons in
greater detail. For this is the only way we can pursue the objectives of
understanding one another's perspectives, learning from one another
through open ended listening, and subjecting each others premises to
fair-minded immanent criticism.98
The kind of theology which appeals to Stout, then, is "one where its
practitioners seek to make explicit their actual reasons for advancing certain moral,
political, and civic concerns with both tradition-specific integrity and communicative
93
Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 116.
94
Philip G. Ziegler, "Christian Theology and Democratic Politics in Conversation with Jeffery Stout",





Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 90.
159
candor".99 What he correctly finds democratically amenable about Barth's
theological discourse for the contemporary context is "that in casting off false
humility it does not cast off humility altogether."100 For instance, according to
Ziegler, Stout sees exclusive claims like those set at the head of the Barmen
Declaration - "Jesus Christ as he is attested in Scripture is the one Word of God we
are to hear, trust and obey both in life and in death" - as cutting not only against the
world but also against the Church.101 Ziegler goes on to explain that, for Stout,
"[h]igh claims made for God and Jesus Christ entail correspondingly low claims for
the Church as regards its purchase upon, and disposal over, the very truths of its
faith. Divine uniqueness, sovereignty, and freedom relativize the church together
1 09
with the world, so that boasting is 'excluded' (Rom. 3:27)." Stout correctly
understands Barth to mean that:
The church is one place where truths are spoken. It is also, however,
a place where many falsehoods are spoken. And it is not the only
place where truths are spoken. It does not follow from affirmation of
Christ as the one Word of God "that every word spoken outside the
circle of the Bible and the Church is a word of false prophecy and
therefore valueless, empty and corrupt" ([CDJIV/3, 97).1 3
The Reformed delineation - in which God and Church are related by grace
across a 'gap' constituted by both human finitude and sin - commits Christians to
what Stout calls the "cautionary use of the notion of truth", such that, "[w]e may be
justified nowadays in believing P but P might not be true."104 It does so because "the
boundary between the church and the secular world can still take at any time a
different course from that which we think we discern" at present.105
Thus, writes Stout, "when Christians are considering the question ofwhere
truths - in the plural - are to be found, they must be prepared to look . . . outside
of [the Church]":106
99
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Wherever they look, they must be suspicious and critical, as well as
open to the possibility of needing to change their minds. Wherever
they find important truths being spoken by other human beings, they
must take themselves to have been addressed by Christ himself, by the
Truth, the Light, the Word.107
Thus Stout endorses Barth's view that Christians are obliged to be open to,
and indeed should expect, "secular parables" of the gospel truth in the world at
108
large. But because of the particular content of its gospel, "the Christian
community is rightly and thoroughly self-critical".109
For Stout, the "participants in a given discursive practice are not in a position
to take for granted that their interlocutors are making the same religious assumptions
they are", since no single set of theological presuppositions are "tacitly agreed upon
as the framework within which discussion proceeds".110 Ziegler contends that Barth
also operates with a similarly matter-of-fact version of the secular1" when Barth
writes that "the civil community embraces everyone living within its area ... its
members share no common awareness of their relationship to God" and so,
practically speaking, no effective "appeal can be made to the Word or Spirit of God
112in the running of its affairs." Barth continues:
In the political sphere the Christian community can draw attention to
its gospel only indirectly, as reflected in its political decisions, and
these decisions can be made intelligible and brought to victory not
because they are based on Christian premises but only because they
are politically better and more calculated to preserve and develop the
common life.113
The secular sphere is thus "a sphere of religious contestation".114 Here,
Ziegler argues, the "pluriform practices and discourses of gratitude and reverence
believed to befit 'the sources of our existence and progress through life' encounter,
107 Ibid.
108 See CD IV/3, 38-165.
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interrogate, and criticize each other."115 According to Ziegler "this is not a
religionless, metareligious, or religion-neutral discursive space".116 It is a space
where Christian citizens are at liberty to make their reasoning explicit and so expose
it to interrogation. But here they are also at liberty to put their questions to
democratic piety - and indeed to all other modes of piety - regarding whether the
faith and hope in liberal virtue expressed in its reasoning are sufficient to sustain
human freedom, justice, and welfare and to see them flourish.
Ziegler is right to suggest that Barth understands that Christians are obliged
by their faith to accept Stout's invitation to engage other citizens in this secular
sphere for the sake of human well-being.117 The Church therefore should not
perceive itself "as in opposition to . . . contemporary secularisation, which has
118
pluralism as its consequence". Rather, a stand against secularisation and pluralism
"would be a terrible self-misunderstanding".119 This is because, Jiingel argues,
[T]he church may be thankful that its spiritual goods now exist in
secular form. For example, the secular respect for freedom of
conscience (which the philosopher Fichte declared to be "a holy thing
that it would be sacrilege to infringe"), the secular assertion of the
inviolability of the dignity of the person, the secular commitment to
protect handicapped human life, universal schooling and many other
achievements of the modern constitutional state are secularised church
treasures, and not least of the Protestant Church - treasures which
were often recognised in their full significance only when they had
been secularised.120
121
Jiingel contends that European Christianity exists in a secular form. But
the Church is not the "parental home" to which this secularism should return; it is "a




Jiingel, "The Gospel and the Protestant Churches of Europe: Christian responsibility for Europe
from a Protestant Perspective", 141.
119 Ibid.
120
Ibid., 141-2, cf. Barth, "The Christian Community and the Civil Community", 173-9, and also
Barth's understanding that lights ofcreation can become truth extra muros ecclesiae.
121 Cf. Barth, who argues that "the tasks and problems which the Christian community is called to
share ... are 'natural,' secular, profane tasks and problems" ("The Christian Community and the Civil
Community", 165). Barth even goes so far as to say that the Church is more secular than the world: in
its essence it cannot be estranged from anything human; everywhere and at all times, the Church is the
Church of humanity, of given epochs and cultures, and of a given people and a given language (see
162
pointer" for secular society "towards the coming city of God, in which church and
122
state will share a common future".
For Jiingel the Church should affirm "in principle" the pluralist society which
exists in Europe. It should "present the gospel's claim to truth, which it represents,
as a universal claim to truth 'for all people' - but affirm it within society as one
claim to truth among many",123 This is because "the basic Protestant conviction that
the truth of the faith can be asserted sine vi humana, sed verbo has prepared the
ground for the pluralism of modern society".124 It follows then that the Church
should also strive for an understanding with the non-Christian religious
communities. This entails standing up for the freedom of people of other faiths so as
to testify "that the truth of the gospel is a liberating truth".125
Migliore, in concert with Jiingel, rightly recognises that in a western
pluralistic context, Christians and people of other faiths must take their own faith
commitments with utmost seriousness. But he correctly goes further than Jiingel, in
accordance with the trajectory of Stout's argument, in explaining that Christians
must also enter into genuinely open dialogue with other faith communities, so as to
"affirm the universal saving significance of Christ" while also maintaining the claim
that "our knowledge of Christ and salvation in him is augmented, corrected, and to
some extent completed in the encounter with other religions." John Cobb echoes
Revelation, Eglise, Theologie (Geneve: Labor et Fides, 1964), 28-9). Nothing human is therefore
foreign to the Church, not is anything secular, profane, worldly or cultural.
122
Ibid., 142. Cf. Karl Barth, "The Christian Community and the Civil Community".
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 A window into Barth's understanding of religious freedom is found in his response to the Second
Vatican Council document entitled "Declaration on Religious Freedom". Firstly he attempts to clarify
the purpose of this document: he points out that the document is not addressing Christians but national
governments on their behalf, demanding "the free scope due to Christians and the [Roman Catholic]
Church for the confirmation and spreading of their faith as the only true religion" (Karl Barth, Ad
Limina Apostolorum, 39). The basis for this position is the natural dignity of humanity which
underlines this freedom as the right of every human. Secondly Barth asks a number of poignant
questions which indicate his own position on this matter: he espouses a biblical sense of religious
freedom - one that is not dependant upon a state's legislation nor natural human dignity. It is rather
based upon Jesus Christ as "God's vigorous announcement of his claim upon our whole life"
("Theology for the Christian Community: The Barmen Declaration", 149). It rejects "the false
doctrine that there could be areas of our life in which we would not belong to Jesus Christ but to other
lords, areas in which we would not need justification and sanctification through him" (ibid.).
126 Daniel Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology, second
edn. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 313.
163
this sentiment: "Many Christians certainly feel more faithful when they listen in love
and respect to what others have to say ... . To learn from others whatever truth they
have to offer and to integrate that with the insights and wisdom we have learned from
our Christian heritage appears to be faithful to Christ."127
Hence the Church can contribute to upholding Jtingel's secularised treasures,
i oo
which can lead to a "just, peaceable and stable social order", by listening to and
learning from other world faiths, including Islam. This in turn would lead the
Church to make common cause with Islam. By doing this the Church can advance
the Kingdom of God without eschewing its particularity or the particularity of Islam.
This notion seems to gain support from Stout's assertion that "mere refusal of the
secular shuns the Christian's obligation to discern the difference between true and
false words being lived and spoken outside the church".129
But there is very little literature on just how to appropriate Barth's theology
to do this in a pluralistic context. One place to start would be to investigate if
Jungel's assertion that "the [Gjospel's claim to truth ... as a universal claim to truth
- 'for all people' " can share commonalities with truth claims made by other
religions, such as Islam, in democratic society.lj0 Stout seems to support this notion
when he suggests that a recognition of various truth claims other than one's own
1 T1
should be undertaken and understood by Christians. What is correctly not
acceptable in Stout's view is any form of relativism or pluralism that would be
incompatible with making particular truth claims:
... all parties involved in the discussion will have their own
affirmations to offer. Without truth-claims, there would be no
communication, no exchange of reasons. No one can make
declarative statements without implying that those who deny the
propositional content of those statements are committed to falsehoods.
... It would therefore be arrogant to assume that one knows in
advance which human voices are speaking truly. This is what
secularists assume when they rig the rules of discussion to exclude
127 John Cobb, "Beyond Pluralism", in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: the Myth ofa Pluralistic
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religious voices. And it is also what Christians assume when they
treat the [Cjhurch as the only source of truths.132
Truth Claims
J.A DiNoia's study, The Diversity ofReligions: A Christian Perspective, looks at the
issue of truth claims in different religions within a chapter entitled: "The Providential
1 TT
Diversity of Religions". His proposal for discerning truth in other religions
consists of three components.134
Firstly, there is the Christian conviction that God is the one source of all
truth, including the "truth and rectitude that [Christians] find expressed in the
doctrines and life of other religious communities".135 Secondly, by way of holding
this commitment alongside his desire to acknowledge a genuine diversity between
the patterns of life fostered by the different religions, DiNoia proposes that any truth
so perceived be considered as both subordinate and not opposed to the truth revealed
in Jesus Christ. Drawing on the relationship between Buddhism and Christianity to
make his point, he suggests that after "extensive comparative analysis and dialogue .
. . a Christian theologian might be led to propose, for example, that the pursuit of
enlightenment was subordinate and not opposed to the pursuit of fellowship with the
Blessed Trinity".136 Thirdly, he suggests that it is possible for Christians to
appropriate these subordinated and non-oppositional truths. He claims that such
appropriation neither diminishes nor qualifies the pursuit of the aims of life fostered
by Christian faith; the appropriation may contribute, but is not necessary, to that
pursuit. In a similar way to Barth, he draws a distinction between that truth which is
acknowledged by a community and that which the same community is commissioned
by its own authorities to teach. He rightly suggests that there is a precedent for this
pattern of appropriation in the manner in which Christianity has appropriated truth
from the physical, biological and social sciences:
These examples suggest that the Christian community might
acknowledge the truth of doctrines in other religious communities
without adopting these teachings as its own and without prejudice to
132 Ibid.






its own conviction about the completeness of revelation as it bears on
seeking, attaining, and enjoying salvation. Thus, there is no prima
facie reason why individual Christians might not learn something
from the study of Buddhist meditation methods, neo-Hindu
conceptions of nonviolent resistance, and so on. If doctrines about
these and other matters were not incompatible with Christian doctrines
and if they were educible without the adoption of the entire doctrinal
scheme of another community, there would be no reason why the
Christian community would have to disallow such learning.137
DiNoia thus stresses both the uniqueness of the various religions and the view
that Christians can learn from other religions' non-oppositional truth. In this he has
been "strongly informed" by the work of Christian.138 Christian's brief examination
of Barth's account of extra-ecclesial truth leads Thompson to argue that Christian
concluded "that Barth was allowing for precisely the kind of non-oppositional truths
and endorsing their appropriation by the Church in the manner which DiNoia"
proposes is relevant to Christianity's encounter with other religions.139
Consequently, Thompson suggests that if Christian is correct, Barth's account of
extra-ecclesial truth can be "linked to a commitment to acknowledge the
heterogeneity of the patterns of life fostered and pursued by . . . various religious
communities."140
Christian's brief discussion about Barth occurs in the course of his own
discussion concerning a community's doctrines and "alien claims". For Christian, an
"alien claim" is:
A claim that what is proposed in some assertion is true, or that some
course of action is right, . . ., with respect to some community, if and
only if what is proposed in the claim is not an authentic doctrine of
that community. 41
137 Ibid., 93.
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His fundamental distinction between an "authentic doctrine" and an "alien
claim" corresponds to a distinction between those assertions and courses of action
which the community is commissioned to teach and those assertions and courses of
actions which arise in a second community, and which the first community
recognises as not inconsistent with its own doctrines, but which it is not itself
commissioned to teach. This differentiation is similar to Barth's understanding of
the difference between the purpose of true words of the Kingdom and the little lights
of creation.
For Christian, the possibility of acknowledging the existence of an "alien
claim" would itself be a "doctrine" of the community, dependent for its authority on
certain warrants among the community's other "primary doctrines".142 Moreover,
closely related to the warrants might be certain explanations of the possibility of true
or right "alien claims". Such explanations might have to do, he suggests, with "the
powers of human minds, with the course of human history, with the status of the
natural world as the setting of human life, with the activity of God in the natural
world and in human history".143
Not only are "alien claims" to be acknowledged, and such acknowledgment
to be warranted by other doctrines, but these claims can also be valued positively:
It may be that a community would have no reason to discourage its
members from learning truths it is not bound to teach or carrying out
courses of action in which it is not bound to instruct them, provided
that these truths and courses of action are consistent with the doctrines
it is bound to teach. It may even be that a community could
encourage its members, or some of them, to do so.144
Christian confines his attention to Barth's discussion of true words (passing
no comment at all on the related account of the lights of creation), but clearly
believes that he detects in this text an acknowledgment of "alien claims" as well as a
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insistence that such words can be true "without being given any canonical or
dogmatic status".146 Christian rightly suggests that "it seems clear that Barth is
proposing for his own community the position . . . that there may be truths and
courses of action which the community itself is not bound to teach".147 Christian
argues that this positive valuation is seen in Barth's contention that acquaintance
with these true extra-ecclesial words could "make a contribution to the strengthening,
extending and defining of the Christian knowledge which draws from [the bible]".148
In this claim Christian sees evidence that Barth is proposing that "the Christian
community should teach positive valuations of knowing such truths and of knowing
how to carry out such courses of action".149 Hence he suggests that this text
confronts Christian theologians as a text "not only to wonder at but to ponder as they
consider what their community ought to teach about alien claims".150
According to Christian then, Barth's theology may be open to certain lines of
conversation with DiNoia's proposal for subordinate and non-oppositional truth
claims. Despite Christian's focus on extra-ecclesial words, his engagement with
Barth's account of the lights of creation as "co-existing" and "not at cross purposes"
with the Light, reveals parallels with the sort of proposal DiNoia is making. But
while DiNoia is committed to developing genuine conversation between the
religions, he believes that any area of overlap in the form of agreement between
religions is a serious threat to the diversity of those religions.
Thompson is right to criticise DiNoia's resistance to agreement because:
[it] involves the assumption that each religion would be so
significantly defined and characterised by any such overlap that the
overlap does indeed seriously compromise the diversity. Implicit, . . .,
is a strongly homogeneous understanding of any single religion. It is
assumed that any such overlap refers to each religion in equal
measure; each religion would be equally defined by that over which
they agree. There seems no allowance for a level of heterogeneity
within each religion which would allow for the possibility of overlaps
which would be of different levels of importance for each religion and
146 CD IV/3, 134.
147
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148 CD IV/3, 134.
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which did not threaten the basic identity of each religion or the
fundamental distinction between them.151
In DiNoia's configuration, the religions can only encounter each other as
discrete homogeneous entities. Thompson is right to argue that this configuration
can embrace Barth's idea of extra ecclesial lights, which are quasi-independent of the
one true Light, but not Barth's concept of extra- ecclesial words, which point to
Christ and are relevant for the Church.152 Barth's understanding of truth outwith the
Church is a subtle and complex concept which does not readily fit into the
153
exclusivist, inclusivist or pluralist frameworks against which DiNoia is reacting.
As Chapter 1 has shown, and as Gavin D'Costa states: "Barth . . . overturns these
categories by being both exclusivist, inclusivist, and universalist all at once!"154 For
Barth, the little lights of creation can, under certain circumstances, become true
words of the Kingdom. In this sense Barth's work provides a more fluid
understanding of truth claims than is offered by DiNoia's more rigid understanding.
Hence Barth provides unexpected potential for inter-religious encounter.
Nevertheless, DiNoia's identification of non-oppositional or subordinate truth claims
in other faith systems lends support to this potential in Barth's work - but only
qualified support for agreement between religions is not necessarily a threat to their
diversity.
It is possible to make a connection between Barth's account of extra-ecclesial
truth and world religions within the arena of modern European society. This is the
connection which would bring Barth's ideas into the current quest to couple a
commitment to discern God's presence in both Christianity and the non- Christian
religions (in particular Islam) for the well-being of all citizens, with an equally strong
151
Thompson, " 'As open to the world as any theologian could be . ..'?: Karl Barth's Account of
Extra-Ecclesial Truth and Its Value to Christianity's Encounter with Other Religious Traditions", 164.
152 Ibid.
153 DiNoia's insistence on the diversity of religions is driven by his rejection of the "soteriocentric
principle" which he argues has sustained the dominance of "exclusivism", "inclusivism" and
"pluralism" as frameworks for Christianity's encounter with other religions (see DiNoia, The
Diversity ofReligions, 43-64). The "soteriocentric principle" is founded on "the universality of
salvation" where "all human beings who have ever lived, including those who lived before the
appearance of the Christian community, are called to participate in a relationship of union with the
Triune God" (ibid., 70). DiNoia renounces any a priori attempt to describe the aims of other religions
as salvific.
154 D'Costa, "Theology of Religions", 630.
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commitment to acknowledge the genuine diversity of those religions in
contemporary Europe. What is offered by Barth, then, is a framework which is able
to combine an understanding of diversity which is not threatened by ad hoc
"agreements" between religions - a framework which, on the one hand, recognises
the religions' "independence" and "distinctive particularity" and, on the other,
recognises their "interdependence" on the universality of God as "the unconditional
ground of all being and meaning".155
A Framework for Compatibility
One specific possibility for developing such a framework can stem from Cobb's
understanding of religions traditions; an understanding which is sympathetic to
Barth's view. Cobb suggests that "the great religious traditions are [not] well
understood as religions, that is, as traditions for which being religious is the central
goal".156 One should give up the notion of having "an essence of religion"157 which
characterizes all religions and instead replace this with the understanding that
158"individual religious traditions" are particular in nature. Hence he proposes a
"pluralism that allows each religious tradition to define its own nature and purposes
and the role of religious elements within it".159 This is sympathetic to Jiingel's
assertion that "the gospel's claim to truth ... as a universal claim to truth - 'for all
people' " can be affirmed within contemporary pluralist society "as one claim to
truth among many",160
Thompson proposes two formulae which helpfully clarifies Cobb's
understanding:
The two "religious traditions" could be designated RT1 and RT2. The
constituent elements could be designated as el, e2, e3, etc. These
elements would combine in ways determined by the respective
155 Christoph Schwobel, "Particularity, Universality and the Religions: Towards a Christian Theology
ofReligions", in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: the Myth ofa Pluralistic Theology ofReligions,
ed. Gavin D'Costa (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1990), 43. Schwobel suggests, in a similar fashion to
Barth, that all religions, like the Christian religion, are "human responses to the universal creative and
redeeming agency ofGod" (ibid.).
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"purposes" and "goals" of RT1 and RT2. Diversity and overlap
combine as follows:
RT1: el + e2 + e3 + e4 etc.
RT2: e4 + e5 + e6 + e7 etc.
At the point of overlap, i.e., e4, the religious traditions are
brought into a relationship which does not violate the more
comprehensive differentiation between RT1 and RT2, a differentiation
located in the lack of overlap between the remaining elements in each
tradition. The relationship between e3 and e6 may be one of
disagreement; that between e2 and e7 may be one of non-oppositional
difference.161
For the purpose of this thesis, the most suggestive aspect of Thompson's
interpretation of Cobb is the provision which it makes for the various constituent
elements to be found in any religious tradition. There is no reason to suggest that
1 69
such elements could not be ethical or political. Cobb's configuration also
emphasises that:
religious traditions are never encountered in toto. Encounters between
them are always specific to particular people, places and time, i.e, to
particular elements within each tradition. The acknowledgment of
heterogeneity also allows for the recognition of genuine diversity
between more conservative and more radical elements within any
single religious tradition. It allows for the possibility of transition and
change within any religious tradition. It further allows for various
perspectives from within the tradition on how best to define the
tradition.163
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162 Cf. Karl Barth, "Political Decisions in the Unity of the Faith", 149-64. Here Barth's theology
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David Blumenthal is sympathetic to this interpretation of Cobb. Blumenthal contends that Cobb's
comments on the permeability of religious traditions also "helps us use the language of the other to
articulate more clearly our own traditions, see that understanding leads to more positive inter-religious
interaction, and maintain our individuality even as we search for commonalities. Although this
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Thompson is correct to recognise that the appropriateness of this framework
for ad hoc correlation "lies not just in its ability to tolerate overlaps which do not
threaten diversity", but also in the fact that it is compatible with three aspects of
Barth's theology.164
Firstly, for Christianity to re-describe itself as a religious tradition in Cobb's
terms is compatible with Barth's insistence that the Church is "totally and properly
both visible and invisible".165 The Church exists both in its likeness to and in its
distinction from "other historical magnitudes (andere[ ... 7 geschichtliche[ ... J
Grofien)".166 As such, it exists in both total dependence on and in total freedom
towards its environment. This is because even though the people of God is "one
people among others . . . [it] owes its nature and existence to the new divine act of
reconciliation".167 By redescribing itself as one religious tradition among others, the
Church acknowledges that its worldly form is not unique. Indeed Gabriel Vahanian
contends that
with Barth . . . there is a way of talking about the church . . . which is
supremely non-theological. That non-theological way consists in
talking about the church as one would about Islam or Zen-Buddhism,
about atheism or even about Protestantism and Catholicism. It
consists in talking about the church and Christianity as simple
phenomena among other similar events issuing from . . . cultural
influence . . . .168
However, such a re-description of Christianity does not constitute an
exhaustive self-description, nor would it be understood as such by other religious
traditions committed to such a configuration. Built into Cobb's definition is the
freedom for each religious tradition "to define its own nature and purposes and the
role of religious elements within it".169 Christianity thus remains free to describe
164 Ibid., 166-7.
165 CD IV/3, 726. See also Thompson, " 'As open to the world as any theologian could be .. .'?: Karl
Barth's Account of Extra-Ecclesial Truth and Its Value to Christianity's Encounter with Other
Religious Traditions", 167.
166 Ibid., 734; KD IV/3, 840.
167 Ibid., 743.
168 Gabriel Vahanian, "Karl Barth as Theologian of Culture", Union Seminary Quarterly Review, 28.1
(1972), 44.
169 Cobb, "Beyond Pluralism", 84.
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itself in the theological terms of its own self-understanding as the "people of God
170elected in Jesus Christ and called to be His witness". Consequently, a re-
description on these terms remains ad hoc and is dependent upon and subordinate to
Christianity's own theological self-understanding.
A second reason Thompson gives is that, although the divine activity is "one
and same in all things, ... it is not one and the same in the sense of eternal
recurrence, or as the only constant pole in the flux of phenomena".171 More
specifically, Barth rejects, for instance, the image "of a globe, on whose surface and
in whose interior any point may in principle be exchanged for any other, since all of
172them have exactly the same function in their own place". As a more accurate
image, he proposes, for example, that of a "living plant ... in which the various
parts, root, stem, branches, leaves, buds and fruit are all mutually ordered, in which
the presence of all the others demands that each one should have its own place and
function".173
As such, the events of God's rule are not "so many 'cases' in the one rule, but
individual events which have their own importance and have to be considered in and
for themselves".174 In other words, God's "unified plan has nothing whatever to do
with a levelling down and flattening out of individuals and individual groupings".175
God's rule is such that "particular creatures and individuals and natural and historical
groupings and relationships are [not] prevented by Him from existing in their
particularity and for particular ends".176
Consequently, even granting its worldly visibility, no licence is given to the
Church to consider the world's various "natural and historical groupings"177 as
characterised by all the same worldly features which constitute its own worldly
170 CD IV/3, 743.
171 CD III/3, 137. See also Thompson, " 'As open to the world as any theologian could be ...'?: Karl










visibility or to consider them as equally determined by some other combination of
worldly features. Compatibility exists, therefore, because the definition of a
religious tradition does not, it is again to be stressed, demand that the tradition is
most characteristically defined by any of its constitutive elements.
A third reason Thompson gives for compatibility lies in the comprehensive
178and differentiated understanding of each religious tradition. Cobb's recognition
that any single religious tradition consists of various elements allows for the
possibility of applying Barth's concept of truth outwith the Church to those various
elements. In this way,"[t]he various elements of the religious traditions can be
considered by the Christian community in terms of whether they are best explained
as human confusion, a light of creation, or as an extra-ecclesial manifestation of
Jesus Christ".179
Conclusion
Barth's understanding of democratic society can accommodate religious pluralism
where members of the Abrahamic faiths can strive together for justice and the
common good of all citizens. This is because of their ontological unity in God's
grace. Barth's work also provides an understanding of truth claims which offers
unexpected potential for inter-religious encounter and co-operation amongst the
Abrahamic faiths. In particular, Thompson's interpretation of Cobb is useful in
bringing Barth's theology into conversation with Islam in Europe today. It provides
the potential for the Church to use aspects of Barth's theology on an ad hoc basis in
seeking to promote common cause with Muslims on issues of social justice and
political action by identifying the permeability and commonality of elements within
each religious tradition. But, as has been shown in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, this
encounter also has the potential to testify "to divine grace in ways that are positive,
salutary and capable of contributing constructively to the theological and ethical self-
understanding of the [CJhurch", as aspects of Islam become secular parables of the
Kingdom.180 Chapter 6 will investigate what such an encounter might look like
178
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using the example of a possible encounter between the Church, as Barth conceives it,
and the Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan.
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CHAPTER 6
An inter-religious encounter with Tariq Ramadan
Introduction
One person with whom the Church can make common cause with on the topical
subjects of gender equality, socio-economic policies and the war against terrorism in
today's secular and pluralistic Europe from Barth's perspective is the Swiss-born
Muslim scholar Tariq Ramadan. Ramadan's work illustrates that there is a basis
in Islam for open, pluralistic societies dedicated to democratic ideals. This
chapter will argue that Ramadan's work comes to the Church today as a "secular"
parable of God's kingdom, calling the Church to renewed humility, repentance and
revision of doctrine.
Making Common Cause with Tariq Ramadan
Khadija Moshen-Finan contends that for many young Muslims
who were either bom in Europe or emigrated there, the problem of
how to define themselves is crucial. They communicate poorly with
their parents, often no longer speaking the same language or sharing
the same values and standards of behaviour.1
This has led, Moshen-Finan believes, to these youngsters "searching for a
thinking universal Islam based on individual reasoning. They reject an identity based
on their parents' national origin, which they no longer connect with, and also reject
the label of 'Arab' or 'beur' they are often automatically given."2 This rejection
combined with the Islamophobia of Europe in the 1980's and 90's, "9/11", "7/7" and
the current war against terrorism has led to "[cjonfusion, suspicion and stereotyping"
that has undermined Muslim communities, which in turn have "retreated into self-
justification on the basis of [their] religion and religious identity".
This situation has encouraged the emergence of new activists promoting an
1
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Islam adapted to life in Europe - "an identity that transcends national, ethnic or racial
points of reference, a supra-national one closer to a European, even universal order
of things in tune with the image of the modern world, where national borders are
unmarked and life-styles largely similar".4 This message finds an audience
predominantly among a "minority of Muslims from immigrant families who have
become alienated from their parents' culture but are worried about losing their
identity if they became totally integrated into European society and effectively
assimilated".5
A scholar who promotes an Islam adapted to life in Europe is Tariq Ramadan.
Ramadan is "the grandson of Hassan El-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood
movement in Egypt in 1928, and the son of another historic figure of the movement,
Said Ramadan, who was sentenced to life imprisonment by President Gamal Abdel
Nasser and exiled to Switzerland".6 Moshen-Finan contends that Ramadan regards
Islam as a political ideology that applies to broad areas of social activity and that sees
society in a political light.7 In the European situation, he "sees Islam - unlike
fundamentalists operating in the Muslim world - not as a geo-strategic issue but a
social phenomenon".8 Ramadan focuses on the place of Islam and Muslims in
Europe: how one can be a good Muslim in Europe today. He does this by combining
strict obedience to the teachings of Islam with civic commitment and has been
described as offering "highly-educated, relatively young, [European Muslim]
professionals and intellectuals"9 "a set of arguments and his [Ramadan's] own





Kiing accredits Ramadan's grandfather, El Banna (al-Banna') with founding "an Islamic order based
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of religious leadership and where there are no recognized religious authorities to
meet young Muslim needs.
For Ramadan, if Islam is to survive in the West, then contemporary European
Muslims must move from merely preserving their heritage to making an authentic
contribution to modern European society. He contextualises the predicament of
Europe's Muslims historically, vis-a-vis belonging and identity: Muslims have been
in Europe since the Middle Ages, at which point Ramadan claims, they created a
thriving civilization in Spain which became "the conduit of social, religious, and
scientific knowledge to Europe".11 However there is a sense that Muslims feel
alienated in Europe today. They do not feel fully accepted, and Ramadan claims
19
they are denied "rights guaranteed to the more longstanding citizens". He identifies
the 1980's as a period when "the new and fairly sudden visibility of Muslims in
Europe evoked suspicion on the part of Europeans (often based on misconceptions)
and, at times, mutual rejection".13 The resulting understandable tensions led to a
situation where "it has been difficult to establish an atmosphere in which genuine
dialogue can take place or close working relationships between the newcomers
[Muslims] and the resident population".14
The first Muslim immigrants to come to Europe were predominantly
labourers from "North Africa, Turkey, or Indo-Pakistan".15 They were "a people of
modest means who were under severe economic pressures . . . some of which still
continue for Muslim immigrants today: unemployment, rejection, alienation,
violence".16 Ramadan pinpoints a number of issues which made it difficult for these
immigrants to consider staying permanently in Europe: "[tjheir generally low
educational standing, their tentative status in the European host countries, and their
concern for the larger family unit".17 It was therefore left to the second and third
generations to bring about changes in the mindset of these early immigrants;
11
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Muslims are now demonstrating that their presence in Europe is not only a reality but
a permanent choice. They are a new emerging community with a developing
European character and culture, a community which includes "numerous converts to
Islam who, along with the young generations of Muslims who have now become
European, are at home in Europe: they are European citizens; European and
Muslim".18
More recently, the Muslim community of Europe has had to face the backlash
from a number of international events that have had a deep impact in shaping the
perceptions of Islam of European citizens. Among the most influential Ramadan that
cites are "the Iranian revolution of 1979, the Salman Rushdie affair, the 'madness' of
the Taliban in Afghanistan, intermittent violence in the Middle East, and the daily
horror of Islamist repression in Algeria".19 Other situations can be added to the list,
such as the horrific events of "9/11" and the subsequent war against terrorism in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the terrorist attack of "7/7", the process of extraordinary
rendition and the housing of enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay.2" These factors,
combined with an ever increasing security interest in the Muslim population, have
contributed to what Ramadan terms "such a negative perspective [which] is currently
21
a widespread phenomenon that transcends . . . national European borders". He
bemoans the negative coverage of the Muslim world in Western academia and the
media. He contends that unfavourable and blatantly biased portrayals of Islam and
the Muslim world have increased exponentially since the events of "9/11",22 and
recognises that "it would be easy to come to the conclusion that Islam is
incompatible with European legislation or mindset and, by the same token, that it is
23
impossible for Muslims to integrate" in Europe.
But surprisingly, and somewhat controversially for an Islamic scholar,
Ramadan argues that the central notions of "modernity" such as democracy,
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19 Ramadan, "Islam and Muslims in Europe: A Silent Revolution toward Rediscovery", 159.
20 At the time ofwriting, British security services had just prevented major bombing attacks in
London and Glasgow attributed to Islamic extremists (July 2007).
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pluralism, human rights, and the protection of minorities are compatible with a true
Islamic perspective. "Nothing in Islam is opposed to modernity and we can firmly
state that the Muslim thinkers and 'ulamci' (savants) who are opposed to this notion
and to the idea of change and evolution that it covers often confuse it with the model
which is current in the West."24 Ramadan believes that Muslims should distinguish
between the ritual and the mundane aspects of their faith. He rightly denies that a
true separation of state and religion is possible since everyone - secularists and
atheists alike - is motivated by their values. Indeed, there can be no religion or
ideology without social ethics and effects. Muslims must, however, make clear that
there is no particular "Islamic State" to be imposed upon Europe and that their social
engagement in European society is not necessarily missionary. It is important
therefore for Muslims to learn that their faith contains no injunctions against
democratic government. In this way they can accept democratic methods under
duress yet remain faithful to their principles. Muslims therefore should enter the
democratic system by making an authentic contribution to it, asking for respect rather
than mere toleration. This approach encourages Muslims to consider themselves at
home in the West, to overcome their sectarian divisions on ethnic, national,
language, and sectarian grounds and to become more self-critical and more rational.26
Ramadan rightly contends that isolation and ghettoization will not work. Muslims
have to be exposed to their Western environment, or they will develop a victim
mentality instead of learning how to cope selectively with a West that is neither
wholly good nor bad. Indeed, since Muslims are secure in the West, it is no longer
24
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dar al-harb (the abode of war) nor are so-called Islamic countries any longer dar al-
islam (the abode of Islam).27
On the topic of inter-religious encounter, Ramadan is right to point out that
those from different faith traditions who meet in dialogue are not usually
representative of their own religious community; yet those who are representative do
28
not meet. He writes: "[DJialogue is well under way between specialists from each
religion who are more or less open-minded, while ordinary believers meet only rarely
?Q
and the most entrenched and radical views are never voiced." Interestingly he
notes that there are more Muslim-Christian encounters than equally important intra-
communal ones between the branches of Islam. He is right to observe that dialogue
presupposes a mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the other, and that neither
•5 A
should act as exegete of the other's scriptures. Yet Ramadan seeks to go further
than simply dialogue: he is sympathetic to "shared involvement" and "joint action"
among religious traditions. In this context, Ramadan believes that there has to be
recognition that people of differing faiths "hold a great number of convictions and
values in common".31 Specifically this thesis seeks to argue that the Church can
make common cause with Ramadan, through Barth's perspective, not only on issues
relating to the secularised treasures of gender equality and social and economic
justice, but also, more controversially, in connection with the war against terrorism.
Gender Equality
Ramadan is scathing of discrimination against women in Muslim families and
societies, both West and East, under diverse pretexts:
In the minds of many Muslims, being faithful to Islamic teachings
with regard to education for women, access to mosques, marriage and
divorce, social and financial independence, and political participation
means doing what was customary in their country of origin or what
"the ulama from back there" used to say. Thus, we find parents
justifying their unequal treatment of their sons and daughters (clearly
discriminating against the latter) with regard to permissiveness, going








women to enter mosques, and if, by happy chance, there is a place for
them, it is usually dilapidated and often even without a good sound
system. Imams find "Islamic" justifications for "fast-track"
marriages, without any preparatory official administrative procedures,
leaving women without security or rights, abused and deceived by
unscrupulous individuals. Divorce is made very difficult, even when it is
clear that the woman is defending her most basic rights. Some women, with
the knowledge of all around her, suffer violence and degradation while the
Muslim community remains culpably silent and complicit, justifying its
inaction and cowardice by reference to the Islamic injunction "not to get
involved in what does not concern you".32
He contends that women's liberation Islamic-style can only come from
within, and through, Islam, e.g. from a more gender-balanced reading of Islamic
IT
sources. This resolve centres round an understanding of the essence ofwomanhood
as opposed to perceiving the role of a woman simply as "child", "wife" or
"mother".34 Even though Ramadan sees this as an inherently Islamic issue, it serves
to remind the Church of its role in promoting "women's rights, decision making
within couples . . . social involvement and female participation in academic and
35
political debate". Be they Christian or Muslim, the Church is duty bound to show
solidarity with women of all religious backgrounds as they fight "for [the]recognition
of their status, for equality, for the right to work and to equal pay" within society/'6
Ramadan is right to argue that "[this] does not mean that they [women] want to
neglect or forget the demands of their [particular] faith" (be they Christian or
37
Muslim). But what it does do is "to define a certain way of being and of feeling
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convention which does not deserve to be preserved any longer" (Barth, "The Christian Community
and the Civil Community", 175). Ramadan's statement is particularity relevant at a time when female
employees of certain local government authorities in the UK are still being paid lower salaries than
their male counterparts. The Equal Opportunities Commission reports that this practice, amongst
other similar ones, will not be eradicated for at least another decade.
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beings, spiritually, socially, politically, and culturally-free, autonomous, and engaged,
38
as the [particular faith traditions] require and as societies should guarantee".
Social and Economic Justice
Ramadan argues that:
[t]he Age of globalization is an age of upheaval, or more accurately of
reversal, that condones the domination of economics and financial
markets over all other areas of human activity. Globalization is first
and foremost economic, rather than political, cultural, or
technological. It has become impossible to formulate a serious
critique of the world order, the policies of the industrialized nations,
or the decisions of the G8 without referring to a minute study of the
neoliberal economic system, the institutions that sustain it (the World
Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World
Bank), the formidable power of a handful of multinationals, and the
functioning of the banks and financial markets.39
He holds that "in a time of world markets, speculation on every front, and
virtual financial transactions, the old realities of domination, the subjugation of the
Southern nations, and colonialism have changed in nature and in name but have not
disappeared".40 He continues:
It is now no longer necessary to be present in Caracas, Bamako, or
Jakarta in order to make decisions; the dominant powers operate from
offices in Washington, London, and Paris and from stock exchanges in
New York and Tokyo following the new division of labor, which
condones a "new look" colonialism and a veritable "long-distance"
slavery.41
In response to this, Ramadan contends that Muslims should produce
economists but avoid the reductiveness of regarding men as homo economicus: "To
reduce a person to the mechanics of how, without any consideration of the ultimate
why, is inconceivable, unless people are to be confused with 'things', simple tools,







which recognizes that collective interests have to be taken into account over and
above individual ones.43 Central to this notion is the belief that "everyday, simple,
and natural economic activity contains a moral quality".44 Ramadan finds support
for this point of view from an unlikely source - George Soros, the billionaire New
York financier. In an interview about his book The Crisis of Global Capitalism,
Soros states:
. . . market fundamentalism relies on an allegedly scientific economic
theory. Basically, I think it was Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher who were the main movers in adopting a vulgarized version
of laissez-faire economics, turning it into a kind of fundamentalist
position. ... I also worry about inequity. The markets are good for
expressing individual self-interest. But society is not simply an
aggregation of individual interests. There are collective interests that
don't find expression in market values. Markets cannot be the be-all
and end-all. These collective decisions, and even individual decisions,
must involve the question of right and wrong. I think markets are
amoral. . . . But moral values are necessary to prevent their excesses
and inequities. ... In the case of labor markets, work itself is turned
into a commodity. As such, the labor markets often work very
efficiently. But you can also sack someone even if he has an ailing
mother and may have nowhere to turn. People have to be treated as
people. ... I am worried about the replacement of professional
values by market values. Turning law or medicine into businesses. I
43 Ibid., 178-82.
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Ibid., 178. After discussing several approaches to the issue of interest (Riba), Ramadan proposes
the creation of a parallel, alternative Islamic economic system to the "neoliberial capitalist system" of
the West (ibid., 195). Initially he would allow Muslims to finance major economic projects with
credit on interest in order to accumulate resources for a future interest-free economy (ibid., 198-9).
Cf. CD III/4, 545 where Barth writes that the political task of the Christian community is to "espouse
the cause of this or that branch of social progress or even of socialism". Green helpfully explains the
several quite different approaches to socialism that Barth mentions: "Social liberalism in Barth's time
is about equivalent to 'social democratic' in Europe today, namely, a moderate socialist position
consistent with liberal democracy. A cooperator is a voluntary nonprofit association of consumers or
providers for the benefit of its members. Syndicalism is a revolutionary strategy for reorganizing
society by overthrowing the state which it regards as intrinsically oppressive and substituting the trade
union as the key unit of productive labor and government: the motive is socialist in that production is
for use, not profit. . . Freigeldwirtschaft is mistranslated 'free trade' or 'free market economy'. It
refers to the economic theories of Silvio Gesell (1862- 1930) about an economy in which money
would be available without interest (hence 'free money'), and would also depreciate like other capital
assets" (See Clifford Green, "Freedom for Humanity: Karl Barth and the Politics of the New World
Order", in For The Sake of The World: Karl Barth and The Future ofEcclesial Theology, ed. George
Hunsinger (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 2004), 94). Green contends that Gesell's theories were
discussed in Swiss anarchist circles in 1946 "and perhaps among the friends of Leonhard Ragaz"
(ibid., 95) Ragaz, among others, influenced Barth's early political development as a socialist (see
Gorringe, Karl Barth: Against Hegemony, 24-72). Hence, from the above understanding it would
appear that Ramadan is espousing a "branch of social progress or even socialism" which, from Barth's
position, the Church should support.
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think it changes the character of those activities. In the case of
politics, the huge role of money in elections undermines the political
process. [The new global economy resembles the internal crises of
capitalism in the past.] . . . After each crisis, we made institutional
changes. ... We have national institutions that keep excesses from
going too far. During this period when market fundamentalism has
become the dominant dogma, however, markets have become truly
global. And we don't have comparable international institutions to
prevent the excesses.45
Green is right to acknowledge that "the market has won out over state
planning as a more efficient way of allocating resources".46 But markets have long
antedated modern capitalism and there are fundamental ethical and policy issues that
the market can never answer. Capitalism has proved to be a very successful
generator ofwealth that is needed to improve living standards among the poor, but it
should also be recognised that "even moderately controlled capitalism cannot
equitably distribute that wealth".47 Green is therefore correct in arguing that
"structuring a just ecomonic global economy is a complex and demanding task".
There is a long tradition in the Church of making direct connections between
economic life and the Gospel: in fact the Church is already engaged in a great deal of
lobbying. The Make Poverty History campaign of 2005 had both institutional and
grass root support from the global Church and made an impact at both the 2005 and
2007 G8 summits. Millions of pounds are given annually for humanitarian aid and
disaster relief through organisations such as Christian Aid and World Vision;
provision is made for low-income housing and people donate their labour to build
houses through Habitat for Humanity. These are to name but a few Christian
organisations.
Yet Green is right when he points out that "all this is unsystematic and
relatively modest in scale compared to the actual economic resources under the
control of church members".49 He asks a poignant question: "What might a more
45
George Soros and Jeff Madrick, "The International Crisis: An Interview", New York Review of
Books, January 14 (1999), 40 as cited by Green, "Freedom for Humanity: Karl Barth and the Politics
of the New World Order", 97-8.
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ambitious organization of churches as an economic institution be able to accomplish,
in a way that embodies church priorities and addresses social injustices in some
significant measure?"50 An answer might be found from what Ramadan seems to be
saying with regard to the Muslim community's management of zakat.5] He writes:
Rather than continuing to manage zakat in a scattered and incoherent
way, both locally and nationally by distributing money to institutions
and individuals without planning, it is urgent that women and men
take a genuine special interest in the social field and develop,
wherever possible, authentic solidarity programs that will help women
and men toward social and economic autonomy.52
Ramadan contends that "different kinds of support are needed for
unemployed people and disabled people, for educated people and people with no
education, and so on. In order to build such programs, it is necessary to study one's
society and one's community, to get close to the poor, the unemployed, the disabled,
to understand the logic of marginalization, the various kinds of social and financial
C T
breakdowns, and the range of difficulties". This is because "[t]he philosophy of the
'right of the poor' and solidarity that is written at the heart of the requirement of
zakat requires a long-term global vision that will set in motion a dynamic for
socialization through employment, economic participation, and financial
independence".54 This envisions creating "enterprises, businesses, and insurance and
50 Ibid.
51 Zakat is the third pillar of Islam. Its very essence according to Ramadan reveals "the importance of
social involvement in the Muslim worldview. .. . After the two declarations of faith (in the oneness of
God, tawhid, and in the Prophet), and after the obligation of prayer, which establishes the link between
the believer and the Creator, the social purification tax (zakat) projects the believer into the sphere of
the community, which is thus permeated by Transcendence and the sacred. At the same time, what
underpins zakat is a full and ethical conception of social organization and human relations: those who
have possessions have duties; those who are unprovided for have rights before God and among men.
Islam does not conceive of poverty as a normal feature of the social arena and does not envisage that
the remedy for this distortion should be the free generosity of some toward others in the hope that the
wealth of the rich and the destitution of the poor may somehow miraculously find a point of balance.
The obligation of zakat puts this question into the realm of law and morality and cannot be left to
anyone's discretion. Social solidarity is part of the faith and is its most concrete testimony: to be with
God is to be with people; this is the essence of the teaching of the third pillar of Islam" (Ramadan,
Western Muslims and the Future ofIslam, 178-9).




other companies that will make it possible for them [the poor] to live and develop in
their respective societies".55
Barth's understanding of human work can help the Church make common
cause with Ramadan in his quest to develop "authentic solidarity programs that will
help men and women toward social and economic autonomy".56 For Barth, "work"
refers to a person's active affirmation of his or her existence as a human creature. It
embodies "the desire ofmen to 'prolong' their own lives and those of their relatives,
i.e., to maintain, continue, develop and mould them, to secure and hold at the
common table of life a place in closest keeping with their desires and requirements,
57
or, in less grandiose terms, to earn their daily bread and a little more". For Barth,
then, work establishes a level of autonomy in caring for one's own life which doesn't
necessarily exclude being assisted by others.58
Barth posits that work ought to take place in cooperation with others. But
often it appears primarily as an isolated or hostile "struggle for existence".59 What
should be governed by mutual co-ordination of human needs is perverted by the lust
for security that superabundance brings, for possessions and for power over others.
But "[t]he genuine and vital claims of man are not empty and inordinate desires of
this kind".60 When, however, the organization of work involves concentrated private
ownership of the means of production, the opportunity arises for these desires to be
expressed structurally in the exploitation of persons who, possessing limited
economic power, are unable in truth to deal on fair terms with their employers
regarding the contract of labour. Werpehowski notes:
Barth here cites a violation of commutative justice that effectively
treats the weak merely as means or instruments to the interests of
others; appeal to the value of freedom in striking agreements and
exchanges masks the fundamental unfairness of background
conditions of power and resources.61
55 Ibid., 197.
56 Ibid., 193.
57 CD III/4, 525.
88 Cf. Ramadan's desire for social and economic autonomy.
59 CD III/4, 538.
60 Ibid.
61 William Werpehowski, "Karl Barth and politics", in The Cambridge Companion to Karl Barth, ed.
John Webster (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 236, referencing J. P. Gunneman, "Capitalism and
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Barth challenges Western Churches to champion "the weak against any
f\9
encroachment on the part of the strong" through "counter-movements" which may
be described as "socialism in the form most helpful in a specific time and place and
in a specific situation".63 But the Church's "decisive word cannot consist in the
proclamation of social progress or socialism. It can consist only in the proclamation
of the revolution of God against 'all ungodliness and unrighteousness ofman' (Rom.
1:18), i.e., in the proclamation ofHis kingdom as it has already come and comes."64
"Still", Werpehowski contends, "the decisive word may include a political
witness" which might be a form of socialism and which "would correspond to the
Kingdom by realizing to some greater degree the humanization and hence fellow
humanity of work."65 Barth's call for counter-movements to champion "the weak
against any kind of encroachment on the part of the strong" demonstrates in fact a
"preferential option for the poor".66 His understanding thus encourages the Church
to see that what Ramadan is proposing is in fact a counter-movement, specifically for
Muslims, of the type Barth advocates and one that should be supported by the
Church. This understanding "completes and does not jeopardize the commended
community ofmutual assistance; for those who are most marginalized and powerless
to take part in communal life are cherished and honoured as the human creatures they
f\7
are through special efforts to enable and empower them to participate in this way".
The War Against Terrorism
On the issues of citizenship, nationality and religion, Ramadan supports the idea of
nation-state citizenship; he formulates his support of this around the principle of an
agreed treaty between the state and the individual taking an oath. In defence of this
view Ramadan observes that "there is absolutely no contradiction in that matter
between their citizenship and their being Muslims: the law allows them to act in this
Commutative Justice", in The Annual of the Society ofChristian Ethics 1985 (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 1986), 101-22.
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sense, their faith commands it". Where and when a conflict of interest occurs
between an individual's Muslim identity and national duty, Ramadan refers to an
interpretation in secular legislation commonly called "the clause of conscience".69
He suggests that when religious beliefs and national identity conflict, one should
become a passive non-participant, as illustrated by the principle of "conscientious
objection" in times of war.70 He writes: "This principle has to be respected
individually in every situation when it appears clear that the grounds for war have
nothing to do with the defence of justice, regardless of the identity and religion of
the foe."71 "Thus", he writes, "concerning western legislation, the scope of
permission is wider than that of compulsion. Nevertheless, it could happen that
citizenship would lead someone to face or feel a great tension between their faith,
72their conscience, and the duties related to their nationality." He appeals to this
conscience with regard to the current war against terrorism:
In the name of the war against terrorism, anything, or almost anything,
goes. Hundreds of Muslims are imprisoned without trial in the United
States, antiglobalization activists are under surveillance, cross-border
travel is restricted, civil liberties are curtailed, and, on the
international level, the repressive policies of Sharon and Putin are met
with silence and eyes are closed to the behavior of our Saudi and
Pakistani allies. This is all said to be to protect us from 'those who do
not like our civilization and our freedom.' Muslims of conscience
living within the West must have the courage to say that this is not
true and that if terrorism really is unacceptable, war must be declared
on all forms of terrorism, particularly state terrorism, and priority must
be given to dealing with its causes.7
Barth's attitude to war would surely encourage solidarity between the Church
and Ramadan on this issue: Werpehowski contends that Barth exposes "the self-
congratulatory realities of war and statecraft which can be hidden within and behind
ideologies that tend to render war ordinary, inevitable, righteous without
qualification, and, in one case, not utterly horrible".74 So the Church ought to stress
how killing in war challenges, "not merely for individuals but for millions of men,
!M
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the whole of morality, or better, obedience to the command of God in all its
dimensions".75 Christians ought not to assure the state that in the exercise of power
"the state and its organs may do gaily and confidently whatever it thinks is right".76
They can in this context only make a "detached and delaying movement" that calls
"for peace right up to the very last moment", and encourages the state "to fashion
77
peace in such a way that life is served and war is kept at bay".
The Church, for Barth, "is not commissioned to proclaim that war is
absolutely avoidable. But it is certainly commissioned to oppose the satanic doctrine
that war is inevitable and therefore justified, that it is unavoidable and therefore right
no
when it occurs, so that Christians have to participate in it." On the contrary, by
refusing to "howl with the pack", by seeking peaceably "to keep war at bay", and
more generally by trying in political life to construct true peace in international
relations in conformity with normative humanity, Christians act to enable
79discernment of when war is, tragically, morally necessary. Hence Werpehowski is
right in his interpretation of Barth when Werpehowski argues that: "the Christian
ought to unmask false and inadequate reasons for war. He or she should contribute
to a peace which does not lead to war, and to peaceable measures to restrain recourse
to war when it threatens."80
Barth's unfinished ethics of reconciliation states that government "is not just
the establishment and exercise of the right among men but also, for the sake of this,
the establishment of sovereignty and dominion and the exercise of power and force
o 1
by man over man". However, the vain human struggle to live a "lordless" life can
find expression in the perversion and reversal of this order such that "no state of any
kind is or has or will be immune to the tendency to become at least a little Leviathan.
The threat of a change from the might of right to the right of might couches at the
R9
door of every polity." As a response to humanity's tendency to live a lordless life
75 Ibid., 238 citing CD III/4, 275.
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that justifies the "right of might" by governments, the Church, in the light of Barth's
understanding of political power before God, ought to make common cause with
Ramadan over the current war against terrorism. While the Christian community
from Barth's perspective refuses to rule out war in principle, it should incessantly
pose critical questions, and should support genuine peace in the Gulf and Middle
East regions while opposing the ideology of war which drives this current conflict
both at home and abroad. "Modern War and Christian Conscience" writes:
Being against war . . . means opposing the idea that war is "necessary"
or "inevitable", and that peace is not "possible" ... it means opposing
the idea that wars are waged for noble motives: to restore a universal
order of justice and peace or simply to make amends for injustices.
For at most these noble motives - which some people do not lack - in
most cases provide a juridical and moral cover for the true reasons of
war: political domination and economic interest. In other words, to
oppose the "ideology of war" means to do what is needed to unmask
war by showing it as it really is by uncovering its motives and results,
by demonstrating that it is always the poor and the weak who pay for
war, whether they wear a military uniform or belong to the civilian
population.83
A secular parable of the Kingdom of God?
The discussion in this chapter so far has focused principally on demonstrating points
of contact between Ramadan and Barth. But can one press this further and suggest
ways in which the Church might learn something new or forgotten about its own
faith from this encounter with a Muslim scholar?
It was noted in Chapter 3 that, for Barth, secular words, which are distinct
from that of Jesus Christ, are "true" insofar as they stand "in the closest material and
substantial conformity and agreement with the one Word of God".84 But, as
Fergusson notes, they must "be tested by reference to scripture, the confessional
83 See "Modern War and Christian Conscience", in Moral Issues and Christian Response, fifth edn,
ed. P. T. Jersild and D. A. Johnson (Fort Worth, Tex.: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), 231-2 as
cited by Werpehowski, "Karl Barth and politics", 239. "Modern War and Christian Conscience", is
the English translation of the editorial "Conscienza Cristiana e Guerra Moderna", in La civilta
Cattolica, 142 (6th July 1991), 3-16. See also "Modern War and Christian Conscience", Origins, 19th
December 1991,450-5.
84 CD IV/3, 111.
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traditions of the church, and the upbuilding of its common life". Their use will
always be provisional and carried out on an ad hoc and ephemeral basis. Free words
from outside of the Church's orbit are always context-specific, coming to the Church
in a specific time and situation. Furthermore, their reception by the Church is never,
in practice, an affair of the whole community. This is because, Barth argues, "the
right use of. . . free communications of the Lord can never be regarded as other than
extraordinary"; secular parables "cannot be fixed and canonized as the Word of the
Of
Lord". Ramadan's work comes specifically to the European Church today as a
parable of the Kingdom of God calling for renewed humility, repentance and revision
of doctrine.
Humility
For Ramadan, the opening of Islam to democracy and tolerance must be drawn
deeply from it own sacred texts. Even though there is one Islam, there are "diverse
ways" of living it and, while all Muslims adhere to its fundamental principles, there
is "an important margin allowed for evolution, transformation, and adaptation to
87various social and cultural environments". From this perspective, Western
Muslims, "because they are undergoing the experience of becoming established in
new societies", have no choice but to go back to the original sources to distinguish
what is unchangeable (thabit) and what can be subject to change (mutaghayyir) in
Islam.88 Ramadan begins this journey by providing a spiritual definition of
Islam based on tawhid (the absolute oneness of God) upon which he builds
everything else: "to understand Islam is to grasp the meaning and significance
OQ
of the multiple dimensions of tawhid". He writes: "[t]he first and most important
element ... is faith, which is the intimate sign that one believes in the Creator
without associating anything with Him. This is the meaning of the central concept of
tawhid, faith in the oneness of God."90 What is central then to the spirit of Islam is
the human need for God, resulting in humility: "[t]o call on God is not to console
85
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oneself - it is to discover the condition originally wanted for us - the spark of
humility, the awareness of fragility".91
Ramadan's work illustrates that Islam has a long and continuing tradition of
Qur'anic exegesis: "It is essentially the ways of reading the Qur'an that distinguish
the various trends of thought among Muslims ... we find a diversity of readings . . .
that can be attributed principally to the greater or lesser role the human intellect is
allowed to play and, consequently, to the scope for interpretation that is permitted as
an integral part of the Islamic field of reference."92 He identifies at least "six major
tendencies" as hermeneutical frameworks: scholastic traditionalism, salafi literalism,
salafi reformism, political literalist salafism, liberal or rationalist reformism and
Sufism.93 The point Ramadan makes in doing this is that contemporary Islam's
situation is far more complex and the boundaries far more subtle than "the dualistic
simplistic readings of the situation that set the liberals over and against all the rest -
the radicals and the fundamentalists".94 Yet he is keen to point out that even with
this diversity, "Islam is one and presents a body of opinion whose essential axes are
identifiable and accepted by the various trends or schools of thought, in spite of their
great diversity."95
This is a reminder to the Church that it too has a long and complex
history of scriptural exegesis and faithful interpretation from people of widely
varying perspectives and contexts but who all claim the sole Lordship of Christ.
Ramadan's call for humility to the Muslim world is an echo of the call to the
Church for humility as it deals today with many hermeneutical issues, in
particular a call for humility, in the face of schism, to the different factions




93 See ibid., 24-30.
94 Ibid., 28.
95 Ibid., 23.
96 At the Church of Scotland's General Assembly of 2007 a report on human sexuality was presented
entitled "A Challenge to Unity". At a subsequent fringe meeting hosted by OneKirk on the 21st May
2007 the report was discussed. Present on the panel was Dr Barbara Wheeler, the president of Auburn
Theological Seminary, New York. She was the Presbyterian Church (USA) representative to the
General Assembly. During one of her contributions she mentioned the journey she had undertaken
with the "Theological Task Force on Peace, Unity and Purity of the Church", a group created by the
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Repentance
In his Gunning lecture, Migliore insightfully points out that Islam actually calls for
rigorous adherence to the first commandment of the Decalogue: "[y]ou shall have no
other gods before me" (Ex.20:3).97 Indeed the faith of Islam in the sole lordship of
God echoes the central Jewish confession or Shema: "Hear, O Israel: the Lord is our
God is Lord, the Lord alone" (Deut.6:4). It also calls to mind the first of the two love
commandments of Jesus: "you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and
with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength" (Mk. 12:29).
213th General Assembly (2001) of the Presbyterian Church (PCUSA), to discover ways that the
Church could live more faithfully in the face of deep disagreements. The final report of the task force,
as approved by the 217th General Assembly (2005), identified one major area of disagreement to be
that of "Sexuality and Ordination" (See the Theological Task Force's final report available from
http://www.pcusa.org/peaceunitypurity/finalreport/final-report-revised-english.pdf., especially page
18). Dr Wheeler shared that members of the working group, while holding in some cases opposing
views on human sexuality and its consequent implications for ordination and marriage, were able to
learn from each other about the consequences of their attitudes and actions. As a whole the task force
came to see that the state of disagreement felt within the denomination was as a consequence of their
"mutual stereotyping and misuse of power" which in turn failed "to offer a suffering world a sign of
the peace, unity, and purity that is God's gift to us in Jesus Christ" (ibid., 12). The report continues:
"As we observed the disciplines of listening and reflection that became foundational in the task force
process, we heard more than the echoes of our sins of omission and commission. We also heard the
gospel anew and felt the spirit of Christ in the words and deeds of our fellow task force members.
Repeatedly, we found ourselves moved and impressed by the depth and truth of statements made by
our colleagues, including those whose backgrounds and experiences are very different from our own.
Most surprisingly, our faith was enriched and strengthened by the contributions of those whose views
on contested issues we do not share" (ibid., 13). However, not all differences were overcome in the
group. Most members still held the views and perspectives that they had brought to the task force, but
all had been "greatly enriched and changed" by their work together (ibid., 13). In a study paper
prepared for the task group, Johnson examined seven viewpoints on same-gender relationships,
considering each of them in relationship to the doctrines of creation, reconciliation, and redemption.
The study also considered some of the biblical arguments used to support each of the seven positions.
The seven view points were divided into the non-affirming ones of prohibition, toleration and
accommodation, legitimation as a critique of the non-affirming viewpoints, and the welcoming and
affirming viewpoints of celebration, liberation and consecration (see William Stacy Johnson "Same-
Gender Relationships in the Church: Seven Theological Viewpoints", a study paper prepared for the
Theological Task Force on Peace, Unity and the Purity of the Church,
http://www.pcusa.org/peaceunitypurity/finalreport/seventheologicalviewpoints.pdf. See also William
Stacy Johnson, Time to Embrace: Same-Gender Relationships in Religion, Law, and Politics (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006). In the conclusion of Johnson's study he writes: "for thirty years this issue
has roiled the church. It has left many people wounded. Somehow we must find a way to move
forward together without further wounding. What should be clear from this study is that the issues at
stake are not simple; they are quite complex. My hope is that in working through these seven
positions, the church will discover that, though we disagree, we are still speaking the same language,
still worshiping the same Lord" (Johnson, "Same-Gender Relationships in the Church: Seven
Theological Viewpoints", 107). The experience of this theological task force is an example from
which all in the Church global can leam - it exemplifies a spirit of humility amongst its members who
recognize the unity of God's people even within their diversity.
97 See Daniel Migliore, "The Different Power of God: the Witness of Christianity and Islam".
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In the midst of the Confessing Church's struggle in Nazi Germany, Barth
called the first commandment the axiom (or foundational principal) of Christian
theology.98 He writes:
Essentially, [the first commandment] is not only something God says
about himself, perhaps about God's uniqueness or that there are no
other gods before God. It is not only a revelation of divine truth. It is
essentially a command of God to the Israelite who is personally
addressed. God not only designates himself as lord but acts as such by
demanding, commanding and forbidding: "You shall have no other
gods before me!"99
For Barth this commandment not only tells a person that there is a Lord, but
that he/she has a Lord; he/she has a Lord whether he/she obeys or not. There can be
no room for serving two masters: there is only one Lord. In Barth's context of pre¬
war Europe he was afraid that Church was not bold enough to be the Church in the
face of Nazi totalitarianism and ecclesial authoritarianism.100 He asserts:
"You shall have no other gods before me!" I think and speak with
theological responsibility when I know myself to be responsible to
that commandment in what I think and speak as a theologian; when I
perceive that responsibility as a responsibility to an authority above
which there is no appeal, because it is itself the last and highest, the
absolutely decisive authority. "You shall have no other gods before
Christians might just be able to hear in Ramadan's affirmation of humility
before the sole lordship of God a call for repentance today in a similar way to Barth's
call for repentance in the 1930's, in response to the failure to practice an
uncompromising rejection of idolatry. The Church has to query continually
interpretations of Christian faith that use it for nationalistic, racist, or class purposes.
Might it have something to learn from the warning of Islam not to associate any
creature or any power with the one and only Lord? Is there sometimes confusion
between Christian faith and uncritical allegiance to the state? Might the idea that
98 Karl Barth, "The First Commandment as an Axiom of Theology", in The Way of Theology in Karl









civilized western democracy is locked in a "clash of civilisations" with Islam,
1 09
function as a way of idolising western democracy? The words of H. Richard
Niebuhr, American theologian of the last century, are still timely:
Christians were tempted in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
perhaps more than previous times, to consider themselves first of all
as members of national and cultural societies rather than of the church
and to turn Christian faith into an auxiliary of civilization. But the
temptation and the tendency to anthropocentrism are universal . . .
For faith in the God of Jesus Christ is a rare thing and faith in idols
1
tends forever to disguise itself as Christian trust.
Steven Kepnes points out that "since 9/11, a formulation that has significantly
shaped academic and popular discourse on the relationship between contemporary
Islam and the West is that 'Islam' and the 'West' are two entities that are completely
and fundamentally alien to each other".104 "This, in turn", he argues "means that
perpetual conflict between the two entities is not only inevitable but also natural."105
In contrast to this, Kepnes believes that there is "an intimate philosophical,
cultural, and religious affinity" between "Islam" and the "West".106 As has already
been stated, both share a commitment to Scripture and its study. Both are also
"facing daunting challenges brought on by global capitalism, consumerism,
environmental disasters and increasing ethnic and religious tensions."107 Kepnes
continues: "The reality is that the West is also plagued by the conflict of
fundamentalisms and secularization" it chooses to project into the Islamic world.108
Hence Kepnes is right when he argues that the "West" should engage Islam in
attempts "to address the large issues of religion, secularism and war that together are
plaguing the planet."109 In this the Church should recognize that it has a part to play,
initially by recognizing the need to repent for "acts of violence perpetrated in the
name of religion" by some of its members.110
102 Steve Kepnes, "A Handbook for Scriptural Reasoning", Modem Theology, 22.3 (July 2006), 379.
103 H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning ofRevelation (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2001), 34.
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Ramadan affirms that, "[m]any groups of specialists have been formed in
recent years. At colloquia, conferences, and seminars, they meet to try to build
bridges, discuss sensitive subjects, and prevent conflicts. With time, these specialists
in dialogue have come to know one another and to enjoy excellent relationships
founded on courtesy and respect. This is an important gain."111 However, he
correctly identifies the heart of the problem when he argues that "these are fairly
closed circles whose members are not always in real contact with their own religious
groups, and this makes it difficult to convey to the heart of each religious community
the advances made in these numerous meetings".112 Whole sections of these
communities are neither concerned with nor touched by the various dialogues that
are taking place. This is because "those who meet do not represent the various
denominations, schools of thought, or tendencies of the adherents of their religion. . .
. [Tjhose who hold the most closed opinions, which in daily life are the cause of the
real problem, never meet".113 Thus the situation arises where "ordinary believers
meet only rarely and the most entrenched and radical views are never voiced".114
Ramadan calls for "mediators between . . . partners in dialogue and their
coreligionists",115 observing:
It is a question of listening to the other side, challenging it and
questioning it in order to increase understanding and then of getting
involved in working within one s own community, informing,
explaining, even teaching. At the same time, participants in dialogue
should express their own convictions, clarify the place of their own
sense of religion among other views held within their religious family,
and respond as well as they can to the questions of their partners in
dialogue. By acting in this way they create, between the various
traditions, areas of trust, sustained by shared convictions and values
that, even though they certainly do not bring the extremes together, do
open real horizons for living together and at least allow ruptures to be







This is a reminder to the Church of the hope for peace it possesses for the
world through its mandate to mediate and build bridges at grass roots level. One way
it can do this is by endorsing the work of groups such as the Scriptural Reasoning
Theory Group. This group provides a space for members of Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam to read and study their respective scriptures together. One aspiration of
this group, which goes someway to address Ramadan's criticism, is to promote this
practice in the public sphere. As David F. Ford writes:
... we are in a multi-faith and secular world and . . . secular
worldviews and principles have no right to monopolise the public
sphere in the name of neutrality, . . . we need ways of forming the sort
of "mutual ground" that allows each tradition to contribute from their
core belief, understanding and practice. That requires many bilateral
and multilateral engagements, and among those is trilateral dialogue
between Jews, Christians and Muslims.117
Ford, in many ways echoing Stout, is right in seeing the public sphere as a
place where these faith groups can work out "the considerable ethical and political
implications of their scriptures; and a place to encourage analogous practices among
Jews, Christians and Muslims in positions of public responsibility".118 This mutually
critical engagement could transform the public sphere "for the better": "For Jews,
Christians and Muslims committed to this the best way forward is through
simultaneously going deeper into their own scriptures and traditions, deeper into
wisdom-seeking conversation with each other and with all who have a stake in the
public good, and deeper into activity dedicated to the common good."119
One particular promise of scriptural reasoning which the Church could
confidently endorse from Barth's perspective is "the formation of people through
collegial study, wise interpretation and friendship who might be exemplary citizens
of the twenty-first century, seeking the public good for the sake of God and God's
117 David F. Ford, "An interfaith wisdom. Scriptural Reasoning between Jews, Christians and





peaceful purposes".120 In this way, "Christian-Muslim reconciliation" might just be
fostered.121
Revision of Doctrine
David Burrell contends that Ramadan's stress on tahwid should also serve to remind
the Church that "the primary reason it took four centuries to clarify the central
Christian affirmation of faith in Jesus (via Nicea and Chalcedon) was the shema"\
Muslim denial of a bowdlerized version of "trinity" should remind us
of the centuries-long struggle our tradition went through, in the face of
a plurality of contending to locate Jesus, to be faithful to shema:
"God our God is one and there is no other besides him".122
But this struggle is not over. Muslim rejection of the Trinity should
encourage the Church to revisit this doctrine continually as it is central to the
Church's own "hermeneutical framework for interpreting the biblical drama of
i
salvation." Migliore believes, quoting Carl E. Braaten, that "an increasing number
of theologians agree that 'the significance of the doctrine of the Trinity for Christian
theology of world religions remains vastly underdeveloped' ".124 One such
theologian is Christoph Schwobel.
In his essay "Particularity, Universality and the Religions: Towards a
Christian Theology of Religions", Schwobel considers "the unity though not
1 9S
uniformity of God's action". In God's revelation, God's creative, reconciling and
saving agency is disclosed by God as "the ground of possibility of the human
1 96
response to faith". The Trinity preserves an emphasis on the particularity of the
divine action because it establishes the "history and destiny of the particular first
120 Ibid. In many respects this is an endorsement of Klappert's argument that Barth's dream of "a
theology of the Holy Spirit" should be an ecumenical and inter-religious one. See chapter 5.
121
Lindsay, Barth, Israel and Jesus: Karl Barth's Theology ofIsrael, ix.
122 David Burrell, "Christians, Muslims (and Jews) before the One God: Jean Danielou on Mission
Revisited", Interpretation, 61 (2006), 38-39.
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Ibid., 316. See also Carl E Braaten, No Other Gospel!: Christianity among the World's Religions
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1992), 7.
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century Jew, Jesus of Nazareth" as the "foundational event in which God
identified himself with humanity".128 It also embraces the work of the Spirit who
particularises this action in the lives of particular people. The same doctrine also
retains the idea of universality because it posits the Triune God as the Creator of the
world. Consequently, Schwobel writes:
the whole of reality is seen as determined by God's creative,
reconciling, and saving agency in such a way that God's action is the
condition for the possibility of all natural processes and all human
activity. Therefore no part of reality can be excluded from the sphere
of God's activity and presence, and every form of knowledge relies on
God as the ground of its possibility and as the source of its truth.129
Schwobel claims that this appeal to the doctrine of the Trinity has two
principal implications for Christianity's encounter with other religions. Firstly, in
drawing attention to the particularity of "this specific God", the doctrine of the
Trinity demands that Christian theologians of religions "overcome" any attempt to
subsume "particular religions", such as Christianity, under a general notion of
"religion" and invites them instead to "create a genuine appreciation of the
particularity" of other religions.130 On this basis he suggests that "Christian theology
can only protest with credibility against the reductionist and reinterpretative
conceptions of Christian faith which threaten to compromise its particularity if it
adopts the same attitude toward other religions."131 The doctrine of the Trinity
points to the particularity of God's action, so that whenever it is recognised,
including within the context of a non-Christian religion, it will be in a particular
form. This excludes the theological possibility of talking about "a plurality of








132 Ibid., 39. In two other studies, Jacques Dupuis and Mark Heim also contribute to the development
of a trinitarian theology ofworld religions (See Jacques Dupuis, Toward a Christian Theology of
Religious Pluralism (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1997); S. Mark Heim, The Depth ofthe Riches: A
Trinitarian Theology ofReligious Ends (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005)). Like Schwobel, Dupuis
and Heim are committed to the uniqueness of God's work of salvation in Jesus Christ. They also
share the conviction that other religions have a positive place within the providence ofGod. All three
agree that all religious traditions must be considered in their particularity and concreteness, and.
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Secondly, in drawing attention to the universality of God's action, the
doctrine of the Trinity invites Christians to approach other religions not as beyond
the scope of God's universal presence and action but as included within the reality
that is "determined by God". Faith in God as the source of all truth and the condition
of all knowledge is for Christians the "basis for . . . the confidence that the truths
they may encounter in inter-religious dialogue are also grounded in the Spirit of truth
and are therefore not ultimately incompatible with the truths Christians hold as
expressions of the response of faith to the self-disclosure of God in Christ".133
Here, Schwobel indicates a possible way of re-envisioning the Trinity, which
is still sympathetic to Barth's perspective, while acknowledging the diversity of
God's action in both Christianity and Islam and recognising the sole Lordship ofGod
in both.
consistent with this emphasis, that a trinitarian understanding of God must be the centrepiece of a
Christian theology of the religions. Dupuis focuses on a trinitarian doctrine of the Holy Spirit. He
contends that the Holy Spirit is active not only in the lives of individuals of other religious traditions
but also in these religious traditions themselves. The Spirit of God is universally present and active,
both anticipating the event of Jesus Christ and subsequently extending his salvific work beyond the
Church. According to Dupuis, "the Spirit spreads throughout the world, vivifying all things" (Dupuis,
Toward a Christian Theology ofReligions Pluralism, 243). This cosmic work of the Spirit is to sow
the seeds of the Word in all cultures and traditions. As the only Son of God, the work of Christ has
saving significance for all of humanity, but, according to Dupuis, the Christ-event does not "exhaust"
God's saving power (ibid., 83, 298). The trinitarian reality ofGod is the basis of both the actuality
and the theological legitimacy of religious pluralism. In God's providence, and through the various
religious traditions, all human beings tend to the ultimate goal of communion with the Triune God
(ibid., 313). While the grace of God in Jesus Christ is rightly called "constitutive" for the salvation of
all, other religious traditions and their practices "can mediate secretly the grace offered by God in
Jesus Christ and express the human response to God's gratuitous gift in him" (ibid., 303). From
Barth's perspective, Heim's position is closer to that of Schwobel's. For Heim, a trinitarian theology
of the religions upholds the Christian claim of the universal and constitutive significance of Jesus
Christ for salvation. It also affirms the possibility and necessity of attending to the particularity of
religious traditions and of being able to discern the work ofGod in them. Accordingly, the Triune
God is unfathomably rich and includes difference within the divine unity. Because of "the depth of
riches" of the Triune God, religions other than Christianity may offer ways to realize a particular
dimension of the life of the Triune God even if they do not offer the fullness of salvation that consists
in participation in the trinitarian life of communion. For Heim, each "religion's end involves relation
to a particular aspect of the triune divine life" (Heim, The Depth of the Riches: A Trinitarian Theology
ofReligious Ends, 268). Seeing the religions in a trinitarian light, Heim concludes that religions
belong to the providential will ofGod. Where Schwobel excludes the possibility of a plurality of
revelations, the religions for Heim offer an eternal pluralism of religious ends that befit "the depth of
the riches" of the divine life, and at the same time constitute penultimate paths to salvation in the
distinctively Christian sense of communion with the Triune God. In this sense Schwobel follows





Ramadan's work illustrates that there is a basis in Islam's own resources for open,
pluralistic societies dedicated to the democratic ideals of justice, peace, and the
equality of persons. What is important for the Church to realize is that, as it engages
in new encounter with Islam, it is itself called to be open once again to reform by the
living Word of God.
Christians are called to relate to Muslims in the confidence that God's grace
is present even where it is not recognized as such. But this requires an openness to
the working of the Word and Spirit of God beyond the boundaries of the Church.
For many members of the Church this is counter-intuitive and counter-cultural. Most
Christians, even those moving in "un-churched" circles such as the Emerging Church
Movement, still use the modernist paradigm of Church/un-Churched, Christian/non-
Christian, which emphasises the secular nature of society but either downplays or
simply ignores its pluralist nature.
To be sure, the Word of God addresses the Church by the power of the Spirit
through the proclamation of the Gospel and the celebration of the sacraments. But as
Barth's writings show, the Word also addresses the Church in the presence and the
voice of the other and the stranger. The question is whether the Church is humble
enough to listen to the other, and whether, when appropriate, it shows a readiness to
repent and reform. In the encounter with Muslims such as Ramadan, Christians
should be willing to listen as well as to speak, to be open to receive fresh insight and
deeper understandings of Islam, and to learn and be reminded of their own faith from
this other world faith.
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CONCLUSION
The quest at the heart of this thesis has been to investigate the extent to which Karl
Barth's theology is useful for furthering inter-faith encounter with Muslims in the
context of contemporary Europe. This is currently an issue of deep significance,
given on the one hand the importance of seeking peace and reconciliation between
these two world faiths, and on the other hand the stature of Barth in the theological
world.
Lindsay quotes Cobb as suggesting that inter-faith encounter can occur at five
distinct levels:
1. There is Christian theological reflection that shows that in principle
a dialogical relation to other religious communities is appropriate. 2.
There is actual participation in such dialogue and promotion of it. 3.
There is reflection about what happens in dialogue and how it can be
improved. 4. There is the interpretation of other religious
communities that encourages dialogue and shares its fruits. 5. There
is clarification of the role and importance of dialogue in the total
human situation.1
Lindsay is right to suggest that Barth was essentially uninterested in the third
and fifth of these levels and, insofar as Barth attempted to engage in critical
interpretation of other religions, notably Judaism, Lindsay is also right to suggest that
Barth "was woefully simplistic and at times derogatory".2 Indeed Kiing identifies the
way in which Barth construes two central Christian doctrines as problematic to such
an endeavour:
. . . the dominant feature is still a doctrine of the Trinity and a
Christology which are remote from their Jewish roots, and built
entirely on the Hellenistic councils of the early church. This is a
dogmatics of the kind for which Karl Barth most recently once again
laid the foundations in the Prolegomena to his Church Dogmatics, and
which was then developed in what is beyond doubt a magnificent way
in his Doctrine of the Reconciliation. But on the basis of a dogmatics
1
Lindsay, Barth, Israel and Jesus: Karl Barth's Theology ofIsrael, 107, quoting John B. Cobb,
"Inter-religious Dialogue, World Ethics and the Problem of the Humanum", in Hans Kiing: New
horizons for Faith and Thought, ed. K. J. Kuschel and H. Haring (New York: Continuum, 1993), 283.
2 Ibid.
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which begins with the "triune God" and "God the Son", a dialogue
with Jews [and Muslims] is hardly possible.3
The fact is that Barth himself does not in any case regard dogmatic theology
as a suitable site of inter-religious encounter. For Barth, dogmatic theology has a
different purpose altogether. As he writes in the first part-volume of the Church
Dogmatics, "dogmatics is not a free science. It is bound to the sphere of the Church,
where alone it is possible and meaningful."4 Similarly, in Dogmatics in Outline,
Barth stresses that:
... the subject of dogmatics is the Christian Church. The subject of a
science can only be one in which the object and sphere of activity in
question are present and familiar. Therefore it is no limitation and no
vilification of the concept of dogmatics as a science to say that the
subject of this science is the Church. It is the place, the community,
charged with the object and the activity with which dogmatics is
concerned - namely, the proclamation of the Gospel . . . The man
[sic] who seeks to occupy himself with dogmatics and deliberately
puts himself outside the Church would have to reckon with the fact
that for him the object of dogmatics would be alien."
Yet, having recognised this, it is important to understand that Barth's
dogmatic theology departs from the Reformed tradition over the question of Christ's
reconciling work. His understanding of election and reconciliation is far more open
than those that were proposed by many of his Reformed predecessors: for Barth all
humanity and not just some are eternally elected in Christ.6 This is of fundamental
importance to Christian inter-religious encounter and should enable scholars to
appropriate his work for such encounter.7
3 Hans Kiing, Judasim: the Religious Situation ofOur Time, trans. J. Bowden (London: SCM, 1992),
316. See also Kiing, Islam: Past Present and Future, 503.
4 CD 1/1, xiii.
5 Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, 9-10.
6
Greggs correctly understands that what is important for Barth "is that the Christian cannot view the
non-Christian [religious other] as anything other than the person for whom God elected, who is
elected in Christ" (Tom Greggs, " 'Jesus is victor': passing the impasse of Barth on universalism",
Scottish Journal ofTheology, 60.2 (2007), 212). This view consequently holds potential for inter-
religious encounter, as Greggs notes when he writes, "Christ stands at the door and knocks: but in the
power of his resurrection, he makes his way into locked rooms" (ibid.).
7
The normative Reformed tradition, ofwhich Barth was an inheritor understood Christ's work of
reconciliation has having only limited efficacy. In the words ofOlevianus: "The sacrifice ofChrist, so
perfect in itself, is both by the eternal counsel ofGod and by the high-priestly intercession ofChrist
himself, appointed only for those whom the Son of God has awakened to faith. . . . Hence although
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The potential to use Barth's work as a resource for inter-religious encounter
is further illustrated by Lindsay, who suggests that Barth was in fact "both interested
and involved in principled dialogue with Jewish contemporaries", and that he
regarded "Christian-Jewish conversation as fundamentally ingredient to the very
being of the Church". As Chapter 5 has shown, it was simply time that prevented
him from further investigating other world faiths.
Barth was deeply committed to the necessary Jewishness of Jesus, and to the
covenantal bond of grace that binds both Israel and the Church to God and to each
other. Chapter 5 has argued that this mutual dependency and ontological unity
between Church and Synagogue should be extended to include Mosque. Muslims,
Jews and Christians are mutually dependent upon one another because of their
ontological unity in God's grace. Integral to any Christian participation in inter-
religious encounter with the other Abrahamic faiths has to be the understanding that
this ontological unity incorporates a responsibility for all three faiths to strive
together for justice and peace. But this responsibility must also recognise the
particularity of each religious tradition.
Barth's work is therefore not a comprehensive "theology of religions" or even
a "theology of religious traditions". It is a theological resource for a particular type
Christ has suffered sufficienter for all, he has done so efficaciter only for the elect" (G. Olevianus, De
Substantia Foederis Gratuiti inter Deum et electos itemque de mediis, quibus ea ipsa substantia nobis
eommunieatur, libri duo (Geneva, 1585), 67-68 as cited in H. Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: set out
and illustratedfrom the sources, trans G. T. Thomson (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1950), 475).
In 1936, the French Reformed pastor Pierre Maury delivered a lecture at the "Congres internationale
de theologie calviniste" in Geneva. This lecture would push Barth in a different direction to his
Reformed heritage. Maury argued that outside Jesus Christ it is impossible to know anything of either
the electing God or of His elect, and that both election and reprobation were properly understood only
in the context of the cross (P. Maury, "Erwahlung und Glaube", Theologische Studien, 8 (Zurich:
EVZ, 1940)). Lindsay suggests the central thesis ofMaury's paper was three-fold: "first, that there is
no election without rejection; second, that the decision of God to reject can be affirmed as a
theological truth only on the basis of the cross; third, that if our election is in Christ (and if the first
two assertions are correct), then our rejection has been taken by Christ upon himself. In other words,
the only sense in which 'double predestination' is true is in the fact of its content - election and
rejection - being fully realized in Christ" (Lindsay, Barth, Israel and Jesus: Karl Barth's Theology of
Israel, 89-90). Barth was convinced by Maury's argument so much so that in the very structure of his
Church Dogmatics, he insists that covenantal election is the basis and presupposition of reconciliation.
Jesus, says Barth, "suffered also for [his enemies]." Yet, we are all God's enemies. Thus "the
contrast between the elect (us) and the damned (them) can continue to concern us only humourously"
(Karl Barth, The Heidelberg Catechismfor Today, trans. S.C. Guthrie, (London: The Epworth Press,
1964), 82).
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Lindsay, Barth, Israel and Jesus: Karl Barth's Theology ofIsrael, 107.
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of inter-religious encounter. It is an explicitly Christian theological resource which
inevitably constructs occurrences of extra-ecclesial truth on its own terms. As
Thompson correctly observes:
... in general terms it is impossible not to work within the terms of a
particular tradition, and some violation of [the other's] self-
understanding is inevitable. Moreover . . . attempts to adopt any
tradition-free position are largely illusory.9
Hence this thesis has been about appropriating Barth's work to see if, in
Cobb's words, "one can integrate the wisdom of alien traditions into one's Christian
vision".10 Cobb is right when he suggests that "[t]his is not easy and there is no
simple recipe".11 But this type of endeavour "is faithful to Christ and precedented in
our history".12 In the secularism and pluralism of modern Europe, Cobb is correct to
consider "whether there are any norms that transcend this diversity, norms that are
appropriately applied to all".13 He is also correct to surmise that "one such norm . . .
is the ability of a tradition in faithfulness to its past to be enriched and transformed in
its interaction with the other traditions".14
Here lies the strength of using Barth's theology as a resource for inter-
religious encounter in the contemporary European context: through the particularity
of their faith, Christians can relate to Muslims in the confidence that the grace of
God made known in Jesus Christ is at work by the power of the Holy Spirit, even
where it is not recognized - beyond the boundaries of the Church.15 Such an
affirmation requires that any encounter between Christians and Muslims must be an
open encounter which can only occur where there is genuine trust.16 Fruitful
encounter can only occur when each faith tradition speaks with clarity and honesty
out of the central logic of its faith. Christians should speak and act in this encounter
9
Thompson, " 'As open to the world as any theologian could be . . .'?: Karl Barth's Account ofExtra-
Ecclesial Truth and Its Value to Christianity's Encounter with Other Religious Traditions", 173.
10





15 See Migliore, "The Different Power ofGod: the Witness ofChristianity and Islam".
16 See Ramadan, Western Muslims and the Future ofIslam, 201.
206
as committed and unashamed Christians; Muslims should do likewise.17 A real
danger lurks in the call to openness in encounter with other religions, especially
when that encounter is undertaken by those alienated from their own faith tradition.
So, in encounter with Islam, Christians should not attempt to hide or avoid their
central doctrines, such as the Trinity, even as Muslims will assuredly refuse to hide
1 R
or avoid theirs; this despite Kiing's fear that "a conversation between Jews and
Muslims on the one hand and Christians on the other" would "ultimately come to
grief on the Christian doctrine of the Trinity".19
Even where there are insuperable impasses on doctrinal matters, opportunities
for co-operation at grassroots level on matters of common concern and commitment
are possible.20 Whilst having a " 'trialogue' on Jesus"21 is an important theological
endeavour, any opportunity for co-operation at grassroots level amongst members of
the Abrahamic faiths is arguably more important than reaching doctrinal agreement
or synthesis. This is an opinion which is fully reconciled to Barth's theology and one
which Lesslie Newbigin describes as "a real and already present fact of life" where
22
"[pjeople of different ultimate commitments are in discussion with one another".
Inter-religious encounter "is not merely the formal dialogue of scholars" but is "the
more elementary matter of day-to-day conversation with our neighbours of other
faiths".23 This is encounter which "is very practical, concerned with the problems of
ordinary life - the social, political, ecological, and, above all the ordinary and
familiar".24 This is an opinion which, this thesis argues, is also shared by "A
17 See Migliore, "The Different Power ofGod: the Witness ofChristianity and Islam".
18 Ibid.
19
Kiing, Islam: Past Present and Future, 503. Ramadan contends that "[w]hat establishes difference
from the other, and consequently the direction and terms of the dialogue that is to be built, is whether
or not there is commitment to the expression of an absolute monotheism" (Ramadan, Western
Muslims and the Future of Islam, 203). But in contrast to Kiing, Ramadan advocates dialogue on the
basis of shared values and teachings if there are difficulties on this central point (which from Barth's
position there clearly is) (ibid).
20 See Migliore, "The Different Power of God: the Witness ofChristianity and Islam". For an
extensive discussion on matters of common concern see Jiirgen Moltmann, "Human Rights, the Rights
ofHumanity and the Rights ofNature", in The Ethics ofWorld Religions and Human Rights, ed. Hans
Kiing and Jiirgen Moltmann (London/Philadelphia: SCM/Trinity Press International, 1990), 120-135.
21
Kiing, Islam: Past Present and Future, 501-3.
22 Lesslie Newbigin, as paraphrased and cited by George R. Hunsberger, Bearing the Witness ofthe
Spirit: Lesslie Newbigin's Theology ofCultural Plurality (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998), 216.
23 Ibid.
24 World Council of Churches, "Guidelines on Dialogue" (Kingston, 1979), in New Directions in
Mission and Evangelization I: Basic Statements 1974-1991, ed. James A. Scherer and Stepehen B.
Bevans (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1992), 13.
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Common Word between Us and You" - an open letter sent by 138 Muslim clerics
and scholars to "[l]eaders of Christian Churches, everywhere" on October 13, 2007.
The letter recognises the love of God and of neighbour as the common ground
between Christianity and Islam - the common ground which should be the basis of
all "future interfaith dialogue" between these two world faiths. The letter also
recognises the need within these world faiths to move beyond "polite ecumenical
dialogue between selected religious leaders" and to work together for justice, peace
and the common good.25 Ford is right when he argues that this perspective on inter¬
faith encounter challenges "Muslims and Christians to live up to their own teachings
and seek political and educational as well as personal ways to do this for the sake of
the common good."26 It also invites people from both world faiths "to go deeper into
77
their own faith at the same time as going deeper into each other's."
Karl Barth's theology can contribute to this understanding of inter-religious
encounter between Christianity and Islam. This thesis has demonstrated how an
encounter between the Church, form Barth's perspective, and Tariq Ramadan might
appear - an encounter which focuses on making common cause between them on
certain issues and values they share in modern secular and pluralistic Europe.
Ramadan's work also speaks to the Church about its own life and purpose by
emerging as a "secular" word of the Kingdom of God at this time, hence potentially
enriching and transforming the Church.
The decisive conclusion then is that the Church, in Barth's view, has the
potential to "be open to transformation by what it learns" from truth claims made by
Muslims, such as Ramadan, who are outside the Church. But in response, the
Church has to decide if it is ready to listen to God's grace as it comes through the
voice of this stranger or indeed through the voice of any other.
25 See "A Common Word Between Us and You", www.acommonword.com.
26 See David F. Ford, "A Common Word Between Us and You: A response by Professor David Ford,
Director of the Cambridge Inter-Faith Programme",
www.divinity.cam.ac.uk/cip/documents/ACommonWorddffoct07_2 002.pdf.
27 Ibid.
28 Cobb, "Beyond Pluralism", 93.
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